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THE MANDATORY PRETRIAL RELEASE
PROVISION OF THE ADAM WALSH ACT
AMENDMENTS: HOW "MANDATORY" IS IT,
AND IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
BRYAN DEARINGERt
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.'
-Justice Louis D. Brandeis
INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2006, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
abduction of Adam Walsh,2 President George W. Bush signed the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 ("AWA" or
I Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice (Honors Program), Civil
Division. The positions taken in this Article are those of the Author, not the
Department of Justice. I am greatly indebted to my amazing wife, Courtney
Dearinger, my brother, Professor Ryan Dearinger, and my colleague, Michelle
Bennett, for their sensible advice and meticulous editing. The mistakes are mine
alone.
' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967).
2 Adam John Walsh was the son of John Walsh, host of the acclaimed television
show America's Most Wanted. About John Walsh, AM. MOST WANTED,
http://www.amw.com/about-amw/john-walsh.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). On July
27, 1981, a stranger abducted six-year-old Adam from a suburban Florida shopping
mall. Id. Two weeks later, law enforcement authorities found Adam's remains in a
canal 120 miles away from his home. Adam Walsh Case Closed After 27 Tortuous
Years, PITISBURGH POST-GAZETIE, Dec. 17, 2008, at Al. Adam's death garnered
national publicity, and his parents soon became prominent advocates for child
victims of violent crime, helping to combat child abduction and exploitation across
the country. See Laura Berman, Locking up Sex Offenders, Throwing Away Key, CHI.
SUN TIMES, May 26, 2010, at C5; Suspect Scrutinized in Slaying of Adam Walsh,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at Al5.
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the "Act").' The Act is a recent addition to an array of laudable
federal programs designed to combat sexual violence and child
exploitation in America.' Its stated purposes are to "protect
children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent
child abuse and child pornography, to promote Internet safety,
and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh and other child crime
victims."' The Act greatly expanded the role of the federal
government in sex offender policy. Among other things, it
created an intricate National Sex Offender Registry and
established a new crime for failing to register;' created a new
federal civil commitment system;' formed regional task forces to
combat the use of the internet to commit crimes against
children;8 made substantive changes to obscenity prohibitions
and sexual abuse, exploitation, and transportation crimes;9
expanded federal jurisdiction over such crimes;'o limited or
removed potential defenses and restricted the scope of discovery
by defendants in certain cases;" and increased statutory
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4 See Press Release, White House, Statement by President George W. Bush upon
Signing H.R. 4472 (July 27, 2006).
6 120 Stat. at 587. Upon its passage, Senator Orrin Hatch described the Act as
"the most comprehensive child crimes and protection bill in our Nation's history."
152 CONG. REC. S8012-02 (daily ed. July 20, 2006). Former Representative Mark
Foley proclaimed: "It used to be that we tracked library books better than we do sex
offenders, but this bill will even that score." 152 CONG. REC. H5725 (daily ed. July
25, 2006).
6 The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"),
42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006) (directing Attorney
General to establish national sex offender registry); 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006)
(establishing SORNA as the federal registration requirements of the Adam Walsh
Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (making failure to register as a sex offender a
federal crime).
18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006); see also United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949,
1965 (2010) (upholding constitutionality of Section 4248 under the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
8 42 U.S.C. § 5771 (2006 & Supp. II).
' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006) (expanding federal crime of kidnapping
to include all instances of crossing state lines or using any means, facility or
instrumentality of interstate commerce during the commission or furtherance of the
kidnapping); 18 U.S.C. § 1465-66 (2006) (expanding obscenity crimes to include
more intrastate conduct).
"o See 18 U.S.C. 1465 (expanding federal jurisdiction to include criminal conduct
occurring entirely within one state).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) (2006 & Supp. III) (establishing new discovery rules
for computer-based child pornography cases).
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minimum and maximum sentences for a variety of offenses. 12
States that do not substantially comply with the Act's provisions
are penalized with a reduction in federal funding."
The AWA also amended the Bail Reform Act of 198414
several significant ways, albeit without a stated purpose or any
supporting congressional findings. Most pertinent to this Article,
a particular provision of AWA Amendments-the undesignated
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)-automatically imposes
certain pretrial release conditions for all persons charged with an
AWA-enumerated offense, even if the district court would find
those conditions unwarranted during a bail hearing." There is
no other provision in American law that predetermines bail
conditions based entirely upon the crime charged.
Although many have debated the post-incarceration
restrictions imposed by the AWA,16 no one questions the
beneficent intentions behind the Act. What has received less
attention, however, is the extent to which the Act, in its zeal to
protect children, may have ignored fundamental constitutional
safeguards routinely afforded criminal defendants at the pretrial
stage.17 Has Congress exalted order at the cost of liberty to those
presumed innocent? This Article addresses that question.
12 Sentences were increased in the following areas: 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (2006
& Supp. II) (sex trafficking of minors by force, fraud, or coercion);
18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2242, 2243 (2006 & Supp. I) (sexual abuse of a minor or ward,
and aggravated sexual abuse of children); 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5) (2006 & Supp. I)
(various forms of abusive sexual contact against minors); 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2006
& Supp. II) (sexual exploitation offenses against children, including attempt and
conspiracy crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 2252B (2006) (using a misleading internet domain
name with the intent to deceive a person into viewing obscene material);
18 U.S.C. § 2258 (2006) (failure to report an incidence of child abuse);
18 U.S.C. § 2260(c)(1) (2006 & Supp. II) (production of sexually explicit depictions of
a minor for importation into the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(1) (2006) (crimes
of violence against minors).
13 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2006). The Attorney General recently extended the
deadline for complying after not a single state had achieved a sufficient level of
compliance as of July 7, 2009. See Kristi Jourdan, States Struggle To Comply with
Sex Offender Database, WASH. TIMEs, July 7, 2009, at Al.
14 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006 & Supp. II).
15 Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). I refer to this provision by its citation or as the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments.
* See infra notes 17, 20, and 23 and accompanying text.
1 See J. Elizabeth McBath, A Case Study in Achieving the Purpose of
Incapacitation-Based Statutes: The Bail Reform Act of 1984 and Possession of Child
Pornography, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 84 (2010) (criticizing various
aspects of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, as amended, including its treatment of child
pornography possession offenses compared to other federal sex crimes against
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To date, seventeen courts have addressed the
constitutionality of the mandatory pretrial release provision of
the AWA Amendments, focusing primarily on the Excessive Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the separation of powers doctrine." One
children, but explaining that "[tihe constitutionality of [the AWA Amendments] is
beyond the scope of this article"); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War
on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435, 472 (2010) (focusing primarily on
the post-incarceration regulation of sex offenders but also noting, in passing, that
due process attacks against the AWA's mandatory bail rules "have received the least
attention by courts and scholars").
18 See United States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 7451512, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011) (finding mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring
conditions of the AWA Amendments facially unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and unconstitutional as-applied under Excessive
Bail Clause of Eighth Amendment); United States v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-RAL,
2010 WL 2179102, at *12 (D.S.D. May 27, 2010) (upholding constitutionality of the
AWA Amendments in first and only reported case involving charges of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child and abusive sexual contact); United States v. Polouizzi, 697
F. Supp. 2d 381, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding mandatory curfew and electronic
monitoring conditions of AWA Amendments unconstitutional under Fifth and
Eighth Amendments as applied to Defendant); United States v. Rondeau, Cr. No. 10-
147-S, 2010 WL 5253847, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 16, 2010) (finding mandatory home
detention and electronic monitoring conditions constitutional as applied to
defendant previously convicted of child kidnapping and indecent assault where
magistrate judge "heard Defendant and considered a number of individualized
factors before imposing his release conditions");United States v. Stephens, No.
CRO9-3037-MWB, 2009 WL 3568668, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 27, 2009) (finding
mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring conditions facially unconstitutional
under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments), motion to revoke order denied, 669 F.
Supp. 2d 960 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (same as to Fifth Amendment), rev'd and remanded,
594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding facial constitutionality of AWA
Amendments on non-constitutional grounds, expressing "no view as to any as-
applied challenge"); United States v. Crites, No. 8:09CR262, 2009 WL 2982782, at *2
(D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2009) (finding mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring
conditions constitutional as applied to Defendant where magistrate judge
specifically "analyzed whether the [disputed] conditions were appropriate for this
Defendant," and properly determined that they were); United States v. Cossey, 637
F. Supp. 2d 881, 892 (D. Mont. 2009) (upholding mandatory curfew and electronic
monitoring conditions on non-constitutional grounds); United States v. Peeples, No.
CR 10-29-M-DWM (D. Mont. Oct. 19, 2010) (upholding AWA Amendments based
entirely on decision in Cossey), affd, 630 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(upholding AWA on non-constitutional grounds); United States v. Merritt, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (D. Neb. 2009) (finding mandatory curfew and electronic
monitoring conditions constituted facial and as-applied violations of Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (D. Neb. 2009)
(same), rev'd in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495 (D. Neb. June 16, 2009); United
States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 977 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (finding same
conditions facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
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additional court has tackled the statutory interpretation question
of whether the mandatory pretrial release provision applies in
blanket fashion to all of the offenses listed in the undesignated
paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B), or if that provision is limited to
crimes committed against actual, as opposed to fictitious, minor
victims. '
This Article analyzes each of those decisions and, by way of
two hypothetical cases, addresses the applicability and
constitutionality of the AWA Amendments.2 0 Part I examines the
(finding mandatory curfew, electronic monitoring, surrender of firearm, and no-
contact conditions facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, but rejecting separation of powers argument); United States v.
Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (finding same conditions of
the AWA Amendments unconstitutional under Fifth and Eighth Amendments as
applied to defendant and also violative of separation of powers doctrine), motion to
revoke order denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated and
remanded, 327 Fed. Appx. 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); United
States. v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 601-02 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (finding mandatory
curfew and electronic monitoring conditions constituted a facial violation of Fifth
Amendment and an as-applied violation of Eighth Amendment); United States v.
Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 20,
2007) (finding mandatory electronic monitoring conditions unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant under the Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment, and
violative of the separation of powers doctrine), motion to revoke order denied, 2008
WL 687203 (D. Kan. March 11, 2008); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (upholding constitutionality of the Amendments);
United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL
3541736, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (same as Vujnovich). Karper, supra, was
decided just as this Article was sent to press.
This Article does not include the circuit decisions in Kennedy, Stephens, and
Peeples in the list of seventeen, as the panels in these cases either applied the
constitutional avoidance doctrine or did not meaningfully address the constitutional
questions raised.
" See United States v. Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283-84 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(holding that the mandatory pretrial release conditions of the Adam Walsh Act were
inapplicable to a case not involving a "minor victim"). But see United States v.
Rizzuti, 611 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970-71 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (holding that AWA
Amendments applied, and term "involves a minor victim" included an undercover
police officer posing as a minor, where underlying charge, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b),
included an attempt provision, and had "been construed by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals ... to include conduct directed by defendants unknowingly at undercover
law enforcement officers"). For reasons explained below, this Article eschews an
exhaustive analysis of the unique ruling in Rizzuti. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
20 This Article focuses on the applicability and constitutionality of the
mandatory pretrial release provision of the AWA Amendments. It does not enter
the debate regarding the perceived harshness of the mandatory registration
requirements, residency restrictions, and increased sentences imposed by the AWA,
nor does it address other potential problems with the Act, such as the
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applicability of the "mandatory" pretrial release conditions of the
AWA Amendments, concluding that the conditions are not as
automatic as Congress may have wished. Part II sets forth a
brief history of the Bail Reform Act and discusses the seminal
constitutional attacks made upon its bail provisions, including
those made in United States v. Salerno.2 1 Part III applies the
lessons learned from Salerno and its progeny to the recent
attacks on the AWA Amendments under the Excessive Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and the separation of powers doctrine. It
concludes that the mandatory pretrial release provision is
facially unconstitutional under the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments or, at the very least, unconstitutional as applied to
the vast majority of defendants charged with an AWA-
enumerated offense, and that the provision violates the
separation of powers doctrine if it has the effect of mandating
detention without any role for the district court in the bail
calculus. Recognizing the lack of political room for meaningful
legislative reform on the criminal war against sex crimes," the
Conclusion of this Article calls instead for Congress to repeal or
redraft the mandatory pretrial release provision of the AWA
Amendments to cure the unconstitutional defects that are
poisoning our criminal justice system at the pretrial stage. In
the alternative, the Conclusion urges Congress to bolster the
legislative record of the Amendments with findings that explain
why mandatory-as opposed to discretionary-conditions are
necessary to fulfill the AWA's goal of protecting children from
sexual exploitation and violent crime.
constitutionality of § 2250(a) of SORNA, various aspects of the Jimmy Ryce Civil
Commitment Program, or the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)'s restrictions on a
defendant's ability to gather evidence to defend against child pornography charges.
For excellent discussions on many of these matters, see generally Wayne A. Logan,
The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 993 (2010); Mary Prescott, Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Civil
Commitment After Adam Walsh, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 839 (2010); Yung, supra note 17;
Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (2009); Ian N. Friedman & Kristina Walter, How the Adam
Walsh Act Restricts Access to Evidence, CHAMPION, Jan.Feb. 2007, at 12.
21 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
22 See infra notes 522-24 and accompanying text.
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Beyond assisting Congress or opening the scholarly debate
on this topic, this Article will be useful to the practitioners and
judges who face these cases on a regular basis. The issues raised
in this Article should give pause and provide guidance to the
federal bench and bar in an area where sex offense legislation
grows more complex and onerous;2 3 where law enforcement
technology evolves rapidly, yet unevenly; and where
unconstitutional dangers lurk behind even the most well-
intentioned laws.
I. How "MANDATORY" ARE THE MANDATORY CONDITIONS?
A. Applicable Provisions of the Adam Walsh Act Amendments
Section 216 of Title II of the AWA amended the Bail Reform
Act to require that defendants charged with one of twenty-one
enumerated crimes be automatically placed on a prescribed set of
pretrial release conditions. 24  The applicable portion of the Bail
Reform Act now reads, in relevant part:
23 This includes a myriad of less serious actions that are now classified as sex
offenses. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 17, at 456 (lamenting the "one-size-fits-all
approach to regulating and punishing sex offenders," including examples such as
public urination prosecuted as public indecency or flashing, teenagers "sexting"-or
transmitting suggestive cell phone images-prosecuted as distribution of child
pornography, and parents prosecuted as accessories to statutory rape for allowing
their daughter's boyfriend to move in with the family). Pedophiles are classified in
the same category as high school students guilty of statutory rape by having sexual
relations with their underage boyfriends or girlfriends. See, e.g., Jane A. Small,
Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and
Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451, 1455-56 (1999) (noting that
under most sex offender registration laws, "the term [sex offender] is not limited in
application to rapists and child molesters: [tlhe nineteen-year old who has
consensual sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend who claims to be eighteen is
labeled a sex offender; a woman convicted of prostitution is labeled a sex offender;
[and] a man who engages in consensual sodomy with an adult female is labeled a sex
offender").
24 These AWA-enumerated offenses include failure to register under SORNA,
18 U.S.C. § 2250, and the following offenses: 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping), § 1591
(sex trafficking of children or by way of force, fraud, or coercion), § 2241 (aggravated
sexual abuse), § 2242 (sexual abuse), § 2244(a)(1) (abusive sexual contact), § 2245
(Title 18 offense resulting in death), § 2251 (sexual exploitation of children), § 2251A
(buying or selling children for purposes of sexual exploitation), § 2252(a)(1)
(transporting child pornography in interstate or foreign commerce), § 2252(a)(2)
(receiving child pornography transported in interstate or foreign commerce),
§ 2252(a)(3) (sale or intent to sell child pornography in interstate or foreign
commerce), § 2252A(a)(1) (transporting child pornography shipped in interstate or
foreign commerce), § 2252A(a)(2) (receipt of child pornography shipped in interstate
1349
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(c) Release on conditions.-(1) If the judicial officer determines
that the release described in subsection (b) of this section[r]
will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as
required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community, such judicial officer shall order the pretrial release
of the person-
(B) subject to the least restrictive further condition, or
combination of conditions, that such judicial officer
determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community, which may include the condition that the
person-
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal
associations, place of abode, or travel;
(v) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime
and with a potential witness who may testify concerning
the offense;
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law
enforcement agency, pretrial services agency, or other
agency;
(vii) comply with a specified curfew;
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive
device, or other dangerous weapon;
In any case that involves a minor victim under section
1201, 1591, 2241, 2242, 2244(a) (1), 2245, 2251,
2251A, 2252 (a) (1), 2252 (a) (2), 2252 (a) (3), 2252A (a) (1),
or foreign commerce), § 2252A(a)(3) (reproduction of child pornography shipped in
interstate or foreign commerce), § 2252A(a)(4) (possession or sale of child
pornography shipped in interstate or foreign commerce), § 2260 (production of
sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into the United States), § 2421
(transportation of an individual to engage in prostitution or any illegal sexual
activity), § 2422 (coercion or enticement of individual to travel in interstate or
foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or in any illegal sexual activity), § 2423
(transportation of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity or travel with the
same to engage in illicit sexual conduct), and § 2425 (use of interstate facilities to
transmit information about a minor under sixteen for purposes of enticing,
encouraging, offering, or soliciting any sexual activity). Bail Reform Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II).
25 Subsection (b) of the Bail Reform Act governs unconditional releases, or
releases without any of the conditions discussed in this Article, such as release on
personal recognizance or upon execution of unsecured appearance bond in an
amount specified by the bail judge. See id. § 3142(b).
1350 [Vol. 85:1343
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2252A(a) (2), 2252A(a) (3), 2252A(a)(4), 2260, 2421, 2422,
2423, or 2425 of this title, or a failure to register offense
under section 2250 of this title, any release order shall
contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic
monitoring and each of the conditions specified at
subparagraphs (iv), (0), (vi), (vii), and (viii).26
According to the undesignated paragraph italicized above,
for any release beyond personal recognizance or an unsecured
appearance bond, the terms of the statute provide that the
normally discretionary17  pretrial release conditions become
mandatory-upon mere charging-in cases "involv[ing] a minor
victim."2 8  A most interesting statutory interpretation question,
then, is presented by the mandatory conditions of the AWA
Amendments as they relate to offenses chargeable without the
existence of a "minor victim," as that term is used in the
undesignated paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). This might
include certain virtual child pornography offenses,2 9 as well as
crimes in which undercover law enforcement personnel pose as
minors.ao In these situations, how "mandatory" are the
mandatory conditions?
26 Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The term "any release order" in this
section appears to be a misnomer, unless it refers only to any releases orders
containing conditions. If the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B) were held to
also apply to release orders on personal recognizance or unsecured bond under
§ 3142(b)-which section expressly authorizes release without conditions-the
former provision would emasculate the latter, contrary to "the elementary canon of
[statutory] construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one
part inoperative." See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472
U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
27 That is, the imposition of such conditions is historically within the discretion
of the bail judge and subject to a rebuttable presumption. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f);
see also discussion infra Parts II.A. and IV.A-B. These orders are typically entered
by United States magistrate judges, who have original jurisdiction over matters
regarding detention or release of arrestees pending trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2)
(2006 & Supp. III).
28 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (governing conditions
for release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond).
29 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)-(4) (2006 & Supp. III). It should be noted,
however, that certain possession-only crimes, such as Possession of Visual
Depictions of Minors Engaging in Sexually Explicit Conduct, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4), (b)(2), are not subject to the mandatory conditions of the
AWA Amendments.
so See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 2423, 2425 (2006).
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B. Hypothetical
A hypothetical helps illustrate the issues presented.
Suppose that the United States government charges an adult
male with the crime of interstate travel with the intent to engage
in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
Suppose further that the person with whom he intended to
engage in such conduct, thought by him to be a minor, was
actually an adult posing as a fictitious minor on an internet site.
Assume that the defendant has no prior criminal record, and
does not otherwise pose a danger to the community. Finally,
assume that United States Pretrial Services"1 has recommended
release with conditions, which do not include curfew or electronic
monitoring, and that the district court32 is prepared to set a
secured appearance bond in some amount greater than zero, with
certain conditions of release. Do the mandatory conditions of the
AWA Amendments apply?
C. Potential Arguments
Three initial observations are clear. First, the question is
obviously one of statutory interpretation. Second, the issue is,
save for two recent rulings,33 a matter of first impression
nationwide. 34 Third, legislative history concerning this particular
AWA provision is non-existent; the mandatory pretrial release
conditions were added to the bill's language a mere seven days
prior to its final passage, without stated purposes, substantive
debate, or any meaningful congressional findings.
3 In 1974, Congress created Pretrial Services as an experiment under the
Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3154 (2006). In providing supervision to
arrestees, Pretrial Services's purpose was to make certain that while bail was
granted whenever possible, it did not result in defendants becoming fugitives. See
H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7402.
* These orders are commonly entered by United States magistrate judges. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2); supra note 27.
- United States v. Rizzuti, 611 F. Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Mo. 2009); United States
v. Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
" Novelty is a problem in the legal landscape of pretrial detention. Because
pretrial detention orders are often issued by magistrate judges and rarely appealed,
there may be very few published orders or opinions on this topic from the judges who
actually hold these hearings. See supra note 27.
" Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 n.4 ("Any effort to examine the legislative
history of the particular Walsh Act Amendment at issue in this case would be futile,
because it appears that no such history exists. . . . See 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily
ed. July 20, 2006) (debate following passage of Sen. Hatch's amendment in the
1352 [Vol. 85:1343
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1. The Government's Position
The government's position in such a case would likely be to
harmonize the term "minor victim" with the language of the
charged offense in such a way as to not distinguish between
actual and intended victims. In other words, the government
would be wise to advance an argument that defines the phrase
"minor victim" broadly, making the mandatory conditions
applicable to the largest degree of listed offenses. To do so, it
should focus on three interrelated issues: (1) the overriding
purpose of the Adam Walsh Act; (2) the principles frustrated by a
cramped reading of the AWA Amendments in conjunction with
the purposes of the Bail Reform Act; and (3) the wide-ranging
statutory evidence that supports eliminating any distinction
between actual victims and intended victims.
First, the government should stress that the mandatory
conditions of the Amendments are designed, in the words of the
AWA itself, "[t]o protect children from sexual exploitation and
violent crime."36 This broad purpose is no doubt furthered by the
government's interest in preventing such crimes by those
arrested and charged with one or more of the offenses listed in
the undesignated paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B), 37
particularly if congressional findings can establish a heightened
nature of a substitute that included the mandatory conditions)."). Title II, Section
216 of the AWA-the section that amended the applicable provisions of the Bail
Reform Act-provides no support for those amendments. Nothing in the
congressional record supports the addition of the mandatory conditions. See 152
CONG. REC. S8012-02 (daily ed. July 20, 2006). Here, one must distinguish between
legislative record support for the AWA in general-such as in its enhanced penalty
provisions-and support for the added pretrial release conditions. The only mention
of the mandatory conditions came from Senator Hatch of Utah, who was speaking to
the issue of post-conviction release when he suggested the addition of electronic
monitoring. See 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 8017 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("If we
send Martha Stewart home with an electronic bracelet on her ankle, we can't do that
to violent sex offenders . . . ?"). In light of this dearth of legislative support, a strong
argument can be made that there is no identifiable government interest in the
imposition of the mandatory pretrial release conditions of the Adam Walsh Act,
much less a valid interest.
36 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also § 154, 120 Stat. at
611; § 501, 120 Stat. at 624 ("The government has a compelling State interest in
protecting children from those who sexually exploit them ... ).
" See United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029-30 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987)); see also De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960) (noting that the government's interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling).
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risk of post-arrest criminal activity." In that light, a statutory
interpretation that limits the meaning of the term "minor victim"
to cases involving actual, and not intended, minor victims
would clash with Congress's above-stated purpose-to ensure
greater protection to the victim and community in situations
where pretrial release of dangerous individuals is appropriate.
Second, the government should emphasize that such a
narrow definition of the term "minor victim" produces a result
weaker than that which might normally occur under the
discretionary provisions of the Bail Reform Act.40 In the
hypothetical outlined above, the government should argue that
the defendant poses no less of a danger to the community
because the minor for whom he traveled hundreds of miles to
have sex with was not an actual but merely an intended-or
fictitious-victim. Such a fact would ordinarily be irrelevant to
the bail court's evaluation, under the Bail Reform Act, of
the danger presented to "the safety of any other person or
the community."4 Indeed, the very features that make the
defendant dangerous in this regard are his intent and
willingness to act. Facts about the victim of which the defendant
was unaware play no role in, and thus should not undercut, that
conclusion.42 Because the same danger remains, the same
protection is necessary.
8 This was a major emphasis for the Bail Reform Act, Congress having
determined that arrestees of certain extremely serious crimes were "far more likely
to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest." See Salerno, 481
U.S. at 749-50. This determination was based in part on what Congress deemed the
"disturbing rate of recidivism among released defendants." S. REP. No. 98-225, at
6-7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189 ("In a recent study of release
practices in eight jurisdictions, approximately one out of every six defendants in the
sample ... were rearrested during the pretrial period-one-third of these defendants
were rearrested more than once, and some were rearrested as many as four times.").
3 As a litigation strategy, the government's use of "intended" victim, rather
than "fictitious" victim, is important at this juncture. The former term mirrors the
language of the underlying offense in our hypothetical, see 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)
(2006), and maintains focus on the acts of the defendant. The latter term runs the
risk of focusing on the ruse, emphasizing the nonexistent minor, and highlighting
the impossibility of causing harm to an actual victim.
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006 & Supp. II).
41 See id. § 3142(b).
42 Cf. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 11.5 (2d ed. 2007)
(explaining that when a defendant's mental state matches that of a person guilty of
the completed crime, the defendant "by committing the acts in question[,]
demonstrate[s] his readiness to carry out his illegal venture").
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Third, the government should reference similar federal
statutory and regulatory provisions to argue that Congress, by
employing the broad term "minor victim" in § 3142(c)(1)(B), did
not intend to create a distinction between actual victims and
intended victims. Congress knows how to specify the situations
in which an actual victim is required, such as in cases involving
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,c where the
question of whether an image depicts an actual child or a
digitally-manipulated adult has enormous constitutional
consequences." In those circumstances, Congress has explicitly
employed statutory terms distinguishing between actual and
intended-or artificial-victims. It has not minced words.
Furthermore, courts have routinely held that an actual minor
victim is not required for a conviction under many of the child
exploitation crimes included in the AWA Amendments, such as
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (actual or attempted sexual exploitation of a
minor),4 6 § 2422(b) (actual or attempted persuasion of a minor to
engage in illicit sexual activity),47 and the offense charged in the
4 The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was part of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of the same year. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-26 to 3009-31 (1996) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243, 2251, 2252,
2256, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, and adding 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)).
" See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256-58 (2002) (striking down
as unconstitutional portions of CPPA that banned virtual child pornography, and
holding that if an image purporting to depict a minor does so only in the virtual
sense-such as computer-generated images of non-humans-it receives First
Amendment protection). Furthermore, the amended CPPA now provides an
affirmative defense based on the argument that the putative child pornography was
not produced using any actual minors. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2) (2006 & Supp.
III); see also, e.g., Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1090 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999).
This Article does not analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, nor does it address the "morphing" provision defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(C).
" Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (2006 & Supp. II) (defining "minor" as "any
person under the age of eighteen years"), with 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (including
definitions of "child pornography" that distinguish between actual, morphed, and
computer-generated images of minors), and 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9) (defining
"identifiable minor" as, inter alia, a minor person "who is recognizable as an actual
person by the person's face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic, such as a
unique birthmark or other recognizable feature").
' See, e.g., United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 234-36 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting
that conviction for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and
(d), does not require "that the individual exploited or that the defendant attempted
to exploit had to actually be a minor").
4 See United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2007) ("When a
statute criminalizes conduct because the victim or intended victim is a minor, . . . it
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hypothetical outlined above, § 2423(b) (interstate travel with the
intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct).48 In such cases, courts
have found it "contrary to the purpose of the statute to
distinguish the defendant who attempts to induce an individual
who turns out to be a minor from the defendant who, through
dumb luck, mistakes an adult for a minor."4 9  Finally, a broad
definition of "minor victim" is also consistent with the definitions
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines applicable to
sexual exploitation offenses that, in "focus[ing] on the intended
harm, and not only the actual harm committed,"so define "minor"
and "victim" as including fictitious persons.5
2. Problems with the Government's Position
The government's position is tenuous. First, under statutory
interpretation canons, it forces the prosecution to argue on one
hand that the phrase "involves a minor victim" is ambiguous or
is of no moment that the person with whom a defendant attempted to engage in
prohibited conduct was actually an adult as long as the defendant believed the
intended victim to be a minor. . . ."); United States v. Helder, 452 F.3d 751, 756 (8th
Cir. 2006) ("[An actual minor victim is not required for an attempt conviction under
§ 2422(b)."); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[We join
several sister courts of appeals in holding that the involvement of an actual minor,
as distinguished from a government decoy, is not a prerequisite to conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (actual or attempted persuasion of a minor to engage in illicit
sexual activity) or 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (traveling for the purpose of engaging in illicit
sexual activity)."); United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding same); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717-20 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that § 2242(b) conviction for use of the internet to attempt to induce minor to engage
in sexual activity does not require an actual minor victim); United States v. Root,
296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that "belief that a minor was involved
is sufficient to sustain an attempt conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)"); United
States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that legal impossibility is
normally not a defense to an attempt to violate § 2422(b)).
' See United States v. Vail, 101 F. App'x. 190, 192 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending
rationale in Meek to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)).
" Meek, 366 F.3d at 718; see also Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 461 ("[T]he involvement
of an actual minor, as distinguished from a government decoy, is not a prerequisite
to conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) ... or 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) . . .").
50 United States v. Spruill, 296 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The commentary
to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(d) provides that a sentencing court may consider an undercover
law enforcement officer as a 'victim' for sentencing purposes.").
" See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2A3.1-.5, § 2G1.3,
§ 2G2.1-.2, § 2G3.1, application n.1 (2007) (defining "minor" as, inter alia, "an
individual, whether fictitious or not, who a law enforcement officer represented to a
participant") (emphasis added); id. § 2A3.1, § 2G1.1, application n.1 ("'victim'
includes an undercover law enforcement officer.").
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leads to an absurd result,5 2 and on the other, that Congress
clearly knew what it was doing when it used the all-
encompassing term "minor victim," rather than distinguish
between actual and intended minor victims. The result is an
argument tied in a knot.
Second, the government's position is so dependent on the
larger legislative framework-so reliant on other statutory
provisions, terms, and histories53-that losing the ambiguity
argument effectively destroys its case, unless the government can
seriously contend that the nonexistent legislative history of the
AWA Amendments "clearly indicates that Congress meant
something other than what it said."54 This is because courts
cannot reach legislative history if the terms of a statute are
52 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) ("[I]n all
statutory construction cases, ... [t]he first step is to determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the
particular dispute in the case. The inquiry ceases if the statutory language is
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." (citations
omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227
(2008) (viewing unfavorably the parties' "attempt to create ambiguity where the
statute's text and structure suggest none"); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) ("The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
6" Most of which, it should be noted, involve attempt crimes. See supra note 47
and accompanying text.
1 Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 877 (9th Cir. 2001)
(approving resort to legislative history in such a circumstance) (quoting Perlman v.
Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 753 (9th Cir.
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And while "[flederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality," International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749
(1961), "[iut is equally true, however, that this canon of construction does not give a
court the prerogative to ignore the legislative will in order to avoid constitutional
adjudication; '"[allthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to
save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point
of perverting the purpose of a statute .. . " or judicially rewriting it.'" Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (quoting Aptheker v.
Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964)); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (stating that constitutional doubt canon does not apply
where statute is clear); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) ("We cannot press
statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a
constitutional question." (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212
(1998) (noting that constitutional doubt canon only applies where statute is
ambiguous).
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plain. Furthermore, references to attempt crimes and the
judicial treatment of such allegedly analogous provisions during
the conviction or penalty stage5 6 does little for an analysis that
must tackle the question at the pretrial stage, where the
presumption of innocence is at its peak.57  The result is an
argument that fails to come to terms with the language of § 3142.
3. The Defendant's Position: United States v. Kahn
a. Background
The strengths of the defendant's arguments and weaknesses
of the government's were on display in United States v. Kahn."
Defense counsel should embrace Kahn when faced with a dispute
over the applicability of the mandatory pretrial release
conditions of the AWA Amendments.
The facts in Kahn are strikingly similar to those in our
hypothetical, save for a few important wrinkles. Mr. Kahn was
arrested after traveling from Vancouver, British Columbia to
Seattle, Washington to have sex with "Jackie," an undercover
Seattle Police detective posing as a thirty-eight-year-old female,
and "Jenny," her fictitious thirteen-year-old daughter. Mr.
Kahn was charged with traveling in foreign commerce with the
intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).6 0 At his initial appearance, the government
and Pretrial Services recommended detention.6 ' They did so
based on the mandatory electronic monitoring requirement of the
AWA Amendments, paired with Pretrial Services' inability
to conduct global positioning satellite ("GPS") electronic
monitoring of Mr. Kahn in Canada.6 2 Furthermore, although the
6 See, e.g., Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. at 450.
56 See cases cited supra notes 47-50.
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (2006 & Supp. II) ("Nothing in this section [of the
Adam Walsh Amendments] shall be construed as modifying or limiting the
presumption of innocence."); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("Th[e]
traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation
of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.
Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." (citation omitted)).
68 524 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
5 Id. at 1279.
60 Id.
ex Id. at 1279-80.
62 Id.
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government appeared willing to release him within the Western
District of Washington, the United States Citizenship and
Immigrations Services ("USCIS") refused to agree to a
63probationary visa. Thus, the legal requirements of the
Amendments, coupled with the practical limitations of Canadian
law enforcement technology and the stance of USCIS, threatened
to turn a mandatory condition of release into detention by
default.
After recognizing this issue as one of first impression,6 4 the
court posed its first-and ultimately, the last-question in the
case: "whether the mandatory pretrial release conditions of the
Walsh Act Amendments apply to the offense of interstate travel
with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with another
person when that person, though thought to be a minor, is
actually an adult posing as a fictitious minor."6 5
The government answered that question in the affirmative.
It interpreted the term "minor victim" broadly, "without
distinguishing between cases involving actual and intended
[minor] victims," and insisted that Congress intended the same.
The government argued that this approach, as discussed above,"
was most faithful to the Bail Reform Act's goal of reasonably
assuring "the appearance of the [defendant] and the safety of any
other person and the community"6 -a mission it claimed was
only strengthened by the AWA Amendments.6 9 Furthermore, the
government argued that "because no actual minor victim is
necessary to convict under [18 U.S.C.] § 2423(b), no such victim
[was] necessary to trigger the mandatory pretrial release
61 Id. at 1280.
* See id. at 1281 n.3 ("The decisions in United States v. Gardner, United States
v. Vujnovich, and United States v. Crowell do not change this result. None of these
cases dealt with [anything close to] the offense outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b),
particularly as it relates to a fictitious 'minor victim.'" (citations omitted)).
6 Id. at 1281; see also id. at 1279 (noting the constitutional questions argued by
the parties, i.e., whether the AWA was unconstitutional "because [it] violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, and the separation of powers doctrine"). These unreached
constitutional questions make up Part III of this Article.
66 Id. at 1281.
67 See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
68 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II).
69 Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82 (summarizing the government's argument).
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conditions of the [AWA] Amendments," citing only post-trial
cases to support its argument.o The government's approach was
expansive and elusive; light on construction, heavy on purpose.
Mr. Kahn, on the other hand, stressed the language of the
statute. He argued that the express terms of the undesignated
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) precluded application of
the mandatory pretrial release conditions to his case." Mr. Kahn
argued that
because § 3142(c)(1)(B) mandates the imposition of certain
pretrial release conditions only in cases "involv [ing] a minor
victim," that provision is inapplicable to the present case, where
the alleged "victim" is an adult undercover police detective
posing as an adult prostitute with feigned access to a fictitious
thirteen year-old prostitute daughter.72
b. The Court's Decision
The fact that the court in Kahn began its discussion with the
plain terms of the AWA Amendments, rather than with some
notion of the "overriding purpose" of the Act, did not bode well for
the government. The court opened its analysis as follows:
As a general matter, the meaning of a statute is found in the
actual language used therein. This is precisely how a
legislature gives expression to its wishes. When the language of
a given statute is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms." 3 To this end, "courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says."74
70 Id. at 1281. To support this argument, the government cited post-trial cases
involving certain exploitation offenses subject to the mandatory pretrial conditions
of the AWA Amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717 (9th
Cir. 2004) ("[An actual minor victim is not required for an attempt conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)." (quoting United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir.
2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Vail, 101 F. App'x. 190,
192 (9th Cir. 2004) (extending Meek's rationale to a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)).
n Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
72 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)).
7 Id. at 1282 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Id. (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)).
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The court then observed that "[n]either the Walsh Act nor
the amended Bail Reform Act defines the phrase 'minor
victim,' " which meant that, under Ninth Circuit law, the court
would be charged with interpreting the words of the statute in
such a way as to "give effect to the intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the
disputed statutory term [was] plain, the court [wiould construe
that term in accordance with its ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning." 6 It noted that "[o]nly if an ambiguity exists
in the statute, or when an absurd construction results, does this
court refer to the statute's legislative history.""
The court's task was therefore to construe "minor victim" in
accordance with its plain meaning, embracing the legislative
history only if an absurd construction resulted. Utilizing Black's
Law Dictionary,8 the court defined "minor" as "[a] person who
has not reached full legal age,"" and "victim" as a "person
harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong."s0 Accordingly, the court
defined "minor victim" as "a child harmed by a crime,""1 and
concluded that the plain meaning of that term did "not
encompass the undercover detective or her fictitious thirteen
year-old daughter."" It decided that "[t]he former [person],
75 Id.
7 Id. (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,
1034 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Id. (quoting San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Any doubt regarding the legislative history was foreclosed by the
court's fourth footnote, which explained
[a]ny effort to examine the legislative history of the particular Walsh Act
Amendment at issue in this case would be futile, because it appears that no
such history exists. The mandatory pretrial conditions now in dispute were
added to the bill's language only seven days prior the bill's final passage.
The amendment including the mandatory pretrial conditions was passed
without substantive debate or supporting congressional reports. See 152
CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (debate following passage of
Sen. Hatch's amendment in the nature of a substitute that included the
mandatory conditions).
Id. at 1282 n.4.
7 See id. at 1282 ("To determine the 'plain meaning' of a term undefined by a
statute, resort to a dictionary is appropriate." (citing United States v. Jackson, 480
F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2007); Cleveland v. City of L.A., 420 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.
2005))).
79 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1017 (8th ed.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80 Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (8th ed. 2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81 Id.
82 Id.
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though perhaps a victim, [was] not a minor. "83 The latter person
was not a person, and was therefore "neither a victim nor a
minor under the 'ordinary, contemporary [and] common meaning'
of those terms.""
The court noted that the government's broad argument
"might [have been] persuasive were the disputed statutory
provision amorphous, or its terms unclear." Because the
provision was plain, however, the court eschewed a diversion into
the legislative history of the Act.86  By its express terms,
§ 3142(c)(1)(B) removed the discretion ordinarily granted the bail
judge only in "case[s] ... involv[ing] a minor victim."8  Because
Kahn did not involve a minor victim, judicial discretion remained
intact, and the mandatory pretrial release conditions of the AWA
Amendments did not apply.
8 Id.
' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,
1057 (9th Cir. 1998)).
85 Id. at 1283.
8 Id. at 1284 ("Because the result here is not absurd, the plain language
controls." (citing San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034
(9th Cir. 2004))). Indeed, although not addressed by the Court, the potential for an
"absurd" result was more likely under the broad definition urged by the government.
For example, interpreting the term "minor victim" to include fictitious persons would
clash with the mandatory condition requiring the defendant to "avoid all contact
with an alleged victim of the crime," 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II), as it
would force the court to enter an order requiring Mr. Kahn to avoid contact with a
fictitious entity.
87 Id. at 1283 (first alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
' Id. ("The plain language of § 3142 demonstrates that Congress did not intend
that all persons charged with a violation of § 2423(b) be subject to the mandatory
pretrial conditions imposed by the Walsh Act. By inserting the qualifying language
'involves a minor victim,' Congress specifically limited the cases in which those
conditions, as mandatory conditions, are to be imposed."). But see United States v.
Rizzuti, 611 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (holding that AWA Amendments
applied, and term "involves a minor victim" included an undercover police officer
posing as a minor, where underlying charge, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), included an
attempt provision, and had "been construed by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. . . to include conduct directed by defendants unknowingly at undercover
law enforcement officers" (citing United States v. Spurlock, 495 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th
Cir. 2007))). Due to the obvious differences in the offenses charged, as well as the
unique treatment of § 2422(b) within the Eighth Circuit, I distinguish the
magistrate judge's opinion in Rizzuti as limited to its peculiar circumstances.
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The court exposed additional flaws in the government's
argument by distinguishing, as a matter of statutory
construction, the very statute Mr. Kahn was alleged to have
violated-18 U.S.C. § 2423(b):
The operative phrase "involves a minor victim" differs markedly
from the language of § 2423(b), which criminalizes "travel for
the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person," whether or not the victim is a minor or the
prohibited conduct actually occurs. Under the government's
reading of § 3142(c)(1)(B), the term "minor victim" has no
meaning, because in any case where a violation of § 2423(b) is
charged, the Walsh Act Amendment's mandatory pretrial
release conditions would be automatic.8 9
The court rejected the government's argument that a minor
victim was unnecessary to trigger the mandatory conditions
because no such victim was necessary to convict under § 2423(b),
explaining that it was "not surprised that such a noticeable
language dichotomy exists between the pretrial and post-
conviction stages of criminal litigation involving §§ 3142(c) and
2423(b): [Tlhe presumption of innocence and its concomitant
liberty concerns, while at their peak during the former stage, are
at their lowest ebb by the latter."' Such an obvious distinction,
in the court's view, rendered the post-conviction decisions in
United States v. Meek and United States v. Vail less persuasive.9 '
Notwithstanding the government's appeal to a broad reading
of "minor victim," the court understood the government's position
as requiring it "to ignore or read out that phrase, violating the
cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that courts must
" Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (citations omitted).
90 Id. at 1283-84 (citation omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) ("Nothing in this
section [of the Adam Walsh Amendments] shall be construed as modifying or
limiting the presumption of innocence.")).
91 See id. at 1284 n.5 ("[A]n actual minor victim is not required for an attempt
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)." (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Meek, 366 F.3d. 705, 717 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Vail, 101 F. App'x. 190, 192 (9th Cir. 2004) (same as to a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)). According to the court, "[tihe same [could] be said for
cases applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines." Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at
1284 n.5 (citing United States v. Butler, 92 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 1996)). For
another related decision, see also United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 914-15
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (distinguishing liberty interest in "post-arrest, post-release booking
procedure for identification purposes only" from "terms and condition[s] of release
which last[ I throughout the pre-trial process" and "restrict an individual's
movement or impose an excessive bail condition").
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give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."92
This was so despite the court's acknowledgement that Mr. Kahn
likely "pose[d] no less of a danger to the community merely
because the thirteen year-old [minor] with whom he allegedly
intended to engage in sexual conduct was a fictitious person."93
The court tiptoed around this fact by recognizing that, pursuant
to the Bail Reform Act, it retained the traditional discretion to
order electronic monitoring should it deem such a condition
necessary to assuage the risk of flight or concerns regarding
safety of the community.9 4  Furthermore, "[bly inserting the
qualifying language 'involves a minor victim[ ]' [into
§ 3142(c)(1)(B),] Congress specifically limited the cases in which
those [listed] conditions, as mandatory conditions, are to be
imposed."" Congress therefore "did not intend that all persons
charged with a violation of § 2423(b) be subject to the mandatory
pretrial conditions imposed by the Walsh Act.""
For better or worse, Congress's use of the term "minor
victim" tied the government's tongue and the bail judge's hands.
The court in Kahn was attentive to both the broad purpose
behind the AWA and the institutional reality that "the drafting
of statutory language to carry out prevailing policy preferences is
a legislative, not a judicial, function."97  In this regard, the
government was stuck between the Scylla of ignoring plain
language and the Charybdis of urging the court to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress. The court did neither."
92 Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (quoting Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women,
Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 21 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93 Id.
" Id. ("The Court recognizes that § 3142(c)(1)(B) specifically emphasizes the
safety of the community when outlining the Court's discretion to impose a condition
or combination of conditions listed in § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i) through (xiv)."). This
discretion applied only in cases falling outside of the undesignated paragraph of
the AWA, as such conditions were otherwise mandatory upon charging. See
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The constitutionality of those conditions is addressed infra
Part III.
" Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
96 Id.
* Id. at 1284.
* See id. Specifically, the court concluded as follows:
Because the statutory language at issue today is plain, the sole function of
this Court is "to enforce [that language] according to its terms." Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026. The government advocates
the temporary abandonment [of] this deeply-rooted prerogative, and would
instead have this Court substitute its judgment for the plain language used
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE BAIL REFORM
ACT OF 1984
Resolution of the statutory interpretation problem in Kahn
avoided the questions vigorously argued by the parties
concerning the constitutionality of the AWA Amendments.9 9
However, one simple alteration to the facts in Kahn can revive
the question of whether unconstitutional dangers lurk behind
this well-intentioned law: Assume the victim was in fact an
actual minor. This altered fact pattern presents an entirely new
situation, rife with constitutional questions unanswered by most
of the federal judiciary. In such a circumstance, the AWA
Amendments apply and, of particular significance to our
hypothetical, the electronic monitoring and curfew conditions,
among others, present legal and logistical problems.
To date, seventeen federal courts have addressed the
constitutionality of the mandatory conditions imposed by the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments."10 Seven
have held that the AWA Amendments violate the Excessive Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment,101 eleven have found Fifth
Amendment due process violations, 102 three have determined that
the Amendments contravene the separation of powers doctrine,"0 s
and only two of these decisions have been reversed. 104 Part III
analyzes these decisions in detail. Before doing so, a brief
background of the Bail Reform Act is necessary to better
understand the constitutional questions that loom.
by Congress. The Court refuses to do so. Cf. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952) (courts "do
not sit as . . . super-legislature[s]").
Id. (first and last alteration in original).
9 Id. ("[In light of the Court's holding that the mandatory pretrial release
conditions of the Walsh Act are not applicable to this case, it is unnecessary to
address the constitutionality of that statute as applied to the defendant in this
case.").
100 See cases cited supra note 18. This number does not include the three court of
appeals decisions in Kennedy, Stephens, and Peeples, see supra note 18, as the panels
in these three cases applied the constitutional avoidance doctrine rather than
meaningfully address any of the constitutional questions raised. See discussion infra
Parts IV.A.5 and B.4.
101 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
102 See infra note 464 and accompanying text.
003 See infra note 480 and accompanying text.
104 See infra notes 283-91, 416-431 and accompanying text.
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A. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
"In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial ... is the carefully limited exception." 05  Bail is the rule,
and pretrial detention is disfavored and strictly limited by
statute.' This is in keeping with the theory of freedom before
conviction,"0 ' which is rooted in the common law. In seventeenth-
century England, pretrial release was a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.0 s This tradition continued in
America with the Judiciary Act of 1789, which permitted bail to
be set by a judge "who shall exercise . .. discretion ... regarding
the nature and circumstances of the offence."'09 Federal district
courts have long possessed the authority to detain an arrestee "to
ensure his presence at trial,""o and to impose conditions, such as
reasonable bail,"' before releasing him.112  Many pretrial
105 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
'" See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)(A)-(D), (f)(2)(A),(B) (2006 & Supp. II).
107 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (explaining that the right to bail
permits, inter alia, "the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent
the infliction of punishment prior to conviction").
' 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 293-97
(1769); see also Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 966 (1965) (noting movement from mandatory nonbailable crimes to
judicial discretion, explaining that "the most critical steps in this process-the
Petition of Right in 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and the Bill of Rights of
1689-grew out of cases which alleged abusive denial of freedom on bail pending
trial").
10 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) (repealed
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-51 (1986)) (making all noncapital offenses bailable and granting
courts the discretion to grant bail in a capital case); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 108, at 294 ("[It is expressly declared by statute. .. that excessive bail ought
not to be required: though what bail shall be called excessive, must be left to the
courts, on considering the circumstances of the case, to determine.").
no Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). "Like the ancient practice of
securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the
modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to
forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused." Stack, 342
U.S. at 5.
11 See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 ("The right to release before trial is conditioned upon
the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to
sentence if found guilty.") (citing Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835)).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)). The first federal bail provision
was enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91 (repealed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-51 (1986)). The
Judiciary Act defined all bailable offenses and established judicial limits on the
setting of bail. Id. Under the act, all noncapital offenses were bailable, and the
decision to grant bail to an arrestee charged with a capital offense was left to the
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detainees freely consent to such conditions, opting to relinquish
certain rights in order to sleep in the comfort of their own beds
pending trial."1 '
In time, the fear that more pretrial releases would result in
the commission of more crimes came to dominate the national
crime debate in the United States. As alternatives to monetary
bail were implemented and avenues of judicial review over
pretrial conditions increased, it became more likely-or at least
more emphasized-that defendants viewed by many as
dangerous would obtain freedom pending trial.'14 Statistics
emerging during America's "War Against Crime""' added to this
fear, and changed the focus of the national discussion on the
issue of pretrial release." 6  Reappearance at trial became a
secondary consideration in the bail calculus, and the issue of
preventative detention took center-stage in the bail reform
debate.
discretion of the court. Id. No major changes were made to the federal bail law until
177 years later, when Congress adopted the Bail Reform Act of 1966. Bail Reform
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. H§ 3141-51), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3141).
113 Scott, 450 F.3d at 865-66.
114 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.3 (5th ed. 2009).
" President Richard Nixon, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 8, 12 (Jan. 22, 1970).
116 See generally John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation
of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1985) (examining the public safety
focus of bail reform laws prior to mid-1980s and evaluating the implication for
pretrial release in the future); Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail
Reform Act of 1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1989) (reviewing
bail reform statistical data and court impact studies of detention procedures
conducted in various federal districts and nationwide); see also Steven R.
Schlesinger, Bail Reform: Protecting the Community and the Accused, 9 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 173, 177-78 (1986) (noting varying percentages of persons arrested while
on pretrial release).
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In 1984, a new Bail Reform Act repealed the most recent
revision to the federal bail statute, the Bail Reform Act of 1966."'
The new Act was designed primarily to combat "the alarming
problem of crimes committed by persons on release," to correct
the regrettable practice of mandatory monetary bails, and to
provide courts with "adequate authority to make release
decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a
person may pose to others if released."" According to Congress,
"providing for [judicial] flexibility in setting conditions of release
appropriate to the characteristics of individual defendants" was
vital to achieving these ends.119
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 covers the gamut of detention
and release in federal criminal cases. 120 It establishes standards
governing "the pretrial phase of a case, the period between
conviction and sentencing, and the period during the pendency of
an appeal by either side. It prescribes consecutive penalties for
failure to appear and for committing offenses while on release"
and "establishes standards and procedures governing material
witnesses."'2 ' The Act altered significantly the prior federal bail
law by directing the bail court to specifically consider whether
the defendant poses a future danger to other persons or the
117 Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3141) (repealing Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-
51). For an excellent history of both Acts, see Scott, supra note 116, at 5 ("In
adopting this Act, Congress for the first time permitted judicial officers to consider
danger to the community, as well as the risk of flight, in establishing conditions of
pretrial release in noncapital cases."); id. at 3-6 ("The 1966 Act was an attempt by
the eighty-ninth Congress to set reasonable conditions of pretrial release and
eliminate bond requirements, especially for indigent defendants. However, the Act
failed to address what many felt was a pressing social problem--crimes committed
by those who were awaiting trial.").
The congressional precursor to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970. D.C. CODE § 23-1322
(2001); Paul D. Borman, The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 NW. U. L. REV.
879, 885-96 (1971) (describing the D.C. Act).
na S. REP. No. 98-225, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185.
See also id. at 3, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3187-88 (explaining that Act is designed, inter
alia, to "deemphasize the use of money bonds ... and to provide a range of alternate
forms of release."). The practice of money bonds and the lack of nonfinancial pretrial
release options were "perceived as resulting in disproportionate and unnecessary
pretrial incarceration of poor defendants." Id.
u1 Id. at 3, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3188.
120 JOHN L. WEINBERG, FEDERAL BAIL AND DETENTION HANDBOOK § 1:3 (2011).
121 Id.
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community;12 2 by establishing more rigid tests for determining
whether a defendant should be released or detained pending
appeal of his conviction or pending sentence; 123 and by imposing
new penalties for defendants who commit new offenses while on
pretrial release,12 violate their conditions of release,125 or fail to
appear.126
Under the Act, when a person charged with a federal crime
appears before the court, the judge must
order the pretrial release of the person on personal
recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance
bond in an amount specified by the court, ... unless the judicial
officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person . .. or will endanger the safety of
any other person or the community.127
The government bears the burden of proving that the defendant
is a flight risk or otherwise poses a risk of harm preventing
release or, if the defendant is to be released pending trial, that
certain conditions should accompany such release.128  Where
public safety, rather than flight, is at issue, the government
bears the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the specific defendant charged poses a danger.129
If that defendant is not detained, but the government meets its
burden with respect to conditions of release, the court must order
release subject to "the least restrictive further condition, or
combination of conditions," that will reasonably ensure both
reappearance and the safety of the community, which "may"
include some or all of the conditions set forth in § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)
through (xiv).1 0
122 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006 & Supp. II). Ironically, however, the same statute
does not expressly authorize the court to hold a detention hearing based solely on an
allegation of an arrestee's danger to the community. Id. § 3142(f).
123 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (2006).
124 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (2006).
125 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (2006).
126 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (2006).
127 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b).
12s 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (noting "clear and convincing" burden of proof).
129 Id. In cases involving defendants previously convicted of certain crimes of
violence, there is a rebuttable presumption that such a risk of danger or
nonappearance exists. See id. § 3142(e)(1)-(2).
130 Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
1369
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
It bears repeating that when the Bail Reform Act of 1984
imposed new penalties, expanded the list of statutory release
conditions, and fashioned new factors for the bail court to
consider, it did so while strengthening, not diminishing, the
critical role played by the court in this process. The "judicial
officer," not the prosecution or Congress, is charged with the
responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention or
any specific condition of release in a case-by-case fashion.' 3'
Guided but not controlled by statutorily enumerated factors, the
court itself is charged with determining whether the government
has demonstrated probable cause to believe that the charged
crime has indeed been committed by the arrestee.' 3  Thereafter,
the government must convince the court, by clear and convincing
evidence during a full-blown adversarial hearing, that no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person from the specific and articulable threat
posed by the arrestee. 3 3  Only then may the court, in its
discretion, take steps to disable the arrestee from executing that
threat.13 4  In making this determination, the court must
undertake an independent and particularized assessment of
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged," the
weight of the evidence against the accused, 3 6 the history and
characteristics of the arrestee,'13 and the nature and seriousness
of danger that would be posed by the arrestee's re-entry into
the community.3 s The answers to these questions are not
predetermined by the Act, but rather, are the sole province of the
131 Id. § 3142(e)-(g).
131 Id. § 3142(e).
133 Id. § 3142(f).
134 Id. § 3142(e).
'" Id. § 3142(g)(1).
13 Id. § 3142(g)(2).
" Id. § 3142(g)(3). This includes such considerations as:
the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings;
and [I whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was
on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing,
appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or
local law ....
Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A)-(B).
13 Id. § 3142(g)(4).
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bail judge. Should the answers lead to a conclusion of detention,
the court must "include written findings of fact and a written
statement of the reasons" for the decision to detain.' 9
As discussed below in Part III, this degree of judicial
involvement and individualized assessment stands in stark
contrast to the AWA Amendments, which mandate certain
automatic conditions of release upon mere charging of an offense
involving a minor victim, even if the presiding judge would find
those conditions unwarranted.
B. United States v. Salerno
It did not take long for the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 to reach the United States Supreme Court.14 0
The potential constitutional problems presented by the AWA
Amendments necessitate a brief review of perhaps the most well-
known case involving the Bail Reform Act: United States v.
Salerno.14'
The question presented in Salerno was whether a
defendant's Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights are violated
when the bail court considers his future dangerousness in
determining whether to grant pretrial release. 4 2 The defendants
in Salerno were members of the Genovese crime family of La
Cosa Nostra who had been charged with several counts of
racketeering activity, including conspiracy to commit murder.143
The defendants, ordered detained by the district court but
1'9 Id. § 3142(i)(1).
140 Indeed, the constitutional limits of preventative detention were being
litigated as soon as the ink dried. See, e.g., United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758,
766 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We join all the other courts in the country that have either
implicitly or explicitly held that the Bail Reform Act does not violate the fifth or
eighth amendment. No court has held the Act unconstitutional."); United States v.
Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 385, 387 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that the Act's rebuttable
presumption of flight was not a denial of liberty without due process), abrogated on
other grounds by United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1391-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Act
did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause, Excessive Bail Clause, or procedural due
process, and was not unconstitutionally vague), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d 202
(2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1448-53 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(similar; Act also not violative of the Fifth Amendment's equivalent Equal Protection
Clause).
141 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
142 Id. at 746.
M3 Id. at 743.
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released by the Second Circuit,144 challenged § 3142(e) of the Bail
Reform Act. This provision permits a federal district judge to
detain an arrestee charged with certain serious felonies pending
trial if the government demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that "no release conditions 'will reasonably
assure ... the safety of any other person and the community.' "145
Specifically, the Salerno Court was faced with the question of
whether the Bail Reform Act's authorization of detention on the
ground that the arrestee was likely to commit future crimes
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and/or
the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.146  The
Court ultimately answered this question in the negative,
rejecting a facial challenge to the Act and avoiding the question
of whether the Act could be unconstitutional as applied in a
particular case.14 1
The Supreme Court first tackled the Fifth Amendment
argument by the respondents that the Bail Reform Act violated
substantive due process by authorizing "punishment" in the form
of detention before trial.14 8 Resolution of this general dispute,
" United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 794
F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Although the stated reason for
granting certiorari in Salerno was the "conflict among the Courts of Appeals
regarding the validity of the Act," the Supreme Court was quick to recognize that
the divide was more of a sliver than a true split. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 & n.1
("Every other Court of Appeals to have considered the validity of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional challenge." (citing United States v.
Walker, 805 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 1102
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Simpkins, 801 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United
States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864 (1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th
Cir. 1985))). But see Salerno, 794 F.2d at 71-72 (finding § 3142(e) of Bail Reform Act
facially unconstitutional under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment insofar as it authorized pretrial detention solely on the ground of future
dangerousness, as opposed to a risk of flight).
14 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)
(2006 & Supp. II)). As mentioned above, supra note 27, this determination is
commonly made upon the recommendation of a United States magistrate judge. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. III).
.46 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
1 Id. at 745 n.3, 755 ("We intimate no view on the validity of any aspects of the
Act that are not relevant to respondents' case. Nor have respondents claimed that
the Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular facts
of their case.").
" Id. at 746.
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first pondered in Bell v. Wolfish,149 hinged on whether the
provisions in question were impliedly punitive or regulatory. 5 0
Absent an intent to punish, the question takes the form of a
balancing test that is still used today: "whether an alternative
purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned [to it]."11
After examining the legislative history of the of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, the Supreme Court first determined that
Congress did not devise the pretrial detention provision as
punishment for dangerous arrestees, but instead, "perceived
pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal
problem[:1 . . . preventing danger to the community."152
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the provision advanced not
a penal solution, but rather, a legitimate regulatory goal.153 It
was therefore not "punishment" in the constitutional sense of
that word.1 4
Second, using the balancing test from Bell, the Court
concluded that "the incidents of pretrial detention" mandated
by the Bail Reform Act were not excessive in relation to
149 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Bell, a class action conditions-of-confinement suit
brought by detainees in a federally operated custodial facility, gave the Supreme
Court its first chance to rule on the conditions of pretrial detention in this posture.
Id. at 523-24. In addition to finding that the presumption of innocence did not apply
to pretrial detainees, the Court also concluded that pretrial detention was not
automatically considered punishment and hinted that securing an arrestee's
appearance at trial might not be "the only objective that may justify restraints and
conditions." Id. at 540 ("If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the
liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial,
house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of
detention." (quoting Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 529 (1978)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). That said, the Court acknowledged "that the Fifth
Amendment includes freedom from punishment within the liberty of which no
person may be deprived without due process of law," such that as a general matter,
'punishment can only follow a determination of guilt after trial or plea." Id. at 536
n.17 (listing exceptions such as the contempt power). This conclusion did not change
the fact that the punitive/regulatory question, under Bell, would ultimately be one of
degree. Id. at 537-39.
"' Id. at 537. This distinction has constitutional significance, for while punitive
measures cannot be constitutionally imposed prior to an adjudication of guilt,
regulatory restraints may. Id.
1s' Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (alterations in original) (quoting Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 748.
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the legitimate regulatory goal of preventing danger to the
community. 5 1 In contrast to the categorical imperative set forth
by the Second Circuit,'5 6 the Supreme Court underscored that
"the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can,
in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
interest."'5 7  According to the Court, this result was obtained
because the Act "narrowly focuses on a particularly acute
problem [(i.e., crime committed by arrestees)] in which the
Government interests are overwhelming," 5 1 "carefully limits the
circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most
serious of crimes,"' 5 9 and mandates a multitude of procedures
"specifically designed to further the accuracy of [the bail court's]
determination[s]" on a case-by-case basis. 60  Importantly, the
Court reemphasized that "the arrestee is entitled to a prompt"
and "full-blown adversary hearing, "161 at which "the Government
1" Id. at 747-49.
1e United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 739
(1987) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the ground of
danger to the community as a regulatory measure, without regard to the duration of
the detention.").
' Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972); Greenwood v. United States, 350
U.S. 366 (1956); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952); Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (contemplating enemy combatants or
aliens during times of war and insurrection, dangerous resident aliens pending
removal proceedings, juveniles and mentally unstable persons who pose a present
danger to the public, dangerous defendants who are deemed incompetent to stand
trial, and even competent adults suspected of a crime).
15 Id. at 750 ("Congress specifically found that [individuals arrested for a
specified category of extremely serious crimes] are far more likely to be responsible
for dangerous acts in the community after arrest." (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6-7
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3187-88)).
1' Id. at 747 (including "offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or
death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)
(2006 & Supp. II)).
160 Id. at 751. The procedures enumerated included: (1) the arrestee's right to
counsel; (2) the arrestee's right to be heard, to testify, and to present information by
proffer or otherwise; (3) the arrestee's right to cross-examine witnesses; (4) the
requirement that the government prove its case by clear and convincing evidence;
(5) the requirement that the court be guided by the statutorily enumerated factors;
(6) the requirement that the court make written findings of fact and a statement of
reasons for detention; and (7) immediate appellate review of such a decision. Id. at
751-52 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f), (g), (i), & 3145(c)).
1I Id. at 747, 750.
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must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the
safety of the community or any person."162
The Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on the
individualized assessment and procedural protections afforded
by the Act, together with its conclusion that this challenge
requires a balancing of the "more particularized governmental
interest" against the individual's fundamental "interest in
liberty," suggests that a more expansive and less particularized
pretrial detention statute may run afoul of the Salerno test and
violate the Eighth and/or Fifth Amendment.1 63 The mandatory
release provision of the AWA Amendments fulfills that potential,
as this Article will explain in Part III.
The Salerno Court next addressed the respondents' Eighth
Amendment argument. The Genovese family respondents
insisted that because the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail
Clause grants arrestees a right to bail calculated solely on
considerations of risk of flight, the new Bail Reform Act violated
the Clause by allowing a court to set bail at an infinite amount
for reasons unrelated to flight. 1 64  This argument was forged
thirty-five years prior through a statement by the Court in Stack
v. Boyle that "[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to [ensure the defendant's presence at
trial] is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment."16 5
Although the Salerno Court agreed that a "primary function
of bail is to safeguard the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or
innocence of defendants," it rejected the contention that the
Excessive Bail Clause precludes the government from "pursuing
other admittedly compelling interests," such as preventing
danger to the community, through the curtailment of pretrial
162 Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). The Court embraced these same
safeguards to conclude that the Bail Reform Act survived a procedural due process
attack as well. See id. at 751-52.
1' Id. at 750. But see United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1038-39 (8th
Cir. 2010) (opining that Salerno has little applicability to procedural due process
challenges).
'6 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752-53.
"I Id. at 752 (alterations in original) (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5
(1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained below, "excessive bail," can
be reflected in more than purely monetary terms. It may exist in other limitations
such as curfews, no-contact orders, limits on employment, travel restrictions, or
electronic monitoring.
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release.1 66 The Court determined that its 1951 language provided
the respondents no refuge, explaining that the "dictum in Stack
v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest" the contention
that the Eighth Amendment grants a right to bail calculated
solely on considerations of flight,'6  particularly considering the
Court's interpretive holding four months after Stack in Carlson v.
Landon6 which, by referencing the English Bill of Rights Act,16 9
embraced a narrower reading of the Excessive Bail Clause.170
The Court in Salerno ultimately concluded that it did not need to
decide
whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to Congress'
power to define the classes of criminal arrestees who shall be
admitted to bail. For even if we were to conclude that the
Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive limitations on
the National Legislature's powers in this area, we would still
hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Nothing in the text of
the Bail Clause limits permissible Government considerations
solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive
limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government's proposed
conditions of release or detention not be "excessive" in light of the
perceived evil. Of course, to determine whether the Government's
response is excessive, we must compare that response against the
interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that
response. Thus, when the Government has admitted that its
only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court
at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more. We believe
166 Id. at 753.
167 Id.
16 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952).
169 See Yale Law Sch., English Bill of Rights 1689, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l7thcentury/england.asp (last visited June 16, 2012)
("[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted[.]").
o Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 ("The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from
the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to
accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be
excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was
carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different
concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the
classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal
cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very
language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable." (quoting
Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545-46) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a
compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has
here, the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.'
Accordingly, the Excessive Bail Clause requires that "the
Government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be
'excessive' in light of the perceived evil" from releasing the
arrestee.'72 In Salerno, this threshold was not crossed. The
Supreme Court concluded that while "liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial . .. is the carefully limited exception," the
pretrial detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fell
"within that carefully limited exception." 73 In so holding, the
Court once again emphasized procedural safeguards. It
explained that the Act authorized pretrial detention of a limited
class of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found
only "after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of
individuals or to the community which no condition of release can
dispel."7 4  So long as "Itlhe numerous procedural safeguards
detailed above .. . attend[ed] this adversary hearing" for each
defendant, the Court would find that the disputed provisions of
the Bail Reform Act did not violate the Fifth or Eighth
Amendment."-' Those individualized safeguards sealed the fate
of the Genovese family defendants.
17 Id. at 754-55 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at
5).
172 Id. at 754. Were it otherwise, the government could circumvent the Clause
simply by refusing to release detainees on any condition(s).
17 Id. at 755.
171 Id. The court elaborated that the Act is not
by any means a scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely
suspected of these serious crimes. The Government must first of all
demonstrate probable cause to believe that the charged crime has been
committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a full-blown
adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker
by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.
Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
... Id. at 755.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ADAM WALSH ACT
AMENDMENTS
As explained in Part I above, the addition of an actual minor
victim triggers the mandatory pretrial release conditions of the
AWA Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984.176 These
conditions are mandatory upon charging and can therefore be
imposed without a predicate finding of dangerousness or flight.
A new hypothetical will better address the questions
presented in this Part. First, assume that the defendant has
been charged with one count of possession of child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).1 77 Next, assume the
government presented no evidence of risk of flight or any threat
posed by the arrestee to the community other than those
accompanying the nature of the charges leveled against him.
Assume that Pretrial Services has recommended release with
conditions that do not include electronic monitoring or curfew,
and that the government concurs. Further assume that the court
sets a secured appearance bond in an amount greater than zero
and, after reviewing the evidence submitted by both parties and
the recommendation of Pretrial Services, releases the defendant
subject to several pretrial conditions, but not electronic
monitoring or curfew as mandated by the undesignated
paragraph of the AWA Amendments, § 3142(c)(1)(B). Next,
assume that after noticing the unambiguous language of that
section, the government moves to modify the conditions of release
to include every condition listed therein, notwithstanding the
court's earlier finding that certain of those conditions were not
required. The government admits that the only reason for its
motion is to comply with the provisions of the AWA
Amendments. The court agrees with the government, and grants
the motion.
176 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph).
"1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006 & Supp. II) (making it a crime for any
person to "knowingly possess[ ], or knowingly access[] with intent to view, 1 or more
books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any
visual depiction [of child pornography] that has been mailed, or has been shipped or
transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. .. by any means[,] including by
computer").
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Did the court's initial appearance bond transgress the
requirements of the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B)?
Did its subsequent application of that section violate the
constitutional rights of our defendant? Further, are the AWA
Amendments facially unconstitutional, or unconstitutional as
applied to our defendant?18
Three constitutional arguments come to mind. First, under
Salerno, do the AWA Amendments violate our defendant's right
to be free from excessive bail, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, because its mandatory electronic monitoring and
curfew conditions are excessive in relation to the government's
interest or the "perceived evil" which may occur by his release? 79
Second, do the AWA Amendments violate our defendant's Fifth
Amendment Due Process rights by providing that a simple
criminal charge, without more, irrebuttably establishes that
certain unnecessary pretrial conditions are required? Third, do
the Amendments contravene the separation of the powers
doctrine by allowing Congress to mandate pretrial release
conditions that effectively strip the judiciary of its fundamental
role in determining whether a particular arrestee is to be
detained or released, and if released, which conditions shall
apply? This Part addresses these challenges in turn.
17 In a successful as-applied challenge, the provision at issue is unconstitutional
when applied literally to the facts of the case. See, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v.
FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (per curiam). In a successful facial challenge, on the
other hand, there are "no set of circumstances," under which the statute would be
valid. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449
(2008) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). There is, however, ongoing disagreement
within the Supreme Court concerning the viability of the Salerno standard in
connection with facial challenges to the validity of legislative acts. See id. (noting
that "some Members of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation"); City of
Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (plurality opinion) ("To the extent we
have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is not the
Salerno formulation, which has never been the decisive factor in any decision of this
Court . . . ."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 & n.7 (1997) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (explaining that "[t]he appropriate standard to be applied in cases
making facial challenges to state statutes has been the subject of debate within this
Court" and arguing that the Court has never applied the Salerno standard, even in
Salerno itself).
179 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754.
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A. The Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment
To the law-trained reader, closely reasoned brevity is usually
considered a virtue. No amendment to the Constitution is
shorter than the Eighth Amendment, which states that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 80 Yet no
amendment is more linguistically baffling than the Eighth."a' It
contains, as the late Professor Caleb Foote noted, "some of the
most ambiguous language in the Bill of Rights."'8 2 Its six-word
180 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The constitutional prohibition against excessive
bail finds roots in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and Clause 9 of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, which adopted verbatim the English provision. See Yale Law
Sch., English Bill of Rights 1689, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
17thscentury/england.asp (last visited June 16, 2012) ("[E]xcessive bail ought not to
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted[.]"). The statutory right to bail emerged from the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties of 1641 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, cl. 18 (1641), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 71, 73-74 (1971); An Ordinance for the Government of the
Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio (1787), 32 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, Art. II, at 340 (1936).
181 The exception might be the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Bryan Dearinger,
Note, The State of the Nation, Not the State of the Record: Finding Problems with
Judicial "Review" of Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Legislation, 53 DRAKE L. REV.
421, 424 n.12 (2005) (collecting sources discrediting the Supreme Court's
extratextual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but conceding that even the
Supreme Court "ha[s] long 'understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but [rather] for the presupposition ... which it confirms'"
(alterations in original) (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
182 Foote, supra note 108, at 969. For example, does the Eighth Amendment
itself import a fundamental right to bail, or merely prohibit an excessive sum in
cases in which the court actually sets bail (or in cases made bailable by other
statutes)? Id. at 969-70. This language has long been debated in the context of
pretrial detention. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive
Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 397-406 (1970) (arguing
that preventative detention based on anticipated dangerousness violates the Eighth
Amendment), with John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of
Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1224, 1230-31 (1969) (arguing that
preventative detention is constitutional), and Hermine H. Meyer, Constitutionality
of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1381, 1455-56 (1972) [hereinafter Meyer, Part II]
(same; explaining why Excessive Bail Clause does not imply right to bail). The
question of a fundamental constitutional right to bail was often argued by resort to
the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 114, § 12.3(c). As
an interpretational matter, the question is whether the Excessive Bail Clause of the
Eighth Amendment was modeled after the English law, which was designed
primarily to curb judicial abuse of the protections of the English Habeas Corpus Act,
or whether it was a new, distinctively American provision that, because it was
contained in the Bill of Rights, primarily concerned curtailing the powers of the
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opening clause-the Excessive Bail Clause-is one of the least
litigated provisions in the Bill of Rights, 183 the Supreme Court
having directly addressed the Clause only three times since the
Amendment's adoption." The controversy created by these
three decisions, however, has generated forests of law review
articles."' This Article chops at a single tree: whether the
mandatory conditions of the AWA Amendments subject our
hypothetical defendant, and perhaps those like him, to "excessive
bail" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
National Legislature, not the Judiciary. Id. Regardless of one's position on this
matter, there can be little disagreement that since at least the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the determination of excessiveness has been left with the courts. See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789), (repealed 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-51 (1986);
BLACKSTONE, supra note 108, at 294 ("[Ilt is expressly declared by statute that
excessive bail ought not to be required," and "what bail should be called excessive,
must be left to the courts, on considering the circumstances of the case, to
determine." (citation omitted)).
'" See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the
Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 603
(2005). Equally scarce are any reports of debates during the adoption of the
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, such debate produced only
one recorded comment over the Clause, which was made by U.S. Representative
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire: "The clause seems to express a great deal of
humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no
meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive
bail? Who are to be the judges?" 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed.,
1834).
1 See generally Salerno, 481 U.S. 739; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952);
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). Indeed, owing to the uncertainty in this area, the
Supreme Court has only indirectly applied the Clause to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (dictum).
18 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the
Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510
(1986); Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 119 (2004); Michael J. Eason, Eighth Amendment-Pretrial Detention:
What Will Become of the Innocent?: United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987),
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1048 (1988); Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent,
Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1
(2005); Meyer, Part II, supra note 182; Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial
Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335 (1990). Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Salerno, much of the scholarly debate centered on whether the
Framers intended to provide a constitutional right to bail. Compare, e.g., Hermine
H. Meyer, The Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1139, 1190-94
(1972) (arguing that the Framers did not provide for such a right), with Foote, supra
note 108, at 972 ("There is .. . no evidence in the concurrent consideration of the Bill
of Rights and Judiciary Act of any deliberate congressional intention to exclude a
right to bail under what became the eighth amendment.").
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Salerno explains that the only "substantive limitation of the
Bail Clause is that the Government's proposed conditions of
release .. . not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil"
Congress has sought to prevent. 8 6 The "excess" which the Clause
prohibits can include monetary terms or other limitations on an
arrestee's freedom such as curfews, house arrests, no contact
conditions, limits on employment, electronic monitoring, and the
like."' In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment challenge, a
defendant must either show that the ostensible governmental
interest is invalid, or that the conditions of release are excessive
in relation to that interest.'88 In our new hypothetical, the
government should stress that Congress's compelling interest is,
in the words of the AWA itself, to "protect children from sexual
attacks and other violent crimes."189 Of course, this argument
presents a congressional intent slight-of-hand because:
(1) Congress made no such findings when it decided to add the
mandatory conditions to the Bail Reform Act,19 and (2) even if
the larger purpose behind the AWA itself is invoked to support to
the conditions, it does not help answer the question of why they
should be mandatory as opposed to discretionary. But if this
argument is accepted by the court-and practice shows it has
been"'-it will be difficult for defendants to argue that the
18 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754.
187 See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 389 (E.D.N.Y.
2010).
19 See discussion supra Part II.B; see also, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d
652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that bail may not be set to achieve an invalid
interest or in an amount that is excessive in relation to the interests desired); United
States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same); United
States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL
3541736, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (same).
1 Adam Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
tit. II, 120 Stat. 587, 611.
1 Defendants charged with an AWA-enumerated offense would be wise to
notify the court of this fact. Indeed, Congress gave no reasons, conducted no
substantive debate, and made no legislative record in support of the Amendments.
See United States v. Kahn, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 n.4 ("Any effort to examine
the legislative history of the particular Walsh Act Amendment at issue in this case
would be futile, because ... no such history exists.") (citing 152 CONG. REC. S8012
(daily ed. July 20, 2006))).
19 See, e.g., Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-30 ("The government's interest in
imposing the conditions mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is valid ... [whereby]
preventing crimes by arrestees is a 'legitimate and compelling' interest." (quoting
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749)); United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1227
(W.D. Wash. 2008) ("It cannot possibly be argued that this interest is not valid or of
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governmental interest is invalid. The question will then become
whether the conditions legislatively imposed in our hypothetical
are excessive in relation to the government's valid interest.
The government, tied to Salerno, will have no choice but to
recycle the rationale from that case by arguing that the
mandatory pretrial conditions of the AWA Amendments are
not excessive in relation to the regulatory goal of protecting
children from sexual exploitation, abuse, and other violent
crimes. By contrast, the defendant's argument can move more
freely, attacking Congress's oversight or overreach in adding
amendments to the Bail Reform Act that removed the procedural
safeguards and individualized judicial determinations that
narrowly saved the Act from demise in Salerno.19 ' The few
reported judicial opinions on this issue have overwhelmingly
shown that the Eighth Amendment rationale in Salerno benefits
the defendant, not the government, in these cases. To date,
defendants have prevailed at the trial level in seven of the nine
Eighth Amendment challenges considered by courts.'
great importance."), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash.
2009), vacated and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished
memorandum); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
("[T]here is a legitimate Government interest promoted by these conditions of
release, i.e., protecting the safety of children.").
192 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
193 See United States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 7451512, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011) (finding mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring
conditions of AWA Amendments facially unconstitutional under Fifth Amendment
and unconstitutional as-applied under Eighth Amendment); United States v.
Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 394-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding same conditions
unconstitutional under Fifth and Eighth Amendments as applied to the defendant);
United States v. Stephens, No. CRO9-3037-MWB, 2009 WL 3568668, at *1-2 (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 27, 2009) (finding same conditions facially violative of the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments), motion to revoke order denied, 669 F. Supp. 2d 960 (N.D. Iowa
2009), rev'd and remanded, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010); Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d
at 1233 (finding same conditions of the AWA Amendments unconstitutional under
Fifth and Eighth Amendments as applied to defendant and also violative of
separation of powers doctrine); Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (finding mandatory
curfew and electronic monitoring conditions constituted a facial violation of Fifth
Amendment and an as-applied violation of Eighth Amendment); United States v.
Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 20,
2007) (finding mandatory electronic monitoring conditions unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant under the Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment and a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine); Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *11
(same). But see United States v. Rondeau, Cr. No. 10-147-S, 2010 WL 5253847, at *2
(D.R.I. Dec. 16, 2010) (upholding constitutionality of mandatory curfew and
electronic monitoring conditions to defendant previously convicted of child
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1. United States v. Crowell
In the first case to address the constitutionality of the AWA
Amendments, United States v. Crowell,"' the court considered
the challenge made by three defendants charged with child
pornography offenses which subjected them to the mandatory
conditions set forth in the undesignated paragraph of the
Amendments, § 3142(c)(1)(B).9 5  At each defendant's initial
appearance, Pretrial Services did not recommend pretrial
detention, nor did the government move for it, as none of the
defendants were believed to present a risk of flight or danger to
the community.19 6 Instead, the court and the parties agreed upon
the conditions recommended by Pretrial Services, which did not
include electronic monitoring, house arrest, or curfew as
mandated by the AWA Amendments.1 97 No objections were made
to these conditions of release, and no motion for reconsideration
was filed. A short time later, however, the government
recognized that it had neglected to seek the mandatory
conditions of the AWA Amendments, and it immediately
requested that the court modify its order to include these
conditions for each defendant.' 8 The defendants challenged the
kidnapping and indecent assault where magistrate judge "heard Defendant and
considered a number of individualized factors before imposing his release
conditions"); Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (upholding constitutionality of the
Amendments). I do not include the decision in Cossey within this group, as the
defendant's made no articulable Eighth Amendment argument in that case, and the
Excessive Bail Clause did not figure into the court's decision. See United States v.
Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 892 & n.4 (D. Mont. 2009) (deciding case largely on
non-constitional grounds); see also United States v. Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136, 1137-39
(9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (upholding AWA based on Cossey and non-constitutional
grounds).
194 Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006). If the court in Crowell was not the first such decision, it
nonetheless was the first to issue a written order on the topic. See generally supra
notes 27 and 34.
195 Specifically, defendant Andrew Crowell was charged with knowingly
transporting and shipping or attempting to ship child pornography in interstate or
foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A)-(B) and § 2252(b)(1); defendant William
Swiat was charged with possession, receipt and distribution of child pornography,
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) and § 2252A(a) (5)(B)); defendant Bruce Bremer was charged with
possession and distribution of the same. Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *1. The
court's decision in Crowell covered all three defendants. See id.
196 See id. at *1-2.
197 Id.
"I Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145, the prosecution may seek review, in the
district court, of a magistrate judge's order setting a defendant's conditions of
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proposed conditions as violative of, among other constitutional
provisions, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause as
applied to them."'
The court agreed.2 00 After underscoring the mandatory
nature of the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B) and
acknowledging the expanded bail function of ensuring safety of
both the victim and community,20 ' the court applied the Salerno
test to the proposed conditions in relation to the government
interest in "protecting children from potential sexual abuse and
exploitation through the creation of pornographic images for
distribution."2 The government was found to have failed that
test as applied to the case.203 Importantly, the court emphasized
the parties' original consensus that the defendants' risk of flight
and threat to the community-including minor children-could
be properly addressed by conditions considerably "less stringent
than those required by the Adam Walsh Amendments," making
the requested conditions excessive in relation to the putative
government interest.20 4 The court ultimately concluded that
[a]lthough the additional conditions sought ... would further
advance the public's valid interest in protecting children from
sexual abuse and exploitation ... and, as such, are not per se
violative of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive bail, the imposition of such conditions on all
defendants charged with certain crimes, regardless of the
personal characteristics of each defendant and circumstances of
the offense, without any consideration of factors demonstrating
that those same legitimate objectives cannot be achieved with
less onerous release conditions . . . are, in the court's judgment,
unnecessary, to excessive bail in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.205
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1) (2006) (permitting the government to file "a
motion for revocation of [an] order [of release] or amendment of the conditions of
release" with "the court having original jurisdiction over the offense").
19' See Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *2.
200 Id. at *3.
201 Id. at *4-5 (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); United States v.
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 714 (1990)).
2" Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Boos, 127 F. 3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1997)).
2 See id. at *7 ("IT)he proposed additional conditions of release sought to be
imposed by the terms of the Amendments violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against excessive bail.").
204 Id.
205 Id.
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2. United States v. Vujnovich
The same result was obtained in United States v.
Vujnovich,2 0 6 despite the fact that the defendant was subjected to
the mandatory condition of electronic monitoring from the
outset. The defendant asked the court to remove the
mandatory electronic monitoring condition of the AWA
Amendments. The magistrate judge in Vujnovich had made no
specific findings as to the necessity of this condition,
but rather viewed it mandatory upon charging and ultimately
found any factual differences between the case and Crowell
immaterial.2 0 9 The court adopted the Crowell analysis in full,
concluding that "insofar as the Adam Walsh Amendments
mandate the imposition of specific conditions for . .. pretrial
release, the Act violates . . . the Excessive Bail Clause of the
Eighth Amendment." 10 The district judge upheld this ruling
on appeal, limited to the "dispositive" procedural due process
violation as applied to the defendant.2 1 '
3. United States v. Gardner
Crowell and Vujnovich are tough to reconcile with United
States v. Gardner."'2 In Gardner, the court granted the
government's motion to amend the pretrial release conditions in
light of the AWA Amendments and, in so doing, found no Eighth
Amendment violation as applied to the defendant.2 13 Defense
counsel's objection, which relied on Crowell,2 14 was unavailing.2 15
The defendant in Gardner, indicted on sex trafficking
charges, was granted pretrial release subject to numerous
conditions, including voice identification curfew, but not
206 No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901 (D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2007).
207 Id. at *1. In Vujnovich, the defendant was charged with receipt and
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). See id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at *2.
210 Id. at *3.
211 Id. at *2-3 & n.2.
212 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
213 Id. at 1031.
214 United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F),
2006 WL 3541736, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (finding mandatory conditions of
Adam Walsh Act violated Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
procedural due process protections of the Fifth Amendment, and separation of
powers doctrine).
215 Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
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electronic monitoring.2 16 Over two months later, the government
made the "subsequent realization" that the AWA Amendments
"mandated electronic monitoring, notwithstanding the Court's
finding that it was not required."217  The practical result of the
new condition was that the defendant's compliance with the
curfew would be enforced via real time monitoring, rather than
the periodic phone monitoring which required her to answer
multiple automated phone calls per day.
After assuming that the Excessive Bail Clause applied to
conditions of release,2 18 the court applied the Salerno test, which
required the defendant to show that the government's interest in
protecting children from sexual attacks and other violent crimes
"is an invalid government interest or that electronic monitoring
is excessive in relation to this interest."219 The court determined
that the government interest in the case was valid, although it
conceded that this interest might be weaker in the case of the
AWA Amendments than that of the Bail Reform Act in Salerno
due to the dearth of legislative findings in support of the
Amendments. 220  Next, the court concluded that the release
conditions of the AWA Amendments were not facially
unconstitutional, citing a single circumstance wherein imposition
of each condition would be necessary-i.e., "where a court
determines [that] all the minimum conditions mandated by the
[Amendments] are in fact warranted."221  Finally, the court
216 Id. at 1026 (citing "order setting conditions of release and appearance of
bond"). The defendant was indicted on one count of sex trafficking under
18 U.S.C. § 1591, and one count of conspiracy to engage in the same under
18 U.S.C. § 371. Id.
217 Id. at 1027.
21s The court appeared somewhat skeptical of this position. It found "no case law
directly on point," but reasoned that if detention was amenable to scrutiny under the
Clause, conditions of release should be as well. Id. at 1029.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1030 ("In contrast [to the Bail Reform Act of 1984], the Adam Walsh
Act contains no such express legislative findings or evidence. While this fact may
speak to the strength of the government's interest, it does not negate the validity of
the interest.").
221 Id. at 1030 & n.3. Thus, even in explaining its conclusion, the Gardner court
implicitly emphasized the limited application of its ruling to future cases where a
court found, at some relevant time, that imposition of every condition was
unnecessary which, by a plain reading of the Act, is a decision that the bail court is
not authorized to make. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II)
(undesignated paragraph) (listing certain offenses which, upon charging, "shall
contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic monitoring and" personal
association restrictions, place-of-abode and travel restrictions, no-contact
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reached the as-applied question of whether the mandatory
electronic monitoring condition was "excessive in relation to the
government's interest," concluding that it was not.222
In finding the "singular addition of electronic monitoring"
was "'reasonably calculated' to fulfill [the government's
interest],"223 the Gardner court relied heavily on the fact that the
defendant was already under curfew from the initial detention
hearing224.
Consistent with this Court's policies and practices, that curfew
is enforced by monitoring. In this case, monitoring is
established by voice identification which requires her to answer
her home phone during the hours of her curfew to demonstrate
compliance with the curfew. Under current conditions of
release, electronic monitoring merely changes the manner in
which her curfew is enforced. Instead of enforcement via
automated telephone calls, Ms. Gardner's curfew would be
enforced through electronic monitoring which provides real time
rather than periodic monitoring. The monitoring, while slightly
more intrusive, does not change the substantive restrictions on
her liberty-she is to comply with the curfew irrespective of how
it is monitored. At the same time, because electronic
monitoring provides real time information to Pretrial Services,
it provides added insurance against violations of bond
conditions, thus furthering the government's valid interest.225
To the Gardner court, the difference between curfew
monitoring and electronic monitoring was not night and day.2 26
Electronic monitoring imposed only an "incremental degree of
intrusiveness, including the physical inconvenience of having to
wear a bracelet or anklet," which itself did not amount to "a
restrictions, reporting and curfew requirements, and firearm restrictions (emphasis
added)); see also United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
("The plain language of the Adam Walsh Amendments, specifically the
unenumerated paragraph at the end of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B),. . . establishes that
Congress has attempted to mandate the court's imposition of certain pretrial release
conditions for those arrestees allegedly involved in certain crimes . . . ." (emphasis
added)).
222 Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
223 Id. at 1031 (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951)).
224 Id. at 1030.
225 Id.
226 Id.
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substantive restriction in her movement." 22  Thus the impact of
the additional condition was of no constitutional significance in
the unique context of the case.2 28
By focusing on the "singular condition" of electronic
monitoring to a pretrial release that already included the
remaining mandatory conditions, the Gardner court limited.its
rationale as an exemplar for future cases229-a fact that was
recently confirmed by two district court rulings that
unequivocally limited the usefulness of Gardner when addressing
Eighth Amendment challenges.2 30
4. United States v. Torres
In United States v. Torres,23 1 the only post-trial AWA
decision analyzed in this Article, the court distinguished Gardner
in a failure-to-register case brought pursuant to the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"),2 32 which also falls
under the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c) of the AWA
227 Id.
228 The Gardner court also rejected the defendant's subsidiary arguments that:
(1) the lack of an individualized judicial assessment of the need for electronic
monitoring ran afoul of the Excessive Bail Clause as interpreted by Salerno; and
(2) that the Clause required she be released "on the least restrictive conditions"
possible. Id. at 1031. The court treated the former argument as more properly
informed by defendant's due process claim, and dismissed the latter as unsupported
by the Bail Reform Act of 1966, by the plain language of the Excessive Bail Clause,
or by Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Clause. Id.
22 Id. at 1034. Indeed, the court later seemed to explain that were it considering
whether both electronic monitoring and a curfew the outcome of the case would have
been different. See id.
230 See United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228-29 (W.D. Wash.
2008), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated
and remanded, 327 Fed. Appx. 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum);
United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
23. 566 F. Supp. 2d 591 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
232 SORNA is found at Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587. It creates an independent federal
obligation on individuals convicted of a specified "sex offense" to register with a sex
offender registry. Section 141(a) of SORNA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250, imposes
criminal penalties of up to ten years imprisonment on individuals required to
register under SORNA who travel in interstate commerce and knowingly fail to
register or update their registration. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). Prior to the
enactment of SORNA, sex offender registration systems were the province of state
law, although they were provided funding through the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act. See Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §170101, 108 Stat.
1796, 2038-43 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)).
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Amendments.' The defendant in Torres was convicted of sex
offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.2 3 4 Upon
release from custody, Torres, as a resident of Texas, was subject
to the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program, which required
him to update his registration every ninety days.2 35 Although
there was no dispute that Torres "regularly and timely" updated
his registration with Texas law enforcement authorities, the
government brought a complaint against Torres under SORNA
after learning that he had failed to also disclose his employment
to New Mexico authorities.2 86 (Peculiarly, the entrance to the
defendant's worksite was in El Paso, Texas, but the company's
headquarters was located just outside the state line in Sunland
Park, New Mexico.) 23 7
After the initial hearing, the magistrate judge ordered the
defendant's release, subject to the mandatory conditions of the
AWA Amendments, but shortly thereafter removed them on the
defendant's motion, finding that automatic imposition of the
curfew and electronic monitoring conditions violated the
procedural Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the
separation of powers doctrine.23 8
The district court upheld the magistrate judge's ruling on the
first two grounds and found no need to address the third.23 9 In so
doing, the court first made clear that by including the
undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c), "Congress has attempted to
mandate the court's imposition of certain pretrial release
conditions" upon the mere charging of one of the enumerated
offenses.o Second, the court distinguished Gardner as a case
that "did not actually analyze the constitutionality of the Adam
Walsh Amendments," but rather merely evaluated the increased
233 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2006 & Supp. II).
1 Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
235 Id. at 593.
" Id. The registration obligations of SORNA require sex offenders to register in
any jurisdiction where he or she resides, works, or is a student. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a)
(2006).
237 Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
238 Id. at 593-94.
239 Id. at 602. Specifically, the district court held that the AWA Amendments
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment on their face, and the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause as applied. Id.
240 Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
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monitoring conditions over that which the Gardner court had
initially imposed, which did not conform to the AWA
Amendments in the first place.24 1
The government argued that because Salerno established
that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude Congress from
achieving compelling interests (beyond reappearance) through
certain conditions of pretrial release, the mandatory pretrial
release provision of the AWA Amendments, with its emphasis on
the protection of children, likewise does not violate the Excessive
Bail Clause.24 2 Torres, however, contended that the Amendments
violated the Eighth Amendment both facially and as applied to
his case.243 Specifically, he argued that the mandatory conditions
were unconstitutional in all cases because: (1) Congress specified
no reasons and made no findings in support of the Amendments,
and (2) mandating the conditions in his and every case was per se
excessive under the Salerno test.2 "
The court split its decision, holding that the mandatory
conditions were not facially violative of the Eighth Amendment,
but unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.2 45 In declining
to find a facial violation, the court perpetuated the congressional
intent slight-of-hand by explaining that while the AWA
Amendments were passed without congressional debate or a
record of any kind,2 46 the legislative findings pertaining to the
Act itself provided a valid governmental interest sufficient to
defeat the defendant's argument that no such interest existed.2 47
Second, the court rejected the defendant's argument that
mandating conditions of release in all cases met the "no set of
241 Id. at 599 n.2. Indeed, the Torres court went even further, concluding that
the holding in Gardner, if not inapplicable, would only support its decision that
mandatory conditions of the Amendments were unconstitutional. See id. ("In fact,
the court in Gardner stated that were it to consider both electronic monitoring and
the curfew, the outcome of that case would have been different." (citing United
States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2007))).
242 Id. at 599.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 600-01.
245 Id. at 602.
2" Id. at 600 (citing Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1030 n.2).
247 See id. (stating government interest in providing additional protection to
children "from sexual attacks and other violent crimes" (quoting Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. II, 109 Stat. 587, 611));
see also United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F),
2006 WL 3541736, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (recognizing this interest of the
AWA as a valid interest for the AWA Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1984).
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circumstances" test for facial invalidity,2 4 8 finding, as Gardner
did, that there were circumstances in which a court could
determine that the conditions of release would not be " 'excessive'
in light of the perceived evil and would impose these conditions of
release upon [the] accused, or, at least, would not object to their
mandated application. "249
The court's finding of an as-applied violation of the Eighth
Amendment tracked Crowell and emphatically rejected the
government's attempt to use Salerno as support for the
mandatory conditions of the AWA Amendments. In determining
that the mandatory application of the conditions "would be
excessive in light of the perceived evil,"250 the court highlighted
the folly of the government's position in the case: that while the
defendant had properly registered and re-registered with the
Texas law enforcement authorities, the government nevertheless
insisted that the Salerno test would be served by enforcing a
failure-to-register offense stemming from the defendant's failure
to also register with New Mexico authorities, despite the fact
that defendant was a citizen and resident of Texas and "the only
way into or out of [the defendant's worksite was] through an
entrance road located in the state of Texas."2 51 Under these facts,
the court concluded that application of the mandatory conditions
of release, "particularly the curfew and electronic monitoring
[conditions,]" were "more stringent than what is required to
achieve the Government's objectives," and "violate[d] Torres's
right to be free from excessive bail under the Eighth
Amendment." 25 2  Once again, Salerno cut against the
24 Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 595, 600-01. This conclusion came after the court's
detailed analysis of the state of the law concerning facial challenges outside of the
First Amendment context, including whether the "no set of circumstances" test
constitutes the proper analysis. See id. at 595 & n.1. As mentioned above, this
discussion falls outside the scope of this Article.
249 Id. at 601. It is fair to say that the latter conclusion was as tenuous as the
former, particularly in light of the court's admission that Congress had taken away a
bail court's ability to make these determinations in the first place. See id. at 595, 601
(noting that Congress has attempted to displace the judiciary's individualized
determination in all cases where bail court requires a secured bond).
250 Id. at 601 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
251 Id. As mentioned above, the entrance to the defendant's worksite was in El
Paso, Texas, but the company's headquarters were located just outside the state line
in Sunland Park, New Mexico. See id. at 593; supra note 237 and accompanying text.
252 Id. at 601-02.
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government's position and provided another example of how the
well-meaning but one-size-fits-all pretrial release scheme of the
AWA Amendments can lead to unconstitutional results.
5. United States v. Kennedy
United States v. Kennedy2 53 likewise rejected the Gardner
analysis for that of Crowell, Vunjovich, and Torres. Kennedy
involved an as-applied challenge to the mandatory conditions-
including electronic monitoring, curfew, place-of-abode, and
firearm restrictions-that arose as a result of a superceding
indictment invoking the undesignated paragraph of the AWA
Amendments.25 4 The defendant, Joshua Kennedy, was a thirty-
one-year-old longshoreman and lifelong resident of Seattle,
Washington.2 55 He had no prior criminal record and had
maintained full-time employment with the same employer for
nearly fifteen years.256
Kennedy was initially indicted for one count of possession of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5), after
his laptop was seized and examined at Sea-Tac Airport upon his
re-entry into the United States from travel abroad.257  He
surrendered voluntarily to United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents and was arraigned the
same day.258 The Pretrial Services report in the case
recommended that the defendant be placed on a personal
recognizance bond with supervision and particular conditions
of release that did not include the mandatory conditions of the
AWA Amendments-an admission that such conditions were
unnecessary.259 The government did not seek detention, nor did
it request conditions such as electronic monitoring or travel,
253 593 F. Supp 2d 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2008), motion to revoke denied, 593 F.
Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir.
2009) (unpublished memorandum).
25 Id. at 1224-25.
255 Id. at 1225.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 1224.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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abode, firearm, or curfew restrictions.2 60  There being no
disagreement, the magistrate judge's appearance bond included
none of these conditions.2 6 '
One week later, the defendant was charged in a superceding
indictment which added a count of transporting child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and § 2256.262
The government admitted that the additional charge was
based on no new facts, no new evidence, and no post-seizure
transmission of the alleged pornography.2 63 It did, however,
invoke the mandatory conditions of the AWA Amendments.6
The government immediately filed a motion to amend the
appearance bond to conform with the additional release
conditions mandated by the AWA Amendments, including curfew
and electronic monitoring, travel and place-of-abode restrictions,
and a firearms prohibition. 26 5  The government conceded that
"the sole reason" for the motion and supplement was to comply
with the mandatory provisions of the AWA Amendments. 2 66 At
the modification hearing, Pretrial Services stated that the
defendant had been in full compliance with the terms of his
original bond.2 67 The defendant expressed concern that the
mandatory conditions would interfere with his employment,
which required him to travel outside Washington multiple times
per month.26 8 Pretrial Services acknowledged this employment
situation and confirmed that the defendant would need to be
260 Id.
261 Id. The release conditions ordered by the court included
submitting to drug and alcohol testing; undergoing a mental health
evaluation; no possession of sexually explicit material; no access to a
computer or the internet without permission of Pretrial Services; no
frequenting of places primarily used by persons under the age of 18 without
approval of Pretrial Services; no employment or volunteer activity that
causes [the defendant] to regularly contact persons under the age of 18; and
no contact with any person under the age of 18 without permission of
Pretrial Services.
Id.
262 Id.
261 Id. at 1224--25.
26 Id. at 1225.
265 Id. Pretrial Services filed a supplement report which concurred with the
government's request for an amended appearance bond. Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
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detained for "perhaps over a week" until a proper home telephone
system could be installed for the curfew, and "would not be able
to board an airplane with an electronic monitoring device."26 9
Applying the Salerno test and referencing the stated
congressional purpose of the AWA itself, the court concluded that
protecting minors "from sexual attacks and other violent crimes"
was a valid government interest,270 which narrowed the scope of
the inquiry to whether "the mandatory conditions legislatively
imposed by the Congress are excessive in relation to the
government's valid interest."2 7 ' In a detailed opinion, the
magistrate judge concluded that the conditions were excessive
under Salerno, and therefore constituted an as-applied violation
of the Excessive Bail Clause, due to the severe restrictions they
placed on the defendant's liberty compared to the government's
basis for the added conditions.27 2 First, the court emphasized the
concession by both the government and Pretrial Services that the
defendant would be satisfactorily bound by the original release
conditions but for the superceding indictment.2 73 That
indictment, however, was based on no new facts. 274  The
government had therefore essentially admitted that its interest
was best met by the original conditions. Nothing had changed:
The superceding indictment was not based on any facts unknown
to the government at the time of the original indictment and the
defendant was not shown to be any more of a flight risk or threat
to the community than during his initial hearing.275 Accordingly,
269 Id. at 1225, 1229.
270 Id. at 1227 (quoting Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. II, 109 Stat. 587, 611) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court also referenced Gardner's conclusion regarding the validity of the
government's interest. See id. ("In the context of the Walsh Act Amendments
relating to conditions of release, the government's specific interest is to prevent such
crimes and attacks by those arrested and charged with one or more of the listed
offenses." (quoting United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (N.D. Cal.
2007))).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1227-29.
27 Id. at 1225, 1227.
274 Id. at 1228.
275 Id. at 1224-25, 1227.
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it was impossible to conclude that the government's AWA
interest in protecting minors could not be met by the conditions
imposed by the court's original appearance bond.276
Second, the court distinguished Gardner as a ruling
"necessarily limited to the unique facts of that case."2 " The
Kennedy court recounted that the defendant in Gardner was
already functioning under a curfew with periodic monitoring as
part of her conditions of release when the court upheld the
"singular addition of electronic monitoring," which it determined
as "only slightly more intrusive" than the conditions originally
imposed.2 78 Kennedy, on the other hand, was under no such
conditions prior to the government's request that the conditions
of electronic monitoring, abode, curfew, and firearm restrictions
be added to comply with the AWA Amendments, despite nothing
having changed.2 79 The court concluded that unlike the
situation in Gardner, the additional AWA conditions sought by
the government would "severely restrict the Defendant's
liberty[,] ... interfere with his present employment[,] ... exact a
significant toll on Defendant's present freedom," and would
therefore "not represent an 'incremental' or 'slightly more
intrusive' restriction on his liberty."280
276 Id. at 1227 ("[There has been no showing that Defendant is any more of a
flight risk or threat to the community now than he was at the time of his original
appearance bond.").
277 Id. at 1228; see also United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 n.2
(2008) (noting similarly).
278 Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (quoting United States v. Gardner, 523 F.
Supp. 2d 1025, 1030-31 (N.D. Cal. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting
that the addition of electronic monitoring in Gardner "merely changes the manner in
which [the preexisting] curfew [was] enforced." (quoting Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at
1030 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
279 Id. at 1227-28.
280 Id. at 1228-29 (emphasis added).
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The government's motion to revoke the magistrate judge's
release order in Kennedy was denied by the district judge,2 81 who
adopted the magistrate judge's analysis regarding the
constitutionality of the AWA Amendments,2 82 handing the
government another stinging defeat.
However, in a vague and unpublished memorandum opinion,
a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district
court's order and remanded the case for a modification of the
terms of release, without addressing the constitutional questions
presented.283 Perhaps confused by the language of the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments, the nature of
bail determinations generally, or by the specific conditions at
issue in Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit placed undue emphasis on
the fact that "[mlany of the terms of the Walsh Act are
undefined." 28 4 This allowed the court to imagine what the statute
should say, even what it used to say, in order to avoid the very
issue presented in every case mentioned above-that is, whether
it was constitutional for Congress to impose the automatic
conditions upon mere charging. The fact, for example, that the
statute mandated electronic monitoring, but "does not require or
define that condition to be continuous or limited to a particular
locality," or that it required a curfew, but without specifying "a
certain time of day or night or number of hours per day,"
convinced the Ninth Circuit that the Amendments somehow
"permitted an individualized determination by the district court
..1 Kennedy, 593 F. Supp 2d 1233, 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated and
remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (permitting the government to file "a motion for
revocation of [an] order [of release] or amendment of the conditions of
release .. . with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense").
282 See Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. Indeed, the district judge concluded
that "the additional evidence presented and proffered at the evidentiary hearing
strengthens Judge Donohue's Eighth Amendment analysis because it is clear that
the mandatory conditions sought by the Government would interfere with the
Defendant's employment," and likewise strengthened the due process analysis
because the new evidence more clearly revealed "the degree to which the mandatory
conditions pose a substantial restriction on the Defendant's liberty." Id. (noting that
Judge Donohue had merely concluded that such conditions "'could interfere with
[Defendant's] present employment.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy, 593
F. Supp. 2d at 1228))).
283 See United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App'x 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2009).
2" Id. at 707.
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to set appropriate parameters" for these conditions "based upon
the particular facts and circumstances of each case."285 This
despite the fact that the statute says the exact opposite.2 86
By highlighting the lack of a detailed definition
accompanying each mandatory release condition, the Ninth
Circuit was able to shift focus away from whether those
conditions could be required in an automatic, across-the-board
fashion. 287 The court's inquiry was entirely academic, of course,
because the nature of the constitutional challenge was to the
automatic imposition of the conditions themselves, not the
parameters of their implementation. It was also clearly
extratextual, as the statute makes plain that the enumerated
conditions are imposed automatically upon maintenance of a
mere charge, without consideration of whether they are
necessary to satisfy any legitimate government objectives.
No matter for the Ninth Circuit, however, as it bumbled
along for the remainder of its two-page unpublished order. It did
so under the contradictory assumption that the AWA
Amendments "require the district court to exercise its discretion,
to the extent practicable, in applying the mandatory release
25 Id.
286 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II) (undesignated paragraph)
(listing certain offenses which, upon charging, "shall contain, at a minimum, a
condition of electronic monitoring and" personal association restrictions, place-of-
abode and travel restrictions, no-contact restrictions, reporting and curfew
requirements, and firearm restrictions); see also, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 697
F. Supp. 2d 381, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the conditions of release are
"plain, unambiguous, and mandatory"); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d
591, 593, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("The plain language of the Adam Walsh
Amendments, specifically the unenumerated paragraph at the end of
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B),... establishes that Congress has attempted to mandate
the court's imposition of certain pretrial release conditions for those arrestees
allegedly involved in certain crimes ... ."); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp.
2d 1025, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that Congress, through the AWA
Amendments "require[s]" the enumerated conditions for defendants charged with
certain listed crimes, and that the government conceded this to be true); United
States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL
3541736, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (similar). But see United States. v. Frederick,
No. 10-30021-RAL, 2010 WL 2179102, at *9 (D.S.D. May 27, 2010) ("Construing the
Adam Walsh Act to require a court to exercise its discretion, when applying the
mandatory release conditions, including those relating to electronic monitoring and
curfew, avoids the need to pass on the constitutionality of the Act and its
amendments as applied here." (emphasis added)).
287 See Kennedy, 327 F. App'x at 707.
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conditions,"28 8 despite the fact that the statute provides neither
discretion nor any clues as to how the court's "practicable"
application might be accomplished.2 8 9 The Ninth Circuit held
that the district court would be required on remand to include all
six mandatory release conditions, "exercis[ing] its discretion" in
applying four of the six conditions: "(1) define a condition of
electronic monitoring; (2) specify restrictions on personal
associations, place of abode, or travel; (3) set a reporting
requirement; and (4) specify a curfew."29 0  The Ninth Circuit's
2" Id. (emphasis added). In order to make this conclusion, the court embraced
"the established principle that a statute should be read to avoid serious
constitutional issues." Id. (citing St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1981) ("A statute, of course, is to be construed, if such a
construction is fairly possible, to avoid raising doubts of its constitutionality.")). The
court assumed so, however, by treating the government's position as a "concession"
that this judicial discretion existed, without analyzing whether such a construction
was fairly possible under the language of the undesignated paragraph of AWA
§ 3142(c)(1)(B). Id. Even the Gardner decision belies any such possibility. See
Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (explaining that the government conceded that the
AWA Amendments "mandated electronic monitoring, notwithstanding the Court's
finding that it was not required." (emphasis added)).
289 Kennedy, 327 F. App'x at 707. The regrettable disconnect between appellate
and district courts on this subject was voiced, for the first time, in a decision handed
down just as this Article was sent to press:
As a Court that is tasked with determining whether a person will be
detained or released, and is obligated to follow the Adam Walsh Act as well,
I strongly yet respectfully disagree with those appellate courts. First, when
the Adam Walsh Act is at play, there is no judicial discretion to be
exercised in any respect. Second, the Act mandates the location where
curfew and electronic monitoring will take place-it is the accused's home
or residence. There is no deviation from that point. And, to suggest that the
statute does not say how long curfew may occur, or that a court has the
discretion "to manipulate" setting the location and the time period for the
curfew is unrealistic, without basis, and unconstitutionally shallow when
you consider that there are substantial constitutional liberties at stake.
Actually, if I were to follow these courts' logic, it would be conceivable for
this Court to set curfew at the offices of pretrial services for an hour each
week. Obviously that would be an absurd result, but nevertheless feasible
under the Eighth's and Ninth Circuit's reasoning. For these reasons, this
Court does not find these precedents persuasive.
United States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 7451512, at *6 n.6 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2011).
290 Id. The court somehow determined that two of the six mandatory conditions
'are absolute"-the no contact order and firearms restriction. Id. (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(v), (viii)). In exercising its "discretion" as to the non-
"absolute" conditions, the bail court was to consider "all relevant factors," including
the defendant's employment-related needs; "the time of day or number of hours in
specifying a curfew, or whether the curfew must be connected to a particular
address[;]" and the "appropriate condition of electronic monitoring that would enable
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instructions neglected to mention that these "specifics" are set
forth in the report of Pretrial Services, to which the bail court
usually grants deference. 9' On remand, the district court
entered an amended appearance bond that included the six
mandatory conditions, which it added by quoting verbatim from
the AWA Amendments themselves. 292
Limited only by its imagination, the Ninth Circuit's order
in Kennedy asks district courts to read out the mandatory
nature of the AWA's undesignated paragraph to save the
statute. It does so by claiming that "mandatory" actually means
"discretion [ary] ."293 By ignoring or failing to understand the
Amendments' express changes to the Bail Reform Act, by flouting
the district court's original release determination, and by
judicially re-crafting the undesignated paragraph of the
Amendments to fit its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit was able to
sheepishly avoid the constitutional questions presented, ensuring
that district courts under it will have massive responsibilities but
no sound guidance when faced with similar legal arguments in
the future.294
6. United States v. Arzberger
One of the more recent published decisions to address the
constitutionality of the AWA Amendments, United States v.
Arzberger,2 95 may have bridged the gap between the statutory-
based decisions in Crowell, Vujnovich, and Torres and the Ninth
Circuit's extratextual rationale in Kennedy. But it did so by
inserting a pre-AWA Bail Reform Act provision into the
defendant to continue his employment," despite Pretrial Services' statements on the
impossibility of such a condition. Id. at 707-08. Compare id., with United States v.
Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (noting Pretrial Services'
conclusion that defendant "would not be able to board an airplane with an electronic
monitoring device").
291 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3154(1) (West 2011).
292 See Appearance Bond, United States v. Kennedy, No. CRO8-354RAJ (W.D.
Wash. May 12, 2009).
29. Kennedy, 327 F. App'x at 707.
294 A similar result was recently obtained in Peeples, where a panel of the Ninth
Circuit repeated its oxymoronic rationale from Kennedy that because the AWA
Amendments "require[d] the district court to exercise its discretion in applying the
mandatory release conditions," the Constitution was not violated in a case where the
magistrate judge "took significant steps to ensure that the monitoring and curfew
conditions did not interfere with Peeples's work- and school-related needs." United
States v. Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
29. 592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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undesignated paragraph of § 3412(c)(1)(B). In Arzberger, the
defendant was charged with possessing and receiving child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)(B) and
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B). 29 6 After the defendant's initial appearance, the
magistrate judge released him on a secured bond, subject to the
conditions of drug testing and treatment, mental health
treatment, no unsupervised contact with minors, limited travel,
and computer usage monitoring.29 7 Upon the defendant's release,
the government moved the court to modify his bail by adding the
mandatory conditions of the AWA Amendments, with particular
emphasis on a curfew, electronic monitoring, no contact with
potential witnesses, and a firearm restriction.29 8
The court quickly rejected the facial challenge under the
Eighth Amendment for the same reason set forth in Gardner and
Torres-to wit, there being situations in which a defendant was
found to constitute a flight risk or public danger without
maintenance of such conditions.2 99 It was far less definitive,
however, regarding the defendant's as-applied attack. With a
reference to the Supreme Court's decision in Stack-the
precursor to Salerno-the court concluded that if the Excessive
Bail Clause were to mean anything, "it must preclude bail
conditions that are (1) more onerous than necessary to satisfy
legitimate governmental purposes and (2) result in deprivation of
the defendant's liberty."30 0  The government's requested
conditions, in the court's opinion, could very well fail this test:
[T]he price of [defendant's] freedom pending trial would be the
surrender of his constitutional rights to travel, to bear arms,
and to associate freely. Conditioning pretrial release on the
relinquishment of constitutionally protected rights in
circumstances where the conditions are not necessary to satisfy
legitimate governmental purposes would constitute excessive
bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment.o1
26 Id. at 592-93.
297 Id. at 593-94 ("I declined to require electronic monitoring.").
298 Id. at 592, 594.
2W Id. at 604; see also United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (W.D.
Tex. 2008); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
300 Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
301 Id. at 605-06. In a footnote accompanying the above-quoted passage, the
Arzberger court intimated that the AWA-mandated conditions requested by the
government might also "be construed as violating the specific constitutional rights
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Such conditioning could also fail the Salerno test, for while
the government had articulated a legitimate purpose in enacting
the AWA-"the protection of the public in general and of minors
in particular"-the determination of whether its response was
permissible or excessive "cannot be determined without an
individualized determination of Mr. Arzberger's
characteristics." 3 02  Accordingly, any ruling on the as-applied
challenge had to await such a hearing. For the Arzberger court,
the way to save the undesignated paragraph of the AWA
Amendments was not to invoke the constitutional avoidance
doctrine; instead, it was to not apply the Amendments.
Arzberger, like the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy, dodged the fact that
for charges falling under the undesignated paragraph of the
AWA Amendments, such an individualized determination is
neither contemplated nor provided under the provision and, even
if held, would be pointless because the mandatory conditions are
irrebuttable, resting solely on the crime charged, irrespective of
any balancing of interests A la Salerno. If the Arzberger court
wanted to turn back the clock to the rebuttable presumption
provided by the pre-AWA Bail Reform Act, it should have struck
down the Amendments.
7. Eighth Amendment Summary
The foregoing decisions expose the central flaw of the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments as it relates
to a challenge under the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Not a single court concluded that the 2006
Congress, in passing the AWA Amendments, determined that
maintenance of a mere charge changed the Salerno calculus.
Congress did not intend to overturn Salerno, yet it had somehow
forgotten what saved the Bail Reform Act from demise in that
very case: the requirement that the applicable conditions of
release be proven case-by-case with particularity in order for "the
Government's proposed conditions of release" not to be
impinged upon." Id. at 606 n.7. In this case, that meant the constitutional rights
protected by the Second Amendment (the firearm restriction), the First Amendment
right of association (the no contact condition), and the right to interstate travel
and/or free movement implicit in the Fifth Amendment term "liberty" (the curfew
with electronic monitoring). Id. at 600-04. Our hypothetical would include the third
liberty, at the very least. For a discussion regarding the Second Amendment issue,
see infra note 331.
302 Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (emphasis added).
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" 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil" from releasing the
arrestee.303  It also betrayed the most deeply-rooted device for
independently protecting against excessive bail: leaving to the
judiciary the definition of "excessive" in its calculation of
appropriate bail."
Congress can correct this problem by either repealing the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments or by
including within that paragraph a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the conditions unless the defendant can meet the burden
of establishing that maintenance of one (or all) of the mandatory
release conditions would violate the Salerno test. Such a
provision does not currently exist in the undesignated paragraph,
despite its longstanding existence in other sections of the Bail
Reform Act dealing with defendants previously convicted of
certain violent crimes."0 Instead, the heart of the Bail Reform
Act is tossed aside and the judicial consideration contemplated by
that Act is foreclosed. Questionable pretrial release conditions
are keyed to a mere charge rather than the arrestee's
particularized risk of danger, re-offense, or flight. For these
specified offenses, no individualized consideration need be given
to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,0 the
weight of the evidence against the accused,30 7 the history and
303 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987); discussion supra Part
II.B.
304 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
30. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. II) (providing rebuttable
presumption in favor of detention to assure reappearance and safety of
community of defendants previously convicted of certain violent crimes), with
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (providing irrebuttable presumption that all listed
conditions are required to assure reappearance of sex offense arrestee and safety of
community).
* Id. § 3142(g)(1).
307 Id. § 3142(g)(2).
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characteristics of the defendant,os or the nature and seriousness
of danger that would be posed by his release into the
community.o9
Until Congress corrects this severe oversight, cases
automatically conditioning release on the relinquishment of
longstanding constitutional liberties when it has been shown that
the condition does not advance the government's interest, or is
not necessary to satisfy that interest, will result in a win for the
defendant. While this could occur in almost any case, the
excessive nature of the AWA Amendments to the "perceived evil"
of the offense charged will be particularly acute when a
defendant is charged with viewing-only offenses, such as
child pornography possession or receiving charges under
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and § 2252A(a)(2)(B).o10  Mandatory
pretrial release conditions limiting, for example, travel, outside
contact, and the freedom to associate, do not relate to such
charges, and would be clearly excessive in relation thereto,3 1 1 as
30 Id. § 3142(g)(3). This makes irrelevant the considerations outlined by the Bail
Reform Act, such as
the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,
criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings;
and .. . whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person
was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing,
appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or
local law[.]
Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A)-(B).
3 Id. § 3142(g)(4).
310 It is important to note that of the seventeen challenges to the AWA
Amendments, all but two involved viewing/possession-only offenses. See United
States v. Rondeau, Cr. No. 10-147-S, 2010 WL 5253847, at *2 (D.R.I. Dec. 16, 2010)
(AWA challenge by a defendant convicted of child kidnapping and indecent assault);
United States v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-RAL, 2010 WL 2179102, at *1 & n.1
(D.S.D. May 27, 2010) (noting its status as the first-and at the time, the only--due
process challenge to the AWA involving actual physical harm to a minor).
311 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp 2d 1221, 1227-28 (W.D.
Wash. 2008), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009),
vacated and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished
memorandum); cf United States v. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070, rev'd in part,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495 (D. Neb. 2009); United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp.
2d 1074, 1076 (D. Neb. 2009). Any comparison to the facts in Salerno would be
ineffective in this situation, for Salerno involved the relation of much different
offenses to the defined congressional goal of preventing offenders arrested on
extremely serious charges to have the opportunity to engage in equally "dangerous
acts in the community after arrest." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750
(1987).
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would the private liberty-infringing impact of an electronic (or
GPS) monitoring device physically attached to every arrestee
upon a mere charge, rather than an individualized determination
of the arrestee's dangerousness. Salerno provides that the
greater the government's intrusion, the narrower that intrusion
must be tailored to protect the putative government interest. 312
In these circumstances, defense counsel has a very strong Eighth
Amendment argument that the government's objectives can be
achieved with much less onerous conditions.
B. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
Salerno dealt with the dangerous Genovese family
defendants; the Supreme Court's ruling hinged on the multitude
of procedural protections provided by the Bail Reform Act. While
the Court conceded that "the Government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh
an individual's liberty interest,"3 13 such a result was tolerated in
Salerno only because the Bail Reform Act "narrowly focuse[d] on
a particularly acute problem in which the Government interests
are overwhelming," 314 "carefully limit[ed] the circumstances
312 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752.
313 Id. at 748-49 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 367-
69 (1956); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160, 186-87 (1948); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)) (contemplating cases involving enemy
combatants or aliens during times of war and insurrection, dangerous resident
aliens pending removal proceedings, juveniles and mentally unstable persons who
pose a present danger to the public, dangerous defendants who are deemed
incompetent to stand trial, and even competent adults suspected of a crime).
314 Id. at 749. Compare id. at 750 ("Congress specifically found that [individuals
arrested for a specified category of extremely serious crimes] are far more likely to
be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest." (citing S. REP. No.
98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189)), with United
States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("Congress did not
engage in substantive debate nor develop supporting congressional reports with
regard to the Adam Walsh Amendments ... ." (citing United States v. Gardner, 523
F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2007))); United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F.
Supp. 2d 381, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[Dlespite congressional debate and findings
regarding other provisions of the Adam Walsh Act, there were none with respect to
electronic monitoring." (citing Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1030)); and United States
v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (E.D. Mo. 2009) ("[Tlhe Adam Walsh Act does
not include any Congressional findings that speak to the efficacy of the curfew
requirement for persons charged with child pornography offenses." (citing United
States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 600 (2008))).
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under which detention may be sought to the most serious of
crimes,"31 and mandated a multitude of procedures "specifically
designed to further the accuracy of [the bail court's]
determination" on a case-by-case basis.16 As discussed above,
these "numerous procedural safeguards" included, but were not
limited to, a prompt and "full-blown adversary hearing"317 at
which the government was required to "convince a neutral
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions of release [could] reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person."3 18  But what happens when a
particular provision of the Bail Reform Act as amended by the
AWA-i.e., the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B)-does
not provide for any such safeguards?
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment should
answer this question. It provides that "[nlo person shall . .. be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."3 19 The Clause, and cases interpreting it, teaches that the
government's exercise of power over an individual must be
accompanied by a fair procedure for determining the basis for,
and legality of, such action.32 0 As the Salerno Court put it:
"When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still
be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has
traditionally been referred to as 'procedural' due process." 3 21 At
its core, procedural due process ensures that parties whose rights
will "be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they
31 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
31 Id. at 751.
317 Id. at 749-50, 754.
318 Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). The Salerno Court was explicit about
what it required, and embraced these same safeguards to conclude that the Bail
Reform Act survived a procedural due process attack. See id. at 751-52; see also id.
at 751 (explaining that matters concerning pretrial release or detention are subject
to judicial determination, and that "the procedures by which a judicial officer
evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further
the accuracy of that determination.").
319 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V (applying to the
states).
320 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
321 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citation omitted).
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may enjoy that right they must first be notified[;" 3 22 and that any
"opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.' "323
In the context of our second hypothetical, the party affected
is the arrestee, the deprivation is the restraint on that arrestee's
liberties prior to trial caused by the mandatory electronic
monitoring and curfew conditions, 3 24  and the meaningful
opportunity to be heard would most likely be achieved through
an individualized hearing and particularized finding regarding
each appropriate condition of release by a "neutral and detached
judge,""' as set forth in the Bail Reform Act.326 Assuming the
existence of a protected liberty interest,327  the heart of the
dispute will hinge on what process the defendant is due.
Resolution requires application of the well-known test
enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge,"2 which balances three
factors: (1) the private interest affected by the government's
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the procedures used by the government and the value
322 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
323 Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see also Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
324 At the very least, this means the right to move freely from one place to
another or to simply stay put. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 164 (1972). To this end, the government cannot deny that "the term 'liberty' in
the Due Process Clause extends beyond freedom from physical restraint." Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989); see also infra notes 356-58 and accompanying
text.
32 Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
326 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)-(g) (2006 & Supp. II).
327 A liberty interest may be created by statute or "may arise from the
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty.' " Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005). These interests could take many forms,
including, for example, the constitutional rights protected by the Second
Amendment (the firearm restriction), the First Amendment right of association (the
no contact condition), and right to interstate travel and/or free movement implicit in
the Fifth Amendment term "liberty" (curfew, travel, and electronic monitoring
conditions).
3 424 U.S. 319 (1976). When assessing a procedural due process claim under
Mathews, the court considers (1) whether a constitutionally protected liberty interest
is at stake and, if so, (2) whether the government has provided adequate procedural
safeguards to protect it. The latter question is comprised of the familiar three-part
Mathews balancing test.
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that additional procedural protections would provide; and (3) the
interest that the government seeks to achieve through its specific
action.32
Determining what process is due requires weighing the
government function involved against the private interest
affected by that function.33 0 In our hypothetical, the Mathews
factors are clear. The "government function" is the requirement
of the AWA Amendments that persons charged with certain
crimes not be released prior to trial absent certain conditions-
such as a curfew, a no contact order, and electronic monitoring-
that by nature limit privacy and physical movement. The private
interest is undoubtedly the constitutional right to such liberties
pending trial-here, freedom from physical restraint, the
freedom to move, the freedom to travel, the freedom to associate,
and freedom from unwarranted invasions of privacy."' The key
factor is the third: the risk of erroneous deprivation of these
liberty interests by the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B)
329 Id. at 335.
33 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
sa In light of the Supreme Court's Second Amendment decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), an interesting question is raised by the
firearm prohibition, which is also a mandatory condition of the AWA Amendments.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (c)(1)(B)(viii). The district court decisions in Kennedy and
Arzberger underscore the point that, as an enumerated constitutional right, the right
to possess firearms is not something that can be withdrawn by Congress without
some modicum of due process. To this end, the magistrate judge in Kennedy
commented as follows:
In District of Columbia v. Heller ..... Justice Scalia noted that a law
regulating a specific, enumerated right such as the right to keep and bear
arms was subject to more than a rational basis level of scrutiny. If the
government's position in this case is sustained, this constitutional right
would be taken away not because of a conviction, but merely because a
person was charged. This right would be lost notwithstanding a lack of
showing that Defendant is a potentially violent individual, or that he even
owns firearms. Certainly no particularized need has been established in
this case that the Defendant should prohibited from possessing a firearm.
United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1230 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 2008)
(citations omitted), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash.
2009), vacated and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished
memorandum); see also United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 602-03
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting similarly in light of Heller: "there is no basis for categorically
depriving persons who are merely accused of certain crimes of the right to legal
possession of a firearm," and concluding that the AWA Amendments "violate due
process by requiring that . .. an accused person be required to surrender his Second
Amendment right to possess a firearm without giving that person an opportunity to
contest whether such a condition is reasonably necessary in his case to secure the
safety of the community").
1408
2011] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AWA AMENDMENTS
which, upon mere charging, imposes certain mandatory pretrial
release conditions on every defendant without requiring a
judicial determination or further consideration of any kind.33
When opposing a Fifth Amendment challenge to the
mandatory pretrial release conditions of the AWA Amendments,
the government should lead with its strongest point: that the
procedural due process holding in Salerno does not control in
AWA cases because Salerno involved detention without bail, not
pretrial release.333 Thereafter, it should hope for cases in which
as-applied challenges present defendants who have (1) been
previously convicted or found to be extremely dangerous, and (2)
received a modicum of due process through an individualized
judicial determination regarding the six mandatory conditions of
the AWA Amendments. 3 4 In other words, the government must
hope for a judge who ignores the terms of the undesignated
paragraph of the AWA Amendments by applying § 3142(c) as it
existed prior to the AWA,335 or who otherwise avoids the
constitutional problems presented by that provision by judicially
re-crafting its terms.33 6
As set forth above, our hypothetical defendant has been
charged with one count of possessing child pornography. The
government has presented no evidence of a risk of danger or
flight, and Pretrial Services has recommended release without
electronic monitoring or curfew. Our hypothetical defendant
benefits from having no prior judicial determination regarding
3" See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph).
33 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding that pretrial
detention provision of Bail Reform Act did not "offend[ I some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental" (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Of course, this statement was made by the Salerno Court
"under the[] circumstances" presented in that case, including the important fact
that the government, by clear and convincing evidence, had proven to the bail court,
during "a full-blown adversary hearing," that the Genovese family defendants
presented a serious and articulable threat to the community. Id. at 750-51.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Crites, No. 8:09CR262, 2009 WL 2982782, at *2 (D.
Neb. Sept. 11, 2009); United States. v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 890 (D. Mont.
2009); United States. v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Rondeau, Cr. No. 10-147-S, 2010 WL 5253847, at
*2 (D.R.I. Dec. 16, 2010); United States v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-RAL, 2010 WL
2179102, at *9 (D.S.D. May 27, 2010); see also discussion infra Part III.B.4.
.36 See United States v. Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2010); Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d at
889-92; United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App'x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2009).
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the necessity of the mandatory release conditions imposed by the
AWA Amendments. He also profits from the legal landscape in
this area-namely, that an overwhelming majority of courts to
have substantively addressed the constitutionality of the
mandatory conditions have found a Fifth Amendment
violation.33 ' Re-examination of these decisions illustrates why
the AWA Amendments would likely be held unconstitutional
under the Fifth Amendment in our hypothetical case and in the
majority of those like it, absent action from Congress or guidance
from the Supreme Court.
1. Gardner-Crowell-Torres
The Fifth Amendment claim in Gardner suffered an early
death. As detailed above, the Gardner court granted the
government's motion to amend the conditions of release to add
electronic monitoring, viewing that "singular addition" as a mere
"incremental restriction" on the defendant's prior conditions of
release-which already included a curfew and voice identification
monitoring-and therefore insufficient to implicate a liberty
interest under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Though it was "troubled by [the] automaticity of the Adam Walsh
Act in imposing certain release conditions without a judicial
determination,"3 39 the court never proceeded to the Mathews
balancing test because it determined that no constitutionally
3 See cases cited supra, note 18; see also discussion infra Part III.B.1-6.
Moreover, only eight of the seventeen trial courts to hear constitutional attacks on
the AWA Amendments actually substantively addressed facial challenges under the
Fifth Amendment and, of those courts, only Frederick rejected such a challenge. See
Frederick, 2010 WL 2179102, at *8. I do not include the three circuit opinions in this
list. See Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136; Kennedy, 327 F. App'x 706; Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033;
see also Rondeau, 2010 WL 5253847, at *2 (rejecting facial challenge in cursory
fashion based on failed as-applied challenge). Furthermore, due to the futile briefing
by the parties, the district court in Cossey did not substantively rule on any Fifth
Amendment attack and, indeed, decided the case on non-constitutional grounds. See
Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 889-92 (ruling on statutory construction grounds); see
also United States v. Peeples, No. 10-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122499 (D.
Mont. Nov. 18, 2010) (upholding AWA Amendments based entirely on decision in
Cossey), affd, 630 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
338 Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32.
3 Id. at 1032; see also id. at 1031 ("[Tlhe lack of any opportunity to be heard on
the enumerated conditions imposed by the Act raises a closer question under the
Due Process Clause than under the Excessive Bail Clause. . . .").
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protected liberty interest was deprived. 40 Under Gardner, then,
it appears that situations in which the court has at some time
meaningfully considered every applicable condition of release will
constitute the government's strongest case,341 assuming of course
that such consideration can be meaningful at all in light of the
fact that the undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments
forecloses such a determination.3 42
Crowell, as discussed above, involved the government's
motion to modify the defendants' conditions of release-to add
electronic monitoring and curfew-pursuant to the undesignated
paragraph of the AWA Amendments.3 4 3 These added conditions
were not initially recommended by Pretrial Services, requested
by the government, or imposed by the court, as none of the
defendants were found to present a risk of flight or danger to the
community.3" Indeed, it was for this very reason that the
Gardner court distinguished its own situation from that in
Crowell when it explained that "[gliven the effect of a curfew on
substantive freedom [in Crowell], a strong case would be made
that the application of the Adam Walsh Act worked a deprivation
of liberty in that case."34  The court in Crowell certainly agreed,
as it found an as-applied violation of the Due Process Clause.3 46
The path to that conclusion in Crowell began with a
summary of the purpose of the Bail Reform Act and the
Supreme Court's holding in Salerno.34 7 Included was a thorough
discussion of congressional attempts to expand judicial power in
the bail setting through the Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984,
emphasizing the importance of providing courts with "adequate
34 Id. at 1034. Indeed, the Gardner court explained that were it to consider the
new addition of both a curfew and electronic monitoring-as was the case in
Crowell-the outcome would have been different. See id. at 1034.
" Unfortunately for the government, however, the facts in Gardner make it an
enigma of sorts. See discussion supra Part III.A.3-5 (discussing Gardner and its
application in later cases).
342 See discussion infra Part III.B.2-5.
34 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
'" See United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-
304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *1-2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006).
' Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
" Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *10. In so deciding, the court did not
exhaustively evaluate the nature of the protected liberty interest involved.
1 Id. at *8-9 (noting goals of "providing for flexibility in setting conditions of
release appropriate to the characteristics of [the] individual defendants" (emphasis
omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3188)).
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authority to make release decisions that give appropriate
recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if
released," and "flexibility in setting conditions . . . appropriate to
the characteristics of [the] individual defendants."m The court
ultimately concluded that the AWA Amendments had eliminated
the very authority Congress sought to expand through the Bail
Reform Act-the same authority the Salerno Court relied upon to
uphold the Act against a procedural due process challenge:
The Adam Walsh Amendments' mandate imposing certain
pretrial release conditions, based solely on the nature of the
particular crimes charged, directly restricts the judicial
discretion Congress sought to enlarge in both the Bail Reform
Acts of 1966 and 1984, and which the Supreme Court has
recognized as paramount to meet the requirements of
procedural due process in the bail-setting process in federal
courts. See Salerno, supra, at 751. In particular . . one of the
Bail Reform Act's most important changes was the addition of a
requirement that arrestees charged with certain serious felonies
be detained prior to trial if the government demonstrates, by
clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing, that
no bail or release conditions would reasonably assure the safety
of any other person and the community. Salerno, supra, at 741
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) ("the detention law")). In upholding
the detention law against both substantive and procedural due
process challenges, the Supreme Court observed that matters
concerning pretrial release or detention are subject to judicial
determination. Salerno, supra, at 751 (stating that the
detention "procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the
likelihood of future dangerousness are specifically designed to
further the accuracy of that determination.").349
" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 2, 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3185, 3188).
349 Id. at *9. In a footnote, the Crowell court reiterated numerous procedural
safeguards which, in Salerno, helped save the Bail Reform Act from the due process
challenge made by the Genovese family defendants:
Defendants have a right to counsel at the detention hearing.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). They may testify in their own behalf, present
information by proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the hearing. Ibid. The judicial officer charged with the
responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention is guided by
statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and the
circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and
characteristics of the putative offender, and the danger to the community.
§ 3142(g). The Government must prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence. § 3142(f). Finally, the judicial officer must include written
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The Crowell court further explained that unlike the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, which created a rebuttable presumption of
pretrial detention for those charged with serious felonies, the
AWA Amendments create an irrebuttable presumption that
reappearance and community safety cannot be obtained without
the mandatory conditions.350 Surprisingly, the undesignated
paragraph of the AWA Amendments had removed the
individualized judicial determination necessary to evaluate the
presumption that lies at the heart of Bail Reform Act.s' The
most such a presumption could do was trigger an adversary
hearing as described in Salerno .3 52 Short-circuiting that process,
the Crowell court concluded, was patently unconstitutional, as
the arrest itself could do nothing by way of due process to
findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for a decision to detain.
§ 3142(i). The Act's review provisions, § 3145(c), provide for immediate
appellate review of the detention decision.
Id. at *9 n.7 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987)).
350 Id. (noting that the Ninth Circuit had recently struck down a similar
irrebuttable presumption as "unduly interfer[ing] with judicial discretion in matters
of pretrial release" in the context of the Fourth Amendment (citing United States v.
Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006))); see Scott, 450 F.3d at 874 ("[I]f a defendant
is to be released subject to bail conditions that will help protect the community from
the risk of crimes he might commit while on bail, the conditions must be justified by
a showing that defendant poses a heightened risk of misbehaving while on bail. The
government cannot, as it is trying to do in this case, short-circuit the process by
claiming that the arrest itself is sufficient to establish that the conditions are
required.").
a' Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *9. The most recent court to address this
problem explained as follows:
In all other federal crimes that come before a federal court, whether drugs,
acts of violence, or even murder, when the court is reviewing the matters of
risk of flight and danger to the community as to that particular accused,
the procedural due process proposition of the rebuttable presumption is
omnipresent. Rebuttable presumptions assure an accused an opportunity to
be heard and present evidence to the contrary, maintain the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence upon the Government, and uphold
the principle of an independent judicial review and exercise of discretion.
In fact, these are the bedrock principles confirmed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Salerno . ...
United States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 7451512, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2011); see also Scott, 450 F.3d at 874 ("Neither Salerno nor any other case
authorizes detaining someone in jail while awaiting trial, or the imposition of special
bail conditions, based merely on the fact of arrest for a particular crime.").
352 Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *10; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006 & Supp
II).
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establish the necessity of the AWA conditions of release.3 13  It
was not "meaningful" enough, in the constitutional sense of that
word.354
The government's Fifth Amendment position fared no better
in Torres. As mentioned above, Torres involved SORNA failure-
to-register charges based solely on the peculiar fact that the
defendant's employer sat partially in the State of New Mexico.55
Tellingly, the parties did not dispute the mandatory nature of the
release conditions set forth in the undesignated paragraph of the
AWA Amendments. Prior to applying the Mathews test, the
court finished this thought:
This paragraph prevents the courts from evaluating and setting
relevant conditions of pretrial release, and, instead, mandates
conditions which implicate significant liberty interests. Under
the Amendments, . . . the court is no longer able to determine
the conditions necessary to ensure an arrestee's appearance at
trial nor to assess his or her dangerousness to the community.
The Amendments strip away any independent judicial
evaluation by mandating that every arrestee be treated the
same, that is, subject to a curfew with electronic monitoring,
among other conditions of release, regardless of the
circumstances. 356
"' The Crowell court also intimated that such a presumption might also violate
the presumption of innocence accorded by the Due Process Clause. See Crowell, 2006
WL 3541736, at *10. However, this assumption might be questionable unless the
presumption is treated as more than a trial right. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
533 (1979) (holding that presumption of innocence "has no application to a
determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial
has even begun"). But see Karper, 2011 WL 7451512, at *4 (holding that the
mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring conditions of the AWA Amendments
unconstitutionally "dispense with the presumption of innocence at this stage of the
criminal prosecution," which is a "fundamental principle implicit within our concept
of ordered liberty"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) ("Nothing in this section shall be
construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.").
3 Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *10 ("[Tlhe Amendments, by mandating the
imposition of certain pretrial release conditions, establish that an arrest on the
stated criminal charges, without more, irrebuttably establishes that such conditions
are required, thereby eliminating an accused's right to an independent judicial
determination as to required release conditions, in violation of the right to
procedural due process applicable to the instant proceedings under the Fifth
Amendment.").
.. United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 593 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
35 Id. at 596.
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The Torres court began its Mathews analysis by explaining
that the "freedom of movement among locations and the right to
remain in a public place" were interests "fundamental to our
sense of personal liberty protected by the Constitution," 7" and
that the mandatory curfew of the AWA Amendments implicated
these interests by "curtailing an individual's ability to move from
one place to another and to remain in a place of choice."35
Applying the three-part balancing test under Mathews, the court
first concluded that "[t]he private interest implicated [was]
significant."35 9 Second, the court explained that the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the private interest was "manifest"
under the AWA Amendments because without any consideration
of the need for the drastic restriction on an arrestee's liberty to
ensure reappearance or public safety, "there is a great risk that
an arrestee will be deprived of his liberty erroneously."a"o
Because the conditions of release are "based solely upon the
arrestee's status as one allegedly involved in a certain crime,"
without any judicial determination of the arrestee's particular
circumstances, "there is no means of knowing whether the
deprivation is erroneous or warranted."361  Furthermore, the
court concluded that additional procedural safeguards would
alleviate this problem by allowing for judicial "consideration of
the arrestee's circumstances when setting the conditions of
pretrial release."362 All that was needed were the protections
provided by the pre-AWA Bail Reform Act. Third and finally,
the court concluded that the government's basis for eviscerating
those protections-"the safety of the community"-did not cut the
constitutional mustard under Mathews:
[Ilt is not clear to the Court how removing from judicial
consideration whether a curfew with electronic monitoring is
necessary ... improves [the government's stated interest]. And,
" Id. at 597 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164
(1972); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)); see also id. ("Indeed, an
individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his
liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is 'a part of our heritage.'"
(quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
3 Id.
359 Id.
" Id. at 597-98.
311 Id. at 598.
362 Id.
3 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2005 version).
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the burden on the Government of [providing] the greater
process is minimal. After all, the greater process only involves
what the Government must provide in all other cases not
involving the Adam Walsh Amendments, that is, presenting
argument to the court regarding what the Government believes
to be the appropriate conditions of release in a given case.364
By removing, for all defendants, any form of procedural
safeguards "critical to the constitutionality of the Bail Reform
Act as explained by the Supreme Court in Salerno," the AWA
Amendment's undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B) facially
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.6
2. United States v. Rueb and United States v. Merritt
The defendants in United States v. Rueb3 6 and United
States v. Merritt3 6 7  were each charged with violating
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and § 2252(a)(4)(B) for allegedly receiving
and possessing photographic depictions of child pornography via
their computers.6 8 In both cases, the only evidence offered by
the government regarding detention or release were reports
prepared by Pretrial Services.3 69  Despite the language of the
undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B), the court imposed
conditions of release particularly suited to the crimes charged:
prohibiting access to a computer, internet, e-mail or other online
communications, and requiring each defendant to submit to
unannounced inspections of his computer. 70 Shortly thereafter,
the court summarily granted the government's request, in both
cases, to add curfew and electronic monitoring conditions
3 Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
.6. Id. at 599. The decision in Torres could be viewed as skirting Salerno's "no set
of circumstances" test for facial invalidity. See supra note 178 (outlining test).
However, I would argue that the Torres opinion implicitly recognizes that the terms
of the undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments removes the possibility for
any circumstance where the court, after a hearing and independent evaluation of the
appropriateness of every condition listed in 3142(c)(1)(B), might find every such
condition warranted. The court simply cannot perform such an exercise under the
AWA Amendments (as currently written). See infra Part III.B.4.
866 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Neb. 2009).
867 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (D. Neb. 2009).
366 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. The
magistrate judge decided both defendants' motions to remove the conditions of
release on the same day.
869 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
370 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-76.
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pursuant to the AWA Amendments."' Both defendants objected,
claiming that the added conditions violated their respective due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment.3 7 2
Upon reconsideration, the court agreed, issuing identical
decisions on the same day. First, it reviewed the evidence offered
by the parties. Notwithstanding the clear terms of the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments, the court
underscored that although both alleged victims were minors,
neither defendant was charged with "any crime involving
personal contact or direct observation of a minor," nor was there
any evidence "before the court that [the] defendant[s] pose[d] any
risk whatsoever of offending against a minor" or "pose [d] any risk
of flight."3 73 Regarding danger to the community, the court noted
that defendant Rueb "ha[d] essentially no prior criminal history,"
that defendant Merritt had "only a minor criminal history," and
that both had "no history of violence or assaultive or even
threatening behavior."7 There was absolutely "no evidence that
[either defendant's] release poseld] a risk of danger to any other
person."3 7 5
Second, the court considered the utility of curfews and
electronic monitoring in cases such as the two before it, noting
that while such conditions may assist the government in knowing
a defendant's location pending trial,
that assistance is limited. It is unlikely, for example, that a
curfew or electronic monitoring can or would serve to prevent or
curtail a defendant's receipt and possession of child
pornography through the use of a computer, since computers
are available for public use in numerous places, and may be
available to a particular person at a friend's residence.
Likewise prohibited material could be brought to a defendant's
house despite the defendant's curfew and electronic monitoring.
Curfews and electronic monitoring are tools better suited to
limit a person's movements when he is a flight risk; this
37 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
372 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
3' Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. As to risk of
flight, the court found that both defendants had very strong ties to the community as
both were employed and had families in the area. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069;
Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. Furthermore, the government presented no
evidence of a risk of flight. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-70; Merritt, 612 F. Supp.
2d at 1076.
37 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
3 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
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defendant is not a flight risk. The government has failed to
show that curfews and electronic monitoring are release
conditions tailored to prevent any foreseeable risk of harm or
flight defendant[s] Rueb [and Merritt] may pose if [they are]
released pending trial. 6
Next, the court underscored that while "the Bail Reform Act
did not mandate certain conditions of release" for crimes
involving minor victims, the AWA Amendments in 2006 changed
course by creating an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant
charged with certain enumerated offenses cannot be released
without, among other conditions, a curfew and electronic
monitoring."' This presumption, according to the court, violated
every such defendant's procedural due process rights. 7 1 "In
contrast to the due process safeguards cited in Salerno," a mere
charge under the AWA Amendments subjected a defendant to
preset conditions of release.37 Every defendant is automatically
determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the community, and
"there is no evidence the defendant can offer to escape electronic
monitoring and a curfew," among other mandatory conditions.o
Any hearing by the court was therefore
unnecessary and, if held, [would be] meaningless because the
decision rests solely on the crime charged. The government
need not prove, and the court need not consider, the
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of evidence
against the defendant, the defendant's history and
characteristics, or whether the defendant poses a risk of flight
or harm to the public.s38
Citing Arzberger and Torres, the court next held that a
curfew coupled with electronic monitoring implicated the
defendants' liberty interests by restricting their "ability to move
about at will" or remain in a place of choice,382 which was of great
concern in light of the absence of evidence suggesting a risk of
37 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006 & Supp.II));
Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)).
"7 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (citing United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-
1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2006)); Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (citing Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *9).
37' Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1073-74; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1079-80.
.. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
380 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1072; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
3 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006 & Supp.
II)); Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)).
382 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1073; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
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danger or flight." The court acknowledged that the government
has the ability to curtail this liberty interest under certain
circumstances, but held that in doing so, "it must afford the
defendant procedural due process" passing muster under the
Salerno test.3M The AWA Amendments failed to meet this
irreducible minimum:
[Als to those defendants charged with crimes listed in the
[undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B) of the] Adam Walsh
Amendments, the amendments eviscerate the government's
duty to present evidence, the defendant's reasonable
opportunity to offer opposing evidence, and the judicial review
and determination otherwise required under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)
of the Bail Reform Act. Under such circumstances, the
procedural due process afforded is not only inadequate, it is
non-existent.
No defendant charged with a crime listed in the Adam Walsh
Amendments is afforded a meaningful opportunity to present
evidence to rebut the presumption that defendant's movement
must be restricted by a curfew and electronic monitoring
pending trial. The Adam Walsh Amendments to the Bail
Reform Act are unconstitutional on their face because, as to
every defendant charged with a crime listed in the
amendments, the amendments foreclose any individualized
judicial consideration of the interests otherwise required to be
considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
The court therefore found a facial violation of the Fifth
Amendment, as the mandatory nature of the Amendments made
any additional procedural gesture by the court "meaningless" as
a matter of due process.8 Furthermore, because the conditions,
" Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
3 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1073; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
* Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (citing United States v. Arzberger, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599
(W.D. Tex. 2008); United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.
Wash. 2008), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009),
vacated and remanded, 327 F. App'x. 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished
memorandum); United States v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2008 WL
687203, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2008); United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-
CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006));
Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (citing Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 601; Torres,
566 F. Supp. 2d at 597; Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Vujnovich, 2008 WL
687203, at *3; Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *10).
3' Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73; Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1079; see
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (holding that a successful facial
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as applied to the facts before the court, would "not serve to
'reasonably assure' [the defendants'] appearance at trial or
protect other persons or the community," those conditions were
removed.387
3. United States v. Smedley
An equally emphatic result occurred in United States v.
Smedley,388 where the court found that the mandatory home
detention and electronic monitoring conditions facially violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.38 9  After
rejecting the government's attempt to compare the case to
Gardner,3 90 the court applied the Mathews test to the challenged
conditions.39 1 Citing Salerno and Torres, the court first concluded
that the defendant's liberty interest pending trial was
"significant."3 92 Next, the court found "substantial" the risk that
the defendant's fundamental liberty interest had been deprived
erroneously, "in the sense that [the] imposed conditions of release
are not necessary to reasonably assure his appearance in court or
to protect the public," but instead are automatically added in
every case, "without any regard for, or inquiry into, the
defendant's individual circumstances."9 Finishing prong two of
the Mathews analysis, the court concluded that the very
procedures lacking in the AWA Amendments were available, "at
challenge requires a showing of "no set of circumstances" under which the statute
would be valid).
38 Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)); Merritt, 612 F.
Supp. 2d at 1080 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)).
388 611 F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
889 Id. at 977. The defendant in Smedley was charged with receiving and
possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (a)(5)(B). Id. at 972.
His motion to modify the conditions of his pretrial release focused on the condition of
home detention with electronic monitoring. Id. at 974.
390 See id. at 976-77.
891 See id. at 975-77.
392 Id. at 975 ("[A]n individual's right to freedom of movement among locations
and the right to remain in a public place are fundamental to our sense of personal
liberty protected by the Constitution." (quoting United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp.
2d 591, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. (" 'We
do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual's right to
liberty" (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987))).
893 Id.
[Vol. 85:13431420
20111 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AWA AMENDMENTS
little cost," to reduce this substantial risk while simultaneously
protecting the government's interest in protecting the safety of
children and the community.394
Specifically, the court noted that while the government's
interest in safety was commensurately high, providing what was
noticeably lacking from the AWA Amendments-i.e., an
individualized judicial determination of the need for each
mandatory condition-would not detract from such an interest.
Any burden to the government would be minimal under prong
three, the court concluded, for in every other criminal case, the
government must provide its reasons for seeking pretrial
detention or certain conditions of release.3 9 1 "Asking the
government to perform a task it must ordinarily perform is no
great burden."396
The Mathews test tipped decidedly in favor of the defendant.
Echoing Rueb and Merritt, the court in Smedley concluded that
the AWA Amendments were facially unconstitutional, as the
"procedural due process afforded defendants under the Adam
Walsh Act 'is not only inadequate, it is non-existent.' "a
Particularly appalling to the court was the absence of an
opportunity for any defendant to meaningfully challenge the
mandatory conditions or for any court to give "consideration [to]
the type of factors outlined in Salerno."'*
4. United States v. Stephens
The same result was obtained, at least initially, in United
States v. Stephens.39 9 The defendant in Stephens was charged
with possession, transportation, and receipt of child pornography,
and making false statements to the FBI.40 0  At the detention
3" Id. at 975-76.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 976.
"I Id. (quoting United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079 (D. Neb.
2009)).
398 Id.
39 No. CRO9-3037-MWB, 2009 WL 3568668, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 27, 2009)
(finding mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring conditions facially violative of
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments), motion to revoke order denied, 669 F. Supp. 2d
960, 969 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (same as to Fifth Amendment), rev'd and remanded, 594
F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
" These offenses are set forth at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2252A(b)(2),
2252A(a)(2)(A), 2252A(b)(1), 2252A(a)(1) and 2252A(b)(1), respectively. Stephens,
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hearing, the prosecution moved to detain the defendant but
presented no evidence in support of this request, relying instead
on the Bail Reform Act's rebuttable presumption that no
condition or combination would reasonably assure reappearance
and community safety for persons accused of receipt of child
pornography.4 0 1 In light of the evidence presented by the
defendant, however, the magistrate judge determined that "the
prosecution had failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant Stephens representled] a flight risk, or
by clear and convincing evidence that [he] represent[ed] a danger
to the community under any terms or conditions of release."4 02
Accordingly, Stephens was released pending trial on conditions
that did not include curfew or electronic monitoring.0
Two weeks later the prosecution moved to add these two
conditions, arguing that they were required under the AWA
Amendments for all defendants charged with transportation or
receipt of child pornography, regardless of the lack of evidence
presented to the bail court.404 The magistrate judge disagreed,
finding that mandatory application of a curfew and electronic
monitoring violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to
procedural due process and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
on excessive bail.405
The government's motion to revoke this order was denied by
the presiding district judge, who confined his analysis to the
Fifth Amendment. 4 06 After rejecting the prosecution's argument
that the Mathews balancing test did not apply,407 the district
669 F. Supp. 2d at 962. The defendant in Stephens was also charged with the
attempt provisions of these offenses. Id.
401 Id.
402 Id.
4 Id. "Among other things, the magistrate judge ordered Stephens to (1) remain
within a hundred miles of his residence; (2) refrain from possessing controlled
substances, firearms, ammunition, destructive devices, and other dangerous
weapons; (3) avoid criminals, pornography, and erotica; (4) maintain weekly contact
with his attorney; and (5) consent to unannounced searches and monitoring of his
computer and other electronic devices." United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 10333,
1035 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010).
' Stephens, 2009 WL 3568668, at *1.
405 Id. at *1-2.
40 Stephens, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 965-69. Although Mr. Stephens argued on
reconsideration that the mandatory conditions violated the Excessive Bail Clause of
the Eighth Amendment, the district court did not reach this issue.
407 Id. at 966. Indeed, the government has disputed this conclusion in only two
reported cases-both of which it lost. See United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d
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court concluded that the private interest prong of that test
favored the defendant because the AWA's mandatory curfew and
electronic monitoring conditions "clearly impact a liberty interest
'by curtailing an individual's ability to move from one place to
another and to remain in a place of choice.' "4" Next, channeling
Torres and Arzberger, the court found that the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of this liberty interest was substantial
because the mandatory conditions were blindly based on a charge
alone, without a judicial determination as to their necessity or
any other independent means to assess whether the deprivation
is warranted.4 09 This risk was particularly unacceptable to the
court in light of the availability of additional procedural
safeguards that were already in place in the unamended Bail
Reform Act 1984, of which the government was well aware.4 10
The court explained that while "the government has a significant
interest in ensuring the safety of the community in general and
specifically in protecting children from being victimized by those
who commit child pornography related offenses,"41 ' this interest
was "in no way diminished by permitting a court to make an
individualized assessment of the need for curfew and electronic
monitoring restrictions based on the unique factual
considerations relevant to a particular defendant," as bail courts
do in every other criminal case. 412 Any burden to the government
in providing this greater process would therefore be minimal.4 13
381, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (rejecting argument that the tougher standard from
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443-44 (1992) provides the proper framework in
such cases because AWA challenge is not to a state rule of criminal procedure, thus
no comity concerns exist); Stephens, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (same).
4" Stephens, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (quoting United States v. Torres, 566 F.
Supp. 2d 591, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2008)).
40 See id. (citing United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 600-01
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 597).
410 See id. (citing Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01).
41 Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990)) (explaining, when
considering Ohio's prohibition on child pornography, that "[ilt is evident beyond the
need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling.'" (quoting New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982))).
412 Id. at 968 (citing United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (E.D.
Mo. 2009); Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 601; United States v. Solomon, No. 09-CR-
4024-DEO, at 7 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 27, 2009)).
"" Id. at 967-68 (citing Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 976; Arzberger, 592 F. Supp.
2d at 601).
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In closing, the district court in Stephens harkened back to
Salerno, contrasting the protections provided by the Bail Reform
Act and the AWA Amendments. The minimal but meaningful
procedural protections sufficient to repel a due process challenge
in Salerno sealed an opposite fate for the AWA Amendments in
Stephens, especially absent congressional findings as to the
efficacy of the mandatory conditions or a determination that
courts would refuse to require them for defendants charged with
child pornography offenses if the conditions were discretionary
rather than mandatory.4 14 After balancing the Mathews factors,
the district court held that
the Adam Walsh Act's mandatory electronic monitoring and
curfew requirements violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because they require the imposition of a curfew
with associated electronic monitoring without providing the
defendant a fair opportunity to contest the necessity for such
restrictions on the defendant's liberty. . . . "[T]he Amendments
are unconstitutional on their face because the absence of
procedural protections is universal: no defendant is afforded the
opportunity to present particularized evidence to rebut the
presumed need to restrict his freedom of movement."41
The government filed an interlocutory appeal of this ruling,
which was reversed and remanded by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in a decision that never applied the Mathews balancing
test or grappled with the actual terms of the undesignated
paragraph of the AWA Amendments.4 16 The court of appeals
ruled solely on the facial challenge, expressing "no view as to any
as-applied challenge Stephens might assert on remand."41 7
The Eighth Circuit began its short opinion in Stephens by
stressing the same point made by three of the five courts to
have rejected facial Fifth Amendment challenges to the AWA
414 See id. at 968-69.
415 Id. at 969 (quoting Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 601) (citing Solomon, No.
09-CR-4024-DEO, at 7; Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 976). The district court in
Stephens distinguished the Ninth Circuit's unpublished memorandum in Kennedy
and the District of Montana decision in Cossey as cases where the Mathews analysis
was not applied, and distinguished Gardner as confined to "its unique facts." See id.
at 969 n.2; see also supra Part III.A.3-5 (describing the limited applicability of
Gardner).
416 Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1040. Judge Smith wrote a concurring opinion that
applied a cursory version of the Mathews test. See id. at 1040-41 (Smith, J.,
concurring).
411 Id. at 1039 (majority opinion).
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Amendments: the distinction between facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges.4 18 Underscoring "the Supreme Court's
'disdain' for" the former, the Eighth Circuit explained that to
reject a facial challenge to the AWA Amendments, it "need
only find them adequate to authorize the pretrial [conditions] of
at least some persons charged with crimes, whether or not
they might be insufficient in some particular circumstances."419
Applying the Salerno's "no set of circumstances" test, the
Eighth Circuit quickly concluded that "Stephens' facial
challenge . .. fails because [he] cannot establish [that] there are
no child pornography defendants for whom a curfew or electronic
monitoring is appropriate."420  According to the court, "[a]n
irrebuttable presumption of curfew and electronic monitoring
would be appropriate in any case in which a judicial officer
conducting a detention hearing would, in fact, find curfew and
electronic monitoring to be warranted,"421 citing a single
unpublished decision from the District of Nebraska.4 2 2
This reasoning leaves open the challenge, made in this
Article, that such a hypothetical individualized judicial
determination is foreclosed by the AWA Amendments. The
Eighth Circuit in Stephens explained that an irrebuttable
presumption is appropriate for all cases if, in any one case, an
individualized judicial determination would still result in
imposition of the conditions mandated by the undesignated
paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B).423 But if Congress, through that
very provision, removed the bail court's ability to make such a
418 See id. at 1037-38; United States v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-RAL, 2010 WL
2179102, at *6 (D.S.D. May 27, 2010); United States. v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881,
891 (D. Mont. 2009).
419 Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1037-38 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 751 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
420 Id.
421 Id. at 1038 ("[there are circumstances where [the Adam Walsh] Act can be
applied constitutionally-e.g., where a court determines all the minimum conditions
mandated by the Adam Walsh Act are in fact warranted" (alterations in original)
(quoting United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
2007))).
422 Id. (citing United States v. Crites, No. 8:09CR262, 2009 WL 2982782, at *2
(D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2009)). The court in Crites analyzed-in extremely cursory fashion
based entirely on the defendant's legal brief-whether the electronic monitoring
and curfew conditions were appropriate for the particular defendant before it,
and in doing so, ignored the automatic application of those conditions via
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
422 Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1038.
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determination and foreclosed the opportunity for defendants to
challenge the mandatory conditions, how would such a case ever
exist? Under the unambiguous terms of the Amendments,
every arrestee covered must submit to electronic monitoring
and a curfew-among other conditions-without any further
consideration.42 4 These conditions are mandatory, and the court
must impose them without any regard for the defendant's
individual circumstances. Indeed, as we have seen in almost
every case, as soon as the government recognizes this procedural
inequity, it moves to add the mandatory conditions regardless
of-even in spite of-any individualized judicial consideration as
to their necessity.4 2 5 Therefore, the question of whether there
exist "child pornography defendants for whom a curfew or
electronic monitoring is appropriate"4 26 ignores the fact that this
very "set of circumstances" has been removed by the
Amendments because it has already been answered by
Congress.4 27 Judges are nothing more than potted plants under
these circumstances.
Rather than address the drastic impact of the mandatory
conditions and removal of the judicial role in assessing those
conditions on a case-by-case basis, the appellate court in
Stephens broadly framed the question as whether the AWA
Amendments prevented defendants from receiving a detention
hearing. 42 8 Having reframed the issue as one of simple detention
or release, the court explained that the defendant's facial
424 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II) (undesignated paragraph); see
also United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
425 See United States v. Stephens, 669 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962-63 (N.D. Iowa 2009),
rev'd and remanded, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rueb, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 1068, 1069-70 (D. Neb. 2009) , rev'd in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495
(D. Neb. 2009); United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1075-76 (D. Neb.
2009); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1027; United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-
291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006).
426 Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1038.
427 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph). Indeed, the courts
that have found no facial violation were content to answer the facial attack
presented in their case with a hypothetical assuming that the bail court will provide
more process than contemplated by the AWA Amendments; supra note 249 and
accompanying text; see also infra note 467 and accompanying text.
" Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039.
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challenge to the Amendments must fail because the conditions,
though expressly mandatory,4 2 9 were somehow discretionary as
well430:
Stephens overestimates the impact of § 216 of the Adam
Walsh Act upon the Bail Reform Act. Section 216 does not
deprive child pornography defendants of a detention hearing or
an individualized determination whether detention or release is
appropriate. As relevant here, the only effect of § 216 is to
require a curfew and some electronic monitoring. The
defendant remains entitled to a detention hearing and a large
number of individualized determinations-including an
individualized determination as to the extent of any mandatory
conditions of release.431
Much like the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy, the Stephens court
resolved the defendant's argument by changing it, ignoring the
express terms of § 3142(c)(1)(B), the precise question of whether
the undesignated paragraph's use of term "shall contain" makes
the conditions mandatory,4 32 and whether it was constitutional
for Congress to impose the curfew and electronic monitoring
conditions upon mere charging, without requiring any procedural
protections. The Eighth Circuit's satisfaction with "a large
number of individualized determinations" 433 suggests a "good
enough" due process standard that was rejected in Salerno.4 34
Rather than address the defendant's challenge to the mandatory
nature of the pretrial conditions, the Eighth Circuit explained
that the mandatory conditions are not defined, and can thus be
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph) ("[A]ny release order
shall contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic monitoring and [five others]."
(emphasis added)).
4o Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039.
431 Id. The reward of "a large number of individualized determinations"-even if
they existed-is empty rhetoric when the result of those determinations are
preordained. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph) ("any release
order shall contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic monitoring and [five
others]." (emphasis added)). The Eighth Circuit in Stephens, much like the Ninth
Circuit in Kennedy and Peeples, fails to explain how this purported flexibility or
discretion matters in any real case other than in those where the bail judge flat out
ignores the words "shall contain" in the undesignated paragraph of
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
4.. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph) (providing that "any
release order shall contain, at a minimum, a condition of electronic monitoring and
[five others]." (emphasis added)).
s Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039.
* Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-51.
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crafted and shaped to the particular case.435 Or to use the court's
words, the "only effect of § 216 is to require a curfew and some
electronic monitoring,"436 whatever that means.437
The court's use of those terms mirrors the Ninth Circuit's
oxymoronic reference to judicial "discretion" in imposing
"mandatory" conditions-i.e.,, the notion that "[blecause 'curfew'
and 'electronic monitoring' remain undefined, the district court
possesses many tools in its discretionary toolkit" to provide due
process and remedy any other constitutional infirmity.438 The
Eighth Circuit in Stephens did not meaningfully define this
"discretionary toolkit" or address whether it still exists after the
AWA Amendments, and the court appeared to have little or no
idea of what might fit inside, or how its contents would advance
the mandatory terms of the Amendments rather than give
district courts more nuanced and unguided pretrial release
decisions to make. Although Congress had clearly removed that
" Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039.
436 Id.
4 Indeed, just as this Article was sent to press, a district court respectfully
attacked this rationale set forth by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See United
States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 7451512, at *6 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
10, 2011); see also United States. v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-RAL, 2010 WL
2179102, at *9 (D.S.D. May 27, 2010) ("Construing the Adam Walsh Act to require a
court to exercise its discretion, when applying the mandatory release
conditions . . . avoids the need to pass on the constitutionality of the Act and its
amendments as applied here.") (emphasis added). The Frederick court further
justified its extra-textual reading of § 3142(c)(1)(B) by noting that the Amendments
"are only at odds with the purpose of the Bail Reform Act if they are construed to
require the mandatory imposition of the same conditions in every case." Id. But see
United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("The plain
language of [the undesignated paragraph] . . . establishes that Congress has
attempted to mandate the court's imposition of certain pretrial release conditions for
those arrestees allegedly involved in certain crimes . . . ."); United States v. Crowell,
Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *7 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 2006) (same); United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 391 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (same); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(noting that Congress, through the AWA Amendments "require[s]" the enumerated
conditions for defendants charged with certain listed crimes and that the
government conced this to be true). Even the court in Cossey admitted this much.
United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (D. Mont. 2009) (explaining that
AWA Amendments mandate pretrial release conditions "that must include, at a
minimum, electronic monitoring and the five specific conditions. The statutory
mandate is unambiguous.") (emphasis added).
438 Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039.
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toolkit in 2006, the Eighth Circuit panel refused to allow the
terms of the AWA Amendments to interfere with its decision to
reverse and remand the finding below. 3 9
' An entirely unique approach to a constitutional challenge to the AWA
Amendments prevailed in Cossey. There, the district court rejected the government's
contention-which it found unsupported by the congressional record-that any
person charged with violating an AWA-enumerated offense is automatically "likely
to commit hands-on sexual offenses against children." Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d at
887. Handcuffed by the parties' futile briefing, the court limited its analysis to the
defendant's argument that imposition of the mandatory conditions violated the
constitutional presumption of innocence-an argument comprised of a single
subheading and a handful of sentences in the defendant's brief. Id. at 886-88. The
court concluded that subsection (j) of the AWA Amendments-which provides that
"[niothing in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the
presumption of innocence"-defeated both the government's claim that such a right
exists only at trial as well as the defendant's contention that the mandatory
conditions conflicted with the procedures set forth Bail Reform Act and required all
persons charged with certain crimes to be treated the same. Id. at 888-89 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (2006 & Supp. II)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see
United States v. Karper, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 7451512, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2011) (holding that the mandatory curfew and elecontronic monitoring
conditions of the AWA Amendments unconstitutionally "dispense with the
presumption of innocence at this stage of the criminal prosecution," which is a
"fundamental principle implicit within our concept of ordered liberty"). The court
held that because subsection (j) would be rendered inoperative if the AWA
Amendments mandated certain identical pretrial release conditions upon the mere
charging of certain crimes, the Amendments could not be so interpreted. Cossey, 637
F. Supp. 2d at 889. It based this holding on the statutory construction principle that
forbade interpretation of one provision so as to render the other provision
inoperative, id., despite the fact that it was doing just that to reach its conclusion.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph).
Of course, enforcing one statutory provision while ignoring another presents the
problem of fashioning a judicial remedy using the passage ignored. But with a little
imagination and an assist from a higher authority, the court in Cossey was up for
the task. Explaining that "[i]t is not difficult to imagine fashioning conditions of
release that honor" Congress's interests in protecting children from harm "without
assuming that every person ... accuse[d] of a child pornography crime is a hands on
sexual offender who will prey on children while on pretrial release," the court
pointed to the only ruling at the time to have so imagined-the unpublished
memorandum opinion by the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d at
889 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App'x 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2009)). The
court adopted the Ninth Circuit's unpublished memorandum to "construe the Walsh
Act to require the district court to exercise its discretion, to the extent practicable, in
applying the mandatory release conditions." Id. at 889-90 (quoting Kennedy, 327 F.
App'x at 707) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cossey provides an example of just how far a court will stretch the terms of a
statute to eschew a detailed analysis of a well-intentioned but poorly-drafted statute.
In laboring to make the point that it was giving neither party what it wished, the
court in Cossey gave the government much more than it asked for: a lifeline from its
own admission regarding the inflexible and mandatory nature of the AWA
Amendments. See id. at 891-92. The court, clinging to subsection (j), conflated the
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5. United States v. Polouizzi
One of the most recent courts to address the constitutionality
of the AWA Amendments, the Eastern District of New York in
United States v. Polouizzi,"0 delivered perhaps the most scathing
indictment of the Amendments to date."' It was not persuaded
by the ultimate dispositions in Kennedy, Stephens, or Gardner,
and instead found the mandatory conditions unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant-a man whose original conviction of
receipt and possession of child pornography had been set aside in
light of the Second Circuit's substantial change in the
indictment.442
Mr. Polouizzi, a restaurant owner in Queens, New York, was
originally charged with receiving and viewing child pornography
on his personal computer, "in a double locked room, in the
privacy of [his] garage."4 43 From the outset of the case, the record
reflected that "the defendant [did] not pose any danger to any
minors" and there was "no evidence ... that [he] ha[d] in any
way engaged in conduct that would result in harm to any
member of the community.""" Indeed, at his detention hearing,
the trial court noted that Polouizzi "has a good relationship with
his wife and five sons, and has been a model citizen
and . .. entrepreneur except for this one aberrant offense.""
permissible individualized judicial inquiry set forth in the pre-AWA Bail Reform Act
with the impermissible inquiry regarding the necessity of the mandatory conditions
of the AWA Amendments, all in an imaginative attempt to save the statute from its
natural demise. See id. at 889-91.
"0 697 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
44 See id. at 387-95 (finding as-applied violations of the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments; not addressing facial challenges brought against AWA).
442 See id. at 386-87, 395; United States v. Polouizzi (Polouizzi V), 687 F. Supp.
2d 133, 142, 209 (E.D.N.Y.) (granting new trial on charges under
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B)), vacated, 393 F. App'x 784 (2d Cir. 2010).
Because his conviction had been vacated, Polouizzi was treated as charged, and thus
stood in the same shoes as those arrestees discussed in previous cases in this Article.
"4 Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 384, 395.
"' Id. at 385 (elipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (observation
of magistrate judge regarding expert opinion offered at trial)); see also id. at 384
("[Hie has never molested any person, sexually or otherwise.").
"' United States v. Polizzi, No. 06-CR-22 (JBW), 2008 WL 1820900, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008) (Statement of Reasons Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)).
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The court therefore determined that "electronic monitoring [was]
not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to
society."" 6
The court released the defendant on bail with the following
conditions: (1) surrender of passport; (2) no-contact order
with unattended minors; (3) random drug testing; (4) mental
health treatment; (5) prohibition on entering son's bedroom;
(6) prohibition on use of family's computer; and (7) a one million
dollar secured bond."7  However, when the prosecution
"demanded that the defendant [also] be ordered to wear an
electronic tracking bracelet in reliance on the mandate of the
Adam Walsh Act," this condition was added." 8 There was no
question it was required under the AWA.4 49 Explaining that the
terms of the undesignated paragraph of § 3142(c)(1)(B) were
"plain, unambiguous, and mandatory,"450 the court expressly
rejected the ultimate decisions in Kennedy and Cossey-decisions
that, despite acknowledging the mandatory nature of the
conditions, allowed district courts to ignore the conditions and
exercise discretion in their application to each arrestee.4 51
The court's Fifth Amendment Mathews analysis began with
the recognition that a valid liberty interest existed in Mr.
Polouizzi's "right to travel from one place to another free of
hindrances," which the court considered "a well established
aspect of constitutionally protected private freedom."45 2  The
4' Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The court further explained that "[slince
his arrest in 2006, the defendant has been successfully engaged in continuing
intensive mental health treatment. He has complied fully with the terms of bail and
supervision. . . ." Id. at 385 (citing Polouizzi V, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56 (finding of
trial court); Order to Show Cause, United States v. Polizzi, No. 06-CR-22 (JBW)
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (same); Transcript of Motion at 2:17-19, United States v.
Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 06-CR-22 (JBW)) (statement of
probation services)). The terms included "the strict rigors of home detention."
Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
" Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
" Id.
449 Id. at 386. Indeed, the court noted that "[w]ithout the statutory mandate, this
condition would not have been imposed." Id. at 385.
4o Id. at 386.
451 Id. (citing United States v. Kennedy, 327 F. App'x 706, 706-08 (9th Cir. 2009)
("construing the Adam Walsh Act 'to require the district court to exercise its
discretion, to the extent applicable, in applying the mandatory release conditions'")
(emphasis added); United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (D. Mont. 2009)
(referencing Ninth Circuit's decision in Kennedy).
452 Id. at 390-91 (citing and quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358
(1983); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353
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court next found this liberty interest unconstitutionally thwarted
by the mandatory curfew and electronic monitoring conditions of
the AWA, emphatically concluding that the "[r]equired wearing
of an electronic bracelet, every minute of every day, with the
government capable of tracking a person not yet convicted as if
he were a feral animal would be considered a serious limitation
on freedom by most liberty-loving Americans. "" Specifically, the
court explained that
[a] curfew, by its definition, restricts the ability of the defendant
to move about in a public area during substantial periods of
time. The condition of a mandatory curfew with an associated
electronic monitoring bracelet imposed pursuant to the Adam
Walsh Act substantially constrains freedom-of-movement
liberty.
Electronic monitoring devices that inhibit straying beyond
spatial home property limits, like those used to restrain pet
dogs, are intrusive. Their requirement, when mandated and
unnecessary, may constitute excessive bail in particular cases.
Any form of mandatory curfew with electronic monitoring may
infringe the strong liberty interest in freedom of movement.454
The mandated yet unnecessary electronic monitoring
condition in Polouizzi "provide [d] near certainty of erroneous
deprivation of defendant's liberty interest," which the court
deemed an unacceptable result, particularly in the total absence
of congressional findings justifying this intrusion.45 5 And despite
F.3d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the "right to free movement is a vital
component of life in an open society"); Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d
Cir. 1990) ("[The Constitution ... protects the right to travel freely within a single
state."); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 600-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("[An
individual's right to freedom of movement among locations and the right to remain
in a public place are fundamental to our sense of personal liberty protected by the
Constitution."); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
("[Lliberty pending trial is the private interest at issue, and that interest is
significant.") (alterations in original)).
... Id. at 389; see also State v. Stines, 683 S.E. 2d 411, 413-14 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009).
4 Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 391, 394-95. As previously noted, Title II, section 216 of the Adam
Walsh Act-the section that amended the applicable provisions of the Bail Reform
Act-provides no support for those amendments. Nothing in the congressional record
supports the addition of the mandatory conditions to the Bail Reform Act. See
generally Children's Safety and Violent Crime Reduction Act of 2006, 152 CONG.
REC. S8012-02 (daily ed. July 20, 2006); see also Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 392
("[D]espite congressional debate and findings regarding other provisions of the Adam
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recognizing the compelling governmental interest in preventing
harm to children, the court refused to read into a silent
congressional record the assumption that district courts would
only impose conditions for defendants if they were mandatory
rather than discretionary. 6 To be sure, actual congressional
findings regarding the Amendments would "be afforded great
weight, but a per se rule that the governmental interest
always outweighs the constitutional right of liberty" would
systematically deny due process to every arrestee, and patently
so for those unlikely to re-offend or pose a threat to the
community.457 The unfortunate result of this "basic defect" of
mandatory application was, in the court's words, an "unjustified
burden[] on all accused persons, even those who present no
risks."458
Polouizzi provides a textbook example of how the AWA
Amendments fail the Mathews test and violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. All agreed that Mr. Polouizzi
presented none of the aforementioned risks.459 The government
provided no evidence that he required an electronic tracking
bracelet to protect children or the public, nor did it refute the
evidence presented regarding the lack of danger he posed.4 60
Furthermore, there was no evidence that any presumed
Walsh Act, there were none with respect to electronic monitoring."); United States v.
Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ('[T]he Adam Walsh [Act]
contains no such express legislative findings or evidence.')" (alterations in original)).
The only mention of the mandatory conditions came from Senator Hatch of Utah,
who was speaking to post-conviction release when he suggested the addition of
electronic monitoring. See 152 CONG. REC. S8012-02, 8017 (daily ed. July 20, 2006)
(statement of Senator Hatch) ("If we send Martha Stewart home with an electronic
bracelet on her ankle, we can't do that to violent sex offenders . . ?").
4.6 Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 391-92 (quoting Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at
601); see also id. at 393 ("There is no reason to suspect that courts will refrain from
imposing necessary restrictions in individual cases as required to protect children.");
United States v. Stephens, 669 F. Supp. 2d 960, 967-68 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (noting
similarly), rev'd and remanded, 594 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
45 Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 392-93.
151 Id. at 391-92, 394 (citing United States v. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073,
rev'd in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495 (D. Neb. 2009); United States v. Smedley,
611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (E.D. Mo. 2009) ("Absent any individualized determination,
there is simply no way of knowing whether the deprivation of liberty is warranted or
wholly erroneous."); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (W.D. Tex.
2008) ("[W]ithout a judicial determination . .. there is no means of knowing whether
the deprivation is erroneous or warranted.") (alterations in original)).
459 Id. at 392.
46 See id. at 384-85, 392.
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government interest in protecting children would be diminished
by allowing the court to impose particular pretrial conditions as
necessary, after providing for a hearing and conducting "an
individual [ized] evaluation of the need" for those conditions, as it
does in all other cases under the Bail Reform Act.46 '
Application of the AWA Amendments, however, provided
no such discretion in Mr. Polouizzi's case. Instead, it imposed
"a mandatory limit on freedom of [the] accused" upon
a mere charge alone, "without permitting an 'adversary
hearing[,]'. . . testimony, cross-examination, judicial weighing, or
burden of proof," despite the fact that such readily available
protections would have made plain that not all the conditions
were necessary-a quintessential erroneous deprivation of his
Fifth Amendment rights.' The court found the AWA
Amendments unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Polouizzi, and
ordered that electronic monitoring be discontinued after a ten-
day appeal window, which was never exercised by the
government.463
6. Fifth Amendment Summary
Fifth Amendment challenges to the AWA Amendments have
been overwhelmingly successful. Eleven of the fourteen district
courts that have addressed such a challenge have ruled in favor
of the defendant,46 4 and only two of those decisions have been
461 Id. at 393; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)-(g) (2006 & Supp. II).
462 Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 394. As the Polouizzi court explained:
The basic defect of the Adam Walsh Act, as applied, is that it imposes a
mandatory limit on freedom of an accused without permitting an
"adversary hearing." Procedural protections embodied in the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 and required by Salerno are far richer than those provided by
the Adam Walsh Act. Under the latter, there can be no hearing, testimony,
cross-examination, judicial weighing, or burden of proof.
Id. (citations omitted).
4 Id. at 395. In light of this ruling, and the rule of sequential analysis, the
court did not address the defendant's facial challenge to the AWA. See id. (citing
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 (2008)).
14 United States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d _, 2011 WL 7451512, at *9
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011); Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d. at 394; United States v.
Stephens, 669 F. Supp. 2d 960, 969 (N.D. Iowa 2009), rev'd and remanded, 594 F.3d
1033 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rueb, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (D. Neb),
rev'd in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50495 (D. Neb. 2009); United States v. Merritt,
612 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (D. Neb.), rev'd in part, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73458 (D.
Neb. 2009); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 977 (E.D. Mo. 2009);
United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United
States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp 2d 1221, 1230-31 (W.D. Wash. 2008), motion to
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reversed.4 65 All but two federal courts to have applied the
Mathews balancing test have ruled in favor of the defendant.4 66
This success has been more than academic, as the trial courts in
Crowell, Vujnovich, Torres, Rueb, Merritt, Smedley, Kennedy,
Stephens, Arzberger, and Polouizzi resolved the cases before them
by striking down the AWA Amendments and applying § 3142(c)
of the Bail Reform Act as it existed prior to the Amendments:
whether by removing the mandatory conditions upon a particular
defendant's motion (Vujnovich, Rueb, Merritt, Smedley, Polouizzi
and the district courts in Kennedy and Stephens), by refusing to
add the mandatory conditions to a prior release order (Crowell
and Torres), or by ordering an individualized determination of
the appropriate conditions of release, notwithstanding the
unambiguous terms of the undesignated paragraph (Arzberger).
Indeed, so tortured is the tale of the AWA Amendments that even
a majority of those decisions upholding its constitutionality used
extra-textual relief to do so. 46 7
revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated and remanded, 327
F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); United States v. Torres,
566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597-99 (W.D. Tex. 2008); United States v. Vujnovich, No. 07-
20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2007), motion to
revoke order denied, 2008 WL 687203 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2008); United States v.
Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *8-
10 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006); see also supra notes 18 and 337 and accompanying text.
" See Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1038-39; Kennedy, 327 F. App'x at 707
(unpublished memorandum).
0 See United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032-34 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (applying Mathews test but upholding constitutionality of the Amendments).
The Mathews test was not applied by the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy, the Eighth
Circuit in Stephens, the District of Montana in Cossey, the District of Rhode Island
in Rondeau, or the District of Nebraska in Crites. See United States v. Rondeau, Cr.
No. 10-147-S, 2010 WL 5253847 (D.R.I. Dec. 16, 2010); Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033;
United States v. Crites, No. 8:09CR262, 2009 WL 2982782 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2009),
affd, 406 F. App'x 88 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881
(D. Mont. 2009); Kennedy, 327 F. App'x 706. Furthermore, although Frederick
applied the Mathews test, this Article distinguishes Frederick from this group on its
facts-that is, as an extreme case not involving viewing-only charges, but rather,
aggravated sexual abuse of a child. See United States v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-
RAL, 2010 WL 2179102, at *1 n.1 (D.S.D. May 27, 2010) ("[Tlhis is the first
constitutional challenge to the Adam Walsh Act, under the Due Process Clause,
made by a defendant charged with sexually abusing a child."); see also id. at *9
(holding that AWA Amendments "do not deprive defendants charged with
aggravated sexual abuse 'of... an individualized determination [as to] whether
detention or release is appropriate'" (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039)).
" See Stephens, 594 F.3d at 1039 (same); Frederick, 2010 WL 2179102, at *9
("Construing the Adam Walsh Act to require a court to exercise its discretion, when
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Decisions such as Torres and Smedley serve as a warning to
the government that recycling its strategy in Eighth Amendment
challenges will not prevail in the context of the Fifth. The mere
fact that a person is charged with a crime falling under the
undesignated paragraph is not enough to require predetermined
conditions of release. The Fifth Amendment requires more. The
government cannot meet the Mathews test for facial challenges
by making a Salerno "no set of circumstances" argument when
such circumstances are entirely foreclosed by the AWA
Amendments. Nor can it satisfy Mathews in as-applied
challenges by simply pointing to a compelling government
purpose or insisting that certain conditions of release are
outweighed by Congress's interest regarding safety or future
dangerousness. Instead, it must be prepared to explain how
removing the judiciary's traditional discretion in determining
individualized conditions
of release furthers its stated interest, how the mandatory
conditions protect against the obvious risks of erroneous
deprivation, and how the return of basic due process protections
would place an unacceptable burden on the government.
Similar to the Eighth Amendment solution provided above,4 68
Congress can solve this problem by either repealing the
undesignated paragraph of the AWA Amendments or by
including within that paragraph a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the mandatory conditions unless the defendant can meet
the burden of establishing that application of the conditions to
him would violate the Mathews balancing test. Alternatively,
applying the mandatory release conditions ... avoids the need to pass on the
constitutionality of the Act and its amendments as applied here." (emphasis added));
Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 891 (similar, referencing Ninth Circuit's rationale in
Kennedy); Kennedy, 327 F. App'x at 707 (holding that the pretrial conditions of the
undesignated paragraph are not mandatory, but rather, that the AWA Amendments
"require the district court to exercise its discretion . . . in applying the mandatory
release conditions" (emphasis added)); see also Rondeau, 2010 WL 5253847, at *2
(same). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II) (undesignated paragraph)
(noting that "any release order shall contain, at a minimum a condition of electronic
monitoring and [five others]" (emphasis added)). One of these decisions ultimately
contradicted itself when faced with the actual terms of the undesignated paragraph.
See Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (explaining that AWA Amendments mandate
pretrial release conditions "that must include, at a minimum, electronic monitoring
and the five specific conditions. The statutory mandate is unambiguous." (emphasis
added)).
4 See discussion supra Part III.A.7.
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Congress could leave that provision untouched and instead create
a legislative record in support of the AWA Amendments,
complete with empirical findings as to the necessity and efficacy
of each mandatory condition for persons charged with various sex
offenses against children, or perhaps with evidence showing that
courts would refuse to require the conditions for such defendants
if they were discretionary rather than mandatory. These
detailed findings would in turn bolster Congress's careful
crafting of the amended statute.
C. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. Overview
Our Constitution diffuses power to secure liberty.4 69 No one
branch has the authority to transfer its power to another branch
or take another's for itself, particularly when reallocation would
threaten individual rights.4 7 0 The separation of powers doctrine
was designed to prevent this risk by implementing the
"fundamental insight" that "[c]oncentration of power in the
hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty."47 ' An
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)
("[Within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.").
470 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-82.
41 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary, in
the same hands . .. may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
(alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed., 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (concluding that the
purpose of separation of powers was "not to promote efficiency" or fast
constitutionalism by the political branches, so much as it was "to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power"). It is generally accepted that the separation of powers is
not an abstract principle. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) ("The
principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the
minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."); E. Donald Elliot, Why Our Separation of
Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989)
(arguing that the separation of powers doctrine was considered by the Framers as
"the foundation of constitutional law"). Indeed, "[slo convinced were the Framers
that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at first they did not consider a
Bill of Rights necessary." Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513, 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 536-
43 (1969)).
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independent judiciary, tasked with interpreting a Constitution
that is supreme over every branch,4 72 safeguards these individual
liberties by enforcing constitutional restrictions on its coequal
branches.4 73 The Constitution returns the favor by vesting the
judicial power in Article III courts and no one else, thereby
restricting Congress's ability to legislate away liberties that are
not subject to a majority vote.7
The separation of powers doctrine also balances our
tripartite system by prohibiting the political branches from
encroaching upon the powers conferred to the unelected federal
judiciary.475 Explaining that Section 1 of Article III "serves both
472 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803) (stating that the Constitution is "a superior, paramount law" and that
"[those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule."); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-
10 (1801); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1996) ("The power to
interpret the laws is an incident to thlel case- or controversy-deciding function;
courts must interpret because they must decide.").
47 See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 870 (1960)
("[The judiciary was made independent because it has ... the primary
responsibility and duty of giving force and effect to constitutional liberties and
limitations upon the executive and legislative branches."); see also Metro. Wash.
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272
(1991) ("The structure of our Government as conceived by the Framers of our
Constitution disperses the federal power among the three branches[, ... placing
both substantive and procedural limitations on each. The ultimate purpose of this
separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed."); Rebecca
L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1515-16
(1991) (explaining how the separation of powers doctrine is designed to protect
individual liberty, and arguing that "when government action is challenged on
separation-of-powers grounds, [courts] should consider the potential effect of the
arrangement on individual due-process interests").
47 See U.S. CONST. amends. I-IX; see also, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (noting that the "very purpose" of having
constitutional rights is "to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts"); id. (explaining
that such rights "may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections").
7 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 336 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) for the
proposition that the Founders enshrined separation of powers principles in the
Constitution because of past legislative interference with the judiciary); id.
("Jefferson observed that members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia
had not been prevented from assuming judicial power, and '[t]hey have accordingly
in many instances decided rights which should have been left to judiciary
controversy.'" (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 336)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 526-27
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to protect 'the role of the independent judiciary within the
constitutional scheme of tripartite government,' and to safeguard
litigants' 'right to have claims decided before judges who are free
from potential domination by other branches of government,' "476
the Supreme Court has explicitly vowed to condemn any
enactment that "impermissibly threatens the institutional
integrity of the Judicial Branch."477  This threat is acted upon,
and the separation of powers is violated, usually in one of two
ways: One branch interferes with another's performance of its
constitutionally assigned function,7 or one branch usurps a
function constitutionally entrusted to the other.4 79 In the context
of our hypothetical, both categories may very well apply:
Congress, through the AWA Amendments, could be both
interfering with and usurping Constitutional and common law
authority long possessed by the federal judiciary in the bail
setting.
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (recognizing the importance of an
independent judiciary to the proper maintenance of separated powers); David P.
Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV.
441, 460 n.108 (1983) (explaining that Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution "was
designed as a protection for the parties from the risk of legislative or executive
pressure on judicial decision").
476 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
(citations omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 583 (1985); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
7 Id. at 851; see also United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (noting that
in separation-of-powers challenges "specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we
have expressed our vigilance against two dangers: first, that the Judicial Branch
neither be assigned nor allowed tasks that are more properly accomplished by
[other] branches, and, second, that no provision of law impermissibly threatens the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch" (citation omitted) (quoting Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 656 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 478 U.S. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, "[elven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself,... the
separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the
performance of its constitutional duties." Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757
(1996).
47 See generally Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 757.
47 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88
(1952); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-48 (1871). This may also
include scenarios when a branch attempts to give its power to another. See, e.g.,
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, at 449 (declaring Line Item Veto Act of
1996 unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment Clause).
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Of the seventeen district court decisions that address the
constitutionality of the AWA Amendments, only five analyze the
separation of powers argument. Crowell, Vujnovich and Kennedy
concluded that the doctrine was violated; Gardner and Arzberger
held that it was not.4 80 No court of appeals has addressed this
issue.
The Gardner court concluded that the AWA Amendments
constituted permissible regulation of a field "already immersed in
legislative prescription [that] does not substantially alter the
fundamental [constitutional] function of the court."4s' The court
stressed that under the facts before it, Congress's imposition of
the mandatory conditions did not divest courts of the
"fundamental role of determining whether an arrestee is to be
detained or released" pending trial. 48 2 Arzberger added little to
this line of reasoning, other than to hold that the Amendments
did not produce any of the three types of legislative
encroachments on the judicial branch that usually violate the
separation of powers: prescribing a rule of decision without
amending applicable law, vesting review of prior Article III
decisions in executive branch officials, or requiring federal courts
to reopen final judgments.4 8 3
The court in Crowell, however, came to a different
conclusion. Explaining that "the setting of bail in federal
criminal cases, with minor exceptions, has been recognized as
representing the quintessential exercise of judicial power," it
found that Congress had unconstitutionally deprived courts of
this fundamental role by mandating certain release conditions
480 Compare United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp 2d 1221, 1231-32 (W.D.
Wash. 2008) (holding that the AWA Amendments violate the separation of powers
doctrine), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated
and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum) and
United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M-1095, 06-CR-291E(F), 06-CR-304S(F), 2006 WL
3541736, at *10-11 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (same), with United States v. Arzberger,
592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding no separation of powers
violation), and United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035-36 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (same). Vujnovich also held that the undesignated paragraph of the AWA
Amendments violated the separation of powers doctrine, see United States v.
Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01-CM-DJW, 2007 WL 4125901, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 20,
2007), but because the court summarily adopted the Crowell analysis, the Vujnovich
decision will not be discussed here.
4 Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
482 Id.
1s Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 607; see infra notes 487-500 and accompanying
text.
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for all defendants charged with crimes involving "minor
victims."484 The district court in Kennedy echoed this
conclusion, explaining that the mandatory conditions of the
AWA Amendments "go much further" than the traditional role
Congress has played in shaping the bail process by requiring
predetermined release conditions in all cases, substantially
burdening fundamental liberty interests while also precluding
courts from making individualized determinations to ensure such
deprivations are warranted.4 85
2. AWA Analysis
The Supreme Court has generally recognized three types of
legislative encroachments on the judicial branch that violate the
separation of powers.486  First, Congress cannot vest review of
prior decisions by Article III courts in executive branch
officials.487 Second, Congress cannot interfere with the judicial
power to decide cases or controversies by commanding federal
courts to revise or reopen final judgments.48 8 Third, under
United States v. Klein,48 9 Congress may not "prescribe rules of
decision to the Judicial Department .. . in cases pending before
it" without amending applicable law.4 90
The mandatory conditions of the AWA Amendments do not
fit the first category, as they apply to prospective bail
determinations, not prior judicial decisions, and cannot transfer
to the executive branch what has already been decided by a
court. Nor is the second category applicable, for the AWA
Amendments do not revise or reopen final judgments by imposing
interim conditions of release awaiting trial.4 91
There is room for argument in the third category. First and
most devastating for defendants, however, is the fact that the
Klein prohibition arises only when Congress has not amended
484 Crowell, 2006 WL 3541736, at *11.
485 Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
486 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995).
7 Id. (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792)); Chi. & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 118 (1948).
4s Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699-700 (1997); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218.
48 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
490 Id. at 146.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (noting that a final judgment is not revised or reopened simply by "altering the
interim conditions of release pending trial").
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the law that underlies the litigation.4 9 2 Here, Congress amended
the applicable release conditions of the Bail Reform Act through
the AWA Amendments.4 93 Thus any effect of the Amendments on
pending cases, the argument goes, is solely a result of a change in
the underlying law, not Congress's impermissible attempt to
dictate a specific rule of decision in a particular category of bail
cases.4 94  This was a predicate holding in both Gardner and
Arzberger.49 5
A second feather in the government's cap is the history of
statutory efforts to regulate bail. As the Gardner court
explained, "Congress has long had a substantial hand in shaping
the bail process,"49 6 from the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the
present.49 7 Setting and conditioning bail, like prescribing
criminal sentences and sentencing factors, 4 98 is merely another
example of permissible cooperation between coordinate
branches. 49 9  That Congress, through the AWA Amendments,
492 See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 ("Whatever the precise scope of Klein,
however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold
when Congress 'amend[s] applicable law.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992))).
493 United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[O]nce
Congress has amended the underlying law, any separation of powers concern
evaporates."); Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (similar).
494 Furthermore, it cannot seriously be argued that Congress may not override a
judicial interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 2-3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071; Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-259, § 6, 102 Stat. 28, 31; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337, 424-41,
450-55 (1991) (noting over one hundred examples of Congress overriding the
Supreme Court's interpretation of statutes between 1967 and 1990); Abner J. Mikva
& Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729, 730-31
(1991) ("Congressional overruling of a Supreme Court decision is not a particularly
exceptional event.").
49- See Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07; Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-
36.
496 Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
497 See id. (noting that Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the denial of bail in
capital cases, and that the Bail Reform Act limits the availability of bail); see also
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966), repealed by
18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1983); Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §203(a),
98 Stat. 1976, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006 & Supp. II).
4" See Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
4" Id. (noting that while "the separation of governmental powers into three
coordinate branches is essential to the preservation of liberty," the Founders "did not
intend for the three branches to remain autonomous" (quoting United States v.
Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (similar).
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decided to mandate "judicially imposed" conditions of release for
specific arrestees does not amount to a separation of powers
violation. Indeed, were the opposite true, the Bail Reform Act
itself might violate the separation of powers, as it directs what a
court "shall" do in several circumstances. 00 Accordingly, the
mere fact that an amended bail statute contains mandatory
pretrial release conditions in certain cases is not enough to
violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Unless, of course, the result is to rob the bail court's
fundamental role in determining detention or individualized
conditions of release.50' Although a court is generally without
authority to decide new cases based on expired law, when judicial
non-reviewability is the result of the questioned amendment, the
bargain between branches may become unconstitutional. 0 In
such an instance, Congress has, in effect, concentrated the bail
power in its own hands by assuming the (judicial) role of
conclusively determining the conditions of pretrial release. Our
hypothetical demonstrates that defendants should focus on this
opening to attack the timing of and degree to which the AWA
Amendments encroach upon quintessential judicial powers
conferred by the Constitution.
As noted above, the Constitution vests federal judicial power
in Article III courts and no one else, thereby restricting
Congress's ability to legislate away liberties that, by their very
nature, are not subject to a majority vote. 03 Naturally then, the
500 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (noting that the judicial officer "shall order the
pretrial release ... unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not
reasonably assure ... [relappearance. . . or will endanger the safety of any other
person or the community.") (emphasis added); id. § 3142(f)(2)(B) ("During a
continuance [of the detention hearing] such person shall be detained.. . ." (emphasis
added)); id. § 3143(b) ("The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been
found guilty of an [enumerated offense] . . be detained [pending appeal] . . . ."
(emphases added)). Furthermore, it is important to note that the Supreme Court did
not consider the separation of powers doctrine in Salerno.
s0 The Gardner court recognized this fact. See Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at
1036.
5" Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("Whatever power the
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive... , it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake." (citing
United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989))).
503 See U.S. CONST. amends. I-IX; supra note 474. This includes not only the
physical liberty deprived by incarceration, but also privacy rights, the freedom of
movement, and the right to remain in a public place, among other liberties. See
supra Part III.B.
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best way to jeopardize these liberties is to cripple their
constitutional guarantor-the independent judiciary. In our first
hypothetical, the AWA requirement that the defendant be placed
on electronic monitoring, coupled with, for example, the inability
to coordinate traditional or GPS monitoring or some other
obstacle to such monitoring,5 0 4 creates a scenario of automatic
detention upon charging. In other words, a supposed mandatory
condition of pretrial release has the effect of barring pretrial
release on any conditions, producing detention by default. What
results is the predicament even Gardner concluded would violate
the separation of powers: a situation in which "Congress
has ... deprived the courts of the fundamental role of
determining whether an arrestee is to be detained or released on
conditions." 0 This is more than the setting and conditioning of
bail, or even the application of a presumption of detention.
Analogies to Gardner and Arzberger would therefore be
504 See United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235 (W.D. Wash.
2009), vacated and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished
memorandum); United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp 2d 1221, 1229 (W.D. Wash.
2008), motion to revoke denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009), vacated
and remanded, 327 F. App'x 706 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); see
also, e.g., STATE OF TENN. BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, MONITORING TENNESSEE'S SEX
OFFENDERS USING GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS: A FOLLOW-UP EVALUATION
3-8 (2008), available at http://www.tn.gov/bopp/Docs/2008-GPS%20follow-up%20
report.pdf (noting several problems and costs associated with GPS monitoring,
including technological complications and the lack of monitoring capability in rural
areas or for indigent defendants); Jonathan Martin, GPS Tracking Beset by
Problems of Terrain, Technology and Time, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A16
(similar; noting that Washington's passive GPS monitoring pilot program
encountered severe geographical limitations, with most of "nearly 4,000 'notices of
violation'" recorded by the devices coming from technical glitches, not actual
violations by the sex offenders); Jesse Jannetta, GPS Monitoring of High-Risk Sex
Offenders 6-7 (Univ. Cal. Irvine Ctr. for Evidence-Based Corr., Working Paper,
2006), available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edulpdflWorkingPaper5106_B.pdf
(noting that GPS systems implemented by California Department of Corrections
pilot program were subject to a real time "lag" of up to twenty minutes between
offense and transmission of notice).
.o. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1036; cf United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863,
874 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Neither Salerno nor any other case authorizes detaining
someone in jail while awaiting trial, or the imposition of special bail conditions,
based merely on the fact of arrest for a particular crime."). In such a case, the AWA
Amendments have clearly removed a defendant's "right to have claims decided
before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government" thereby "impermissibly threaten[ing] the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch" and violating the separation of powers doctrine. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 851 (1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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misplaced, as those decisions extend only to the condition-setting
function of the judiciary and explicitly presume the existence of
proper procedural protections, including the individualized
judicial determinations that narrowly saved the Bail Reform Act
from demise in Salerno.50' Due process performed the work of
the separation of powers doctrine in those cases.507
However, neither Gardner nor Arzberger contemplated
detention by default. In such a case, the AWA Amendments have
clearly removed a defendant's "right to have claims decided
before judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government."50 8  It would certainly place our
tripartite system of separated powers on its head to prevent an
arrestee from challenging the mode of his detention or
" See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-55 (1987); Gardner, 523 F.
Supp. 2d at 1036 (noting that AWA Amendments, by incrementally "mandat[ing]
certain conditions of release ... [have] not deprived the courts of the fundamental
role of determining whether an arrestee is to be detained or released on conditions").
To make its point that the bail-setting function is not the exclusive province of the
judiciary, the Arzberger court invoked Salerno to explain that "Congress may
impinge on the traditionally judicial function of bail setting by declaring that
defendants who meet certain criteria will not be entitled to bail at all." United States
v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 (2008) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755). As
discussed above, however, the result in Salerno was held together by the Supreme
Court's finding that the Bail Reform Act "narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly acute
problem [(i.e., crime committed by arrestees)] in which the Government interests are
overwhelming," Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; "carefully limit[ed] the circumstances
under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes," id. at 747; and
most importantly, mandated a multitude of procedures "specifically designed to
further the accuracy of the [bail court's] determination[s]" on a case-by-case basis,
id. at 751. To this end, the Salerno Court reemphasized that "[tihe arrestee is
entitled to a prompt" and "full-blown adversary hearing," at which "the Government
must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any
person." Id. at 747, 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). Arzberger fails to recognize this
crucial distinction and conflates judicial role with judicial responsibility in the bail
setting. This failure is surprising in light of Arzberger's scathing due process ruling.
See Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
507 See M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 19-
20 (1967) ("The belief that 'due process' is an essential part of constitutional
government is of great antiquity, and it runs parallel with ideas of mixed
government and the separation of powers .... ."); see also Brown, supra note 473, at
1557-65 (concluding that judiciary's primary role in separation of powers cases
should be to protect the due process rights of individuals from the dangers of
arbitrary government, not the institutional interests of the branches of government).
60 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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supervision merely because Congress has already decided for the
Judiciary that he is subject to the same restrictions regardless of
his individual circumstances.
The question ultimately becomes one of degree. If the AWA
Amendments have the effect of mandating detention without any
role for a court in the calculus, the result is reallocation-not
cooperation-at the price of individual rights. 09 In such a
scenario, it is easier to argue that Congress has usurped a
quintessential function constitutionally entrusted to the
Judiciary, and has therefore violated the separation of powers
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Eighty years ago, Justice Brandeis warned us to "be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent," as great dangers to liberty often lurk in the
"insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding."s1 o Five years ago, Congress meant well
in crafting the Adam Walsh Act Amendments to the Bail Reform
Act of 1984,511 but failed to understand the consequences of its
actions. The Amendments were passed without a stated purpose,
a single substantive debate, or a shred of congressional findings.
In drafting the undesignated paragraph of the Amendments,
Congress inserted the term "involves a minor victim" as a
prerequisite to application of the mandatory pretrial release
conditions which, ironically, makes them less mandatory than
Congress may have wished.5 12 Furthermore, while Congress did
not intend to overrule Salerno by adding the mandatory
conditions, it inexplicably removed precisely what had saved the
Bail Reform Act from an Eighth Amendment violation in that
'' Cf Brown, supra note 473, at 1565-66 ("[The federal judiciary's] role in cases
involving separated powers, no less than in those involving the Bill of Rights, ought
to be as vigilant arbiter of process for the purpose of protecting individuals from the
dangers of arbitrary government. When exercises of power by one branch of
government, or by coalitions of two or more acting together, threaten the integrity of
government process, then the Court should consider interfering to restore a balance
of power, a balance of process.").
o Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
" See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, 120 Stat. 587.
51 See id. § 216, 120 Stat. at 617.
[Vol. 85:13431446
2011] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AWA AMENDMENTS
very case-the requirement that the applicable conditions be
proven case-by-case, and in every such case, that the Judiciary
would determine what was "excessive" in its calculation of
appropriate bail.13 As a result of this congressional failure,
liberty-infringing pretrial release conditions are triggered by a
mere charge, rather than the arrestee's particularized risk of
danger, re-offense, or flight. Order is exalted at the cost of
liberty.
Congress's drafting problem also violates the Fifth
Amendment due process rights of every person charged with one
of the enumerated "minor victim" crimes,514 or at least makes an
as-applied attack easy for defendants charged with viewing-only
offenses who are not provided a meaningful, individualized
judicial determination of the propriety of the mandatory
conditions of release. Eleven of the thirteen district courts that
have applied the Mathews balancing test in this situation have
ruled in favor of the defendant.1 All eleven that have struck
down the AWA Amendments have resolved Fifth Amendment
tensions by simply applying § 3142 of the Bail Reform Act as it
existed prior to the AWA's addition of the undesignated
paragraph of subsection (c)(1)(B), complete with an
individualized hearing and rebuttable presumption that no set of
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of children and the
community from those charged with an AWA-enumerated
offense.16 Indeed, even the two courts that have upheld the
Amendments under Mathews tried to do the same by ignoring
the terms of the undesignated paragraph and applying a similar
513 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. II) (undesignated paragraph);
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-55 (1987).
514 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (undesignated paragraph).
115 See cases cited supra note 18; see also discussion supra Part III.B.1-6 and
note 466; United States v. Karper, - F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 7451512, at *5-6
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011). As mentioned above, Karper was decided just as this
Article was sent to press.
516 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)-(2) (providing rebuttable presumption in
favor of detention to assure reappearance and safety of community of defendants
previously convicted of certain violent crimes), with § 3142(c)(1)(B) (providing
irrebuttable presumption that all listed conditions are required to assure
reappearance of sex offense arrestee and safety of community); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2005 version).
1447
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
version of the unamended Bail Reform Act.' The latter
approach fails to answer the question of how a case-by-case
determination of the applicable conditions is even possible when
the Amendments explicitly state that the bail court must impose
each condition, even if the court finds those conditions are not
warranted.
Judicial discretion is either the missing piece or Trojan horse
in these cases. While rulings alternate between saving and
striking down the Amendments, judges on both sides of the issue
emphasize the bail court's discretion as the remedial key. This
again raises the issue of whether the AWA Amendments as
written provide for such discretion. Clearly they do not.
Nevertheless, a few appellate courts-insulated from the bail
world-have answered this question in the affirmative in order to
save the statute from constitutional attack. But by reading into
the Amendments a discretion that does not exist, these courts are
doing more to harm the statute than save it. By leaning too
heavily on the magistrate judge's "discretion" in applying each
"mandatory" condition to fit each defendant's needs, 18 these
appellate courts have increased the risk that the criminal
defense bar will use the Amendments as a sword, threatening an
as-applied challenge whenever an individualized assessment for
each and every possible circumstance is lacking. This will
require bail courts to constantly tinker with the conditions of
release in every AWA case involving a minor victim-ironically,
an exercise the Amendments were designed to eliminate.
Congress meant well but failed miserably. Consequently,
our criminal justice system now provides fewer procedural
protections to first-time arrestees of sex offenses than it does to
arrestees previously convicted of crimes warranting life
imprisonment or death sentences.519  Congress can fix this
mess by repealing the undesignated paragraph of the AWA
Amendments or by including within that paragraph a rebuttable
presumption of mandatory application of the pretrial release
517 See United States v. Frederick, No. 10-30021-RAL, 2010 WL 2179102, at *9
(D.S.D. May 27, 2010); United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d. 1025, 1032-34
(N.D. Cal. 2007).
si See United States v. Peeples, 630 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kennedy,
327 F. App'x 706, 707 (9th Cir. May 6, 2009).
511 See supra note 516 and accompanying text.
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conditions unless the defendant can meet the burden of
establishing, during a full-blown individualized hearing, that
application of one (or all) of the conditions would violate the
Salerno test under the Eighth Amendment or the Mathews test
under the Fifth Amendment. The mere fact that a person is
charged with a crime falling under the undesignated paragraph
is simply not enough. The Constitution requires more.
In the alternative, Congress should consider creating a
detailed legislative record in support of the AWA Amendments,
complete with findings that establish the necessity of each
mandatory condition for persons charged with an AWA-
enumerated offense.5 20 Questions posed throughout this Article
will need to be answered. How, for example, would home
confinement or curfew for those charged with child pornography
possession offenses further the AWA goal of preventing child
pornography and promoting internet safety? Does statistical
evidence support the conclusion that the risks of danger to
children are too high to make the conditions discretionary? Are
there more appropriate pretrial release tools to protect children
in these scenarios? By its very nature, this process might result
in much-needed refinements to the mandatory conditions
themselves. Congress could then attempt to bolster the
legislative record with evidence that courts would not require the
conditions for defendants accused of sex crimes against children
if they were discretionary rather than mandatory, a finding
which would make additional procedural safeguards too costly
under both Salerno and Mathews. Any combination of these
steps would more effectively speak to the strength of the
government's interest and provide the prosecution with more
than a fighting chance in court.
A lack of individual assessment and discretion pervades the
Adam Walsh Act. Nevertheless, despite the steady rise of legal
challenges to its various provisions,52 purposeful noncompliance
520 This will likely require evidence of the risk of future danger against children
by particular arrestees, rather than the mere assumption that all persons charged
with an AWA-enumerated offense must have their constitutional liberty interests
restrained in order to protect children from sexual attacks.
,21 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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with its mandates by several states," and mounting evidence of
the social and financial costs associated with expanding the war
on sex crimes,5 23 it is unlikely that any meaningful policy reform
will take place at the national level.524 One of the purposes of
this Article, however, is to point out that not every problem
created by the AWA needs a grand solution. While zeal can
sometimes cloud the judgment of beneficent lawmakers, it can
also be employed to make a well-intentioned law more
reasonable, functional, and fair. By making the aforementioned
changes to the AWA Amendments, Congress can safeguard the
pretrial rights of arrestees, prevent future judicial decisions
casting doubt on the constitutionality of the Amendments, and
stave off the argument that it has violated the separation of
powers by depriving courts of their fundamental role in
determining whether an arrestee should be detained or released
on conditions.
522 See Yung, supra note 17, at 479 ("[Several states have decided] not to comply
with some AWA requirements," which comes with a penalty of "10% of funds
authorized under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.... Interestingly, every state that has studied the costs of compliance has
determined that noncompliance is substantially cheaper." (citing Amy Borror, Sex
Offender Registration, CQ CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Mar. 10, 2009)); Richard G.
Wright, From Wetterling to Walsh: The Growth of Federalization in Sex Offender
Policy, 21 FED. SENT'G. REP. 124, 130 (2008) (examining Justice Policy Institute
research which concludes that AWA-implementation "may cost states ten times
more than they would lose in federal crime funds").
523 See Yung, supra note 17 at 447-78; Wright, supra note 522, at 131 ("Despite
the lack of empirically demonstrated efficacy, untold financial costs, and faulty
promises of sexual assault prevention, the politics of sex offender laws continue to
dominate the policy debate.").
524 See Logan, supra note 20, at 1012 ("Contemporary politicians, as is well
known, do their utmost to out-tough one another with respect to sex offenders. As a
result, any members of Congress who might have successfully pushed for mitigation
of the AWA's onerous regime were absent from the scene."); Yung, supra note 17, at
476 ("The fact that most sex offender statutes are passed with neither dissent nor
debate makes any evidence-based policy reform unlikely to take hold."); cf Wright,
supra note 522, at 127 ("[R]eason and research are secondary factors in the passage
of sex offender laws."). This problem is neither new nor unique to sex crimes. See,
e.g., Yung, supra note 17, at 473 ("[Elxisting criminal laws are not given much
attention by legislatures on a regular basis. Laws last for decades or centuries
without reform. Very few interest groups focus on criminal law reform so there are
not substantial political incentives for politicians to tinker with existing policy."
(citing Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 219, 220 (2003))).
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